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Introduction 
 
The view that perception is a form of mental representation is widely shared in the philosophy 
of mind. This view can be called an intentionalism about perception. Perception represents 
something and has an intentional content. Mental representations can be true or false, they can 
be accurate or in inaccurate. If intentionalism about perception is true, then perception can be 
accurate or inaccurate, can deceive us or accurately represent external things and properties. 
In that case perceptual states have a content which can be satisfied by external conditions. It 
has been widely discussed what the content of perception may be. Is it a conceptual or a non-
conceptual content; is it a propositional or non-propositional content? If it is propositional, 
what kind of proposition can specify the content of perception?  
 But recently a deeper conflict appeared in the philosophy of perception, namely 
whether perception is a form of mental representation at all, whether it has content at all. 
Relationalism claims that perception is a direct relation to external objects and properties and 
that it involves no relation to a content. As such a direct relation, perception can neither be 
accurate nor inaccurate. The relation can just obtain or not obtain. Relationalists reject 
intentionalism about perceptual states. Furthermore they claim that it has been accepted and 
presupposed without much argument that perceptual states are mental representations. Due to 
this controversy between intentionalism and relationalism, the discussion on the content of 
perception has increasingly shifted from the question about the nature of perceptual content to 
the question about the reasons there are to suppose that perception has content.  
 The central problem in the present dissertation will be this question whether 
perception has content. It will examine the arguments relationalists present for rejecting the 
representational view of perception, i.e. the content view. The position defended here will be 
that the arguments against intentionalism, against the content view about perception, are 
insufficient. They do not show that perceptions are not mental representations. They are 
insufficient to reject the content view about perception. 
 The aim of the book is therefore to defend and develop a coherent theory of perceptual 
content. Representations are defined by the feature that they can be true or false, accurate or 
inaccurate under certain conditions. They have content and it is their content which gives the 
accuracy conditions (or truth conditions) of the representation. A representation is accurate if 
the world satisfies the conditions fixed by their content. I will evaluate the arguments for and 
against intentionalism, the position that perceptual states are such representations having 
accuracy conditions.  
 The central argument for intentionalism is the fact that representations imply the 
 9
possibility of error. Representation implies the possibility of misrepresentation. Erroneous 
perceptual representation seems to be necessary to account for perceptual illusions, i.e. 
perceptual experiences of objects which seem to deceive us about the actual properties of the 
object we see. For relationalism, perceptual experience is a relation to the seen object and its 
properties. We can see an object we are related to or we can fail to see it because we fail to be 
related to it. But we cannot represent falsely. Relationalism permits only to account for seeing 
and not seeing, seeing and blindness. In cases of blindness, we do not see an object or a 
certain property of the object. We fail to stand in a relation to that object or property, but we 
do not falsely represent that object. But relationalism cannot use false representations to 
account for illusions. Relationalism will therefore treat usual cases of illusion as cases where 
we fail to see because we are not appropriately related to an object or its properties. It will 
reduce cases of illusion to cases of not seeing, cases of blindness.  
 A central argument against relationalism and for intentionalism will be that we need 
the concept of perceptual representation and of erroneous representation to account for 
illusions. In cases of failures to see, we need to distinguish blindness and illusion, not seeing 
and seeing falsely. But only intentionalism can make such a distinction and relationalism 
cannot due to its lack of a concept of misrepresentation and inaccurate content. In the 
following chapters I will carefully distinguish between cases of seeing, not seeing and seeing 
falsely, i. e. seeing, blindness and illusion, in order to account for the diversity of our 
perceptual experience. Intentionalism and relationalism will be evaluated for their capacity to 
account for this diversity of our perceptual experience. The following arguments in this book 
are not restricted to visual experience, but apply to perception in general, therefore also to 
hearing, deafness and auditory illusion and the other sensory modalities.1  
 After a first mainly introductory chapter explaining the notion of perceptual 
representation, the book divides in two parts. A first part (chapter 2 and 3) evaluates and 
criticizes the arguments presented against the notion of perceptual representation. Chapter two 
evaluates Alva Noë´s enactivism, a position which is skeptical against the classical view of 
perceptual representation, but which does not per se reject the notion of perceptual content. 
Chapter three evaluates relationalism, a position which rejects that perception is 
representational and has content. This first part is conceived as the critical part of the book in 
the sense that it presents arguments against the discussed positions, enactivism and 
relationalism. 
                                                 
1 The title “Seeing, Blindness and illusion“ seems to restrict the argument of the dissertation to visual perception. 
This is not intended. Unfortunately there is no general word for not-perceiving (blindness, deafness etc.) 
applicable to all perceptual modalities, therefore I used in the title only terms referring to vision. 
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 A second part of the book (chapter 4 and 5) is constructive in the sense that it presents 
a theory of perceptual representation and of perceptual content which avoids the relationalist 
objections. One chapter (chapter 4) develops the criteria which permit to attribute content to 
perceptual states and one chapter (chapter 5) develops a theory of propositional content for 
perception, a theory of the specific components of perceptual content. The five chapters of the 
present book propose a positive reconstruction of a representational, or intentional, theory of 
perception, given the objections of relationalism and some other skeptical arguments against 
the intentionality of perception. I give a brief overview of the content of these chapters.  
 Chapter one is mainly introductory and expository of the notion of perceptual 
representation as it was developed in the representational theory of the mind and as it was 
applied to perception. The chapter gives a definition of perception and perceptual states and 
then characterizes the notion of representation as it was developed in the philosophy of mind 
in the last forty years. Representation is defined here as a state which has intentionality. It is 
shown how that concept of representation was applied to perception and compares that view 
of perception to the theories in perceptual psychology which also use “representations” as 
explanatory concepts. The chapter shows the similarities of the psychological use of 
“representation” with the notion developed in philosophy, but emphasizes also some 
differences. And the main challenges for the representational view of perception are briefly 
described.  
 The second chapter discusses the view of perceptual content developed in Noë´s 
enactivism. Noë ultimately rejects the intentionality of perception, but his enactivism per se is 
compatible with the intentionality of perception. The chapter focuses on the argument that 
perceptual content depends on sensorimotor activity and knowledge and the thesis that we are 
“blind” without these sensorimotor components. So, the chapter focuses on Noë’s description 
of “experiential blindness” as the central evidence for enactivism. I show in that chapter that 
there is no evidence for such a dependency of perceptual content on sensorimotor knowledge 
and that the evidence Noë provides for enactivism, namely the phenomenon of “experiential 
blindness” is unable to support his point about enactivism. It is unable to show that we are 
“blind” and have no perceptual content without sensorimotor knowledge. 
 The third chapter addresses the central arguments against the intentionality of 
perception developed by relationalism. It analyzes the central conflict between intentionalism 
and relationalism about perception. The main focus is laid here on the account of illusion 
given by relationalists. As for relationalists perception has no intentionality, it cannot falsely 
represent and does not have a content which fails to be satisfied by external condition. 
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Illusions must either be explained by a failure to see which does not involve error, a form of 
not-seeing (or blindness) instead of a false representation, or it must be explained by 
erroneous beliefs, i.e. intentional states which are not perceptual. I will show that some, but 
not all cases of illusions can be reduced to blindness (not-seeing without seeing falsely). To 
differentiate these two failures to see, blindness and illusion, the distinction between the 
accuracy and the acuity of perception is introduced. Illusion is characterized by a lack of 
accuracy, blindness by either an absence of perceptual representation or a lack of acuity. The 
chapter emphasizes also the difficulty to reduce illusions to false beliefs. 
 The chapters 4 and 5 are closely connected. They present a theory of perceptual 
representation which is able to avoid the objections of relationalism and the skepticism about 
intentionalism. One chapter discusses the criteria we have to attribute content in the case of 
perception; the other specifies the nature of that content and the specific components of 
perceptual content. Chapter four discusses the naturalistic theories of intentionality and argues 
for a causal and functional (teleosemantic) account of the content of perceptual states. Some 
problems of the existing versions of teleosemantics are discussed and the chapter proposes a 
version of a teleosemantic theory of content which combines causal relations and the 
biological functions of consumer systems as criteria to attribute content. Contrary to 
teleosemantic theories of content which focus on the functions of producer systems (systems 
which produce perceptual states) I argue that we need to consider the function of consumer 
systems (systems which use perceptual states) in order to attribute in a determinate way 
perceptual content. And contrary to teleosemantic theories of content which focus on the 
functions of consumer systems (Papineau, Millikan), I argue that we cannot attribute content 
in a determinate way without considering the causes of a perceptual state. I show how content 
can be attributed to perceptual states with such a hybrid theory combining causes and 
functions of producer and consumer systems. 
 The previous chapter gives the criteria to specify what enters into the content of a 
perceptual state. The final chapter gives a more detailed account of what such a perceptual 
content looks like. It defends a theory of propositional content for perception. Perceptual 
content can be specified by a Russellian proposition constituted by objects and properties. I 
defend here the view that the properties entering content can be intrinsic or relational 
properties. Reasons are given why such a Russellian content gives a better account of the 
content of perceptual states than other versions of propositional or non-propositional content. 
The view is defended that such a theory of Russellian content can give a much better account 
of the phenomenology of illusions than a relationalist rejection of intentional content. I also 
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argue that not all theories of perceptual content but the present theory of Russellian content 
can meet the objections relationalists addressed to an intentionalist account of perception.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Perception as Representation 
 
Introduction 
 
It is a widely held view that perceptions are a kind of representation of external objects, 
events and their properties. In perception we gain access to features of our environment. 
Perception provides us with information about the environment and it guides successfully our 
interaction with external objects. Perceptual states are therefore about something and have a 
representational (or intentional) content. This view of perception as representational states is 
broadly shared, although not uncontroversial as show the growing debates about 
relationalism. Less broadly shared is a consistent explanation of the representational status of 
perception. How can we explain that perception represents something? Several explanations 
of what makes perceptions representational have been given and the debate is still not closed 
concerning what the best explanation may be or even if there is any possible explanation of 
this representational status. In this chapter I will mainly try to clarify what is meant by the 
attribution of such a representational status to perceptions and why philosophy of mind and 
the cognitive sciences concur to attribute this status to perceptions.  I will not decide here if 
the representational view should be accepted or rejected, but I want only to clarify what this 
view implies and commits us to. Furthermore I want to examine if there is one unitary 
conception of the representational view of perception, or if different disciplines (philosophy 
of mind, psychology, neurosciences) mean different things with the claim that perception is a 
form of representation.  
When we say that perception is a representation, about which specific states are we 
speaking? (1) It has to be cleared first what we mean by perception and to which states we 
attribute a representational status and representational content. To answer this, I will delimit 
perception from other mental states which seem to share with them the property to be about 
something. I will also delimit perception from other representational states which are not 
mental. (2) Then I will consider the concept of representation used in the philosophy of mind, 
especially in the representational theory of the mind. (3) I will show how this concept of 
representation was then applied to the special case of perception. (4) I will compare this 
concept of perceptual representation to the one used in the psychology of perception. (5) 
Finally I will state the main challenges which are raised against the representational view of 
perception in psychology and philosophy. The discussion and possible answers to these 
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challenges will only be addressed in the subsequent chapters. The aim of this chapter is to 
state the position and the problems of the representational view of perception and to clarify 
the concept of representation as it is used in the content view.  
 
1. Perception: A conceptual clarification 
 
We have different sensory systems which provide us with information about the external 
world. The sensory systems register through some sense organ a physical stimulus which 
impinges on some receptor, e.g. the light on the retina. The physical stimulus is itself caused 
by some external object or event. The sensory receptor “transduces” the stimulus into an 
electrical impulse of the nerves. Different stages of cognitive processing in the sensory areas 
of the brain lead finally to a perceptual state, which is generally described as a conscious 
perceptual experience. Traditionally perception has been identified with this conscious output:  
a conscious perceptual experience with its specific phenomenology. The conscious experience 
can furthermore be used and modulated by higher cognitive functions. Attention can more or 
less be directed to the experience or to specific parts of it, through categorization the 
experience can be classified under different concepts and through perceptual judgments the 
perceptual experience is used in reasoning and linguistic utterances. Although we have the 
immediate intuition of a perceptual experience with its qualitative aspects, the psychology and 
the neurosciences of perception present us with a far more complex process which begins 
with the physical stimulus and ends with the use of perception in higher cognitive processing. 
When psychology or the neurosciences speak about perception, their investigation is not 
limited to the conscious output of perceptual processing, the phenomenology of perception. 
Before giving a definition of perception, I will make some distinctions: first, between 
processes in the sensory systems and phenomenal experience and second, between 
phenomenal experience and representational content.  
We can distinguish in the case of perception between the phenomenal experience and 
the larger perceptual processing in our sensory systems which describe how that experience is 
caused and how it is used in further cognitive processing. Mostly, this perceptual processing 
is not conscious and we are only aware of some aspects of it, namely its results in conscious 
and phenomenal experience. Phenomenal experience is defined by the qualitative character 
of our conscious states. It is generally described by “what it is like” to have that experience, 
e.g. what it is like to see something red. Perceptions, emotions, feelings and moods are 
distinguished from other mental states (thoughts, beliefs) by this phenomenal character, the 
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fact that it feels a certain way to have them. All such states which have a phenomenal 
character are states of our phenomenal consciousness (Block 1995). Traditionally a further 
distinction was made about perceptual experience, that between sensations and perceptions 
properly. Sensations were conceived as the simple qualitative building blocks out of which 
were built more complex perceptual experiences, e.g. the experience of objects or scenes. 
Because it was thought that in sensations we have only the feeling of simple qualities and no 
representation of external objects, the concept of perception was restricted only to these more 
complex perceptual experiences (of objects, scenes). Only this was conceived as a perception 
of external states, while sensation was seen as an inner qualitative feeling which was not 
about something external.  
From the phenomenal character of perception we have to distinguish the 
representational content of perception. My thoughts, beliefs, desires and generally all 
propositional attitudes represent something, namely what is expressed in their “that”-clause. If 
I believe that tomatoes are red, then “tomatoes are red” is the content represented by this 
belief. Such mental states can represent something without feeling a certain way, i.e. without 
a phenomenal character.2 We do not need phenomenal consciousness, the qualitative feeling 
of “what it is like”, to have representations. Equally in the case of perceptual experience, we 
have to treat separately the question of the phenomenal consciousness of perceptual 
experience from the fact that they represent something. Although representationalists suppose 
that the phenomenal character of an experience is explained by its representational content 
(Dretske 1995, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996), they do not identify phenomenal character and 
content. For them also, there are mental representations without phenomenal character and 
representation has to be explained by something else than phenomenal consciousness.3  It is 
certainly an important problem to explain how representation and phenomenal character are 
connected, but as a first step, these two aspects of perception have to be separated, as they are 
separated in other mental states.4 The investigation in this book will be limited to an 
explanation of the representational status and content of perception without trying to explain 
their phenomenal character.  
 
Although we should separate the phenomenal character from the representational aspect in 
                                                 
2 Some philosophers, for example Owen Flanagan (1992: 65), defend the position that believing something has 
also a phenomenal character. It feels like something to have the belief attitude toward a content.   
3 The philosophers who defend the position of „Phenomenal Intentionality“ (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Kriegel 
2013) want to explain intentional (or representational) content by phenomenal consciousness. I do not want to 
presuppose that position in the present investigation.   
4 See Chalmers (2004), for the relation between phenomenal character and representational content. 
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perception, it might still seem that we can pick out perceptual states only through phenomenal 
consciousness. Traditionally philosophy made such an identification of perception with 
conscious perceptual experience, but there are strong reasons not to limit perception to 
conscious, phenomenal experience and to look at the larger perceptual processes described by 
the sciences. The phenomenology of perception is therefore not sufficient for a definition of 
perception. The main reasons for this are such phenomena as blindsight (Weiskrantz 1986) 
and the dual process theory of vision (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006). Both phenomena 
show that we can use perceptual information in our behavior and guide our actions in 
accordance with the properties represented by this perceptual information without being 
phenomenally conscious of that perceptual information. Weiskrantz showed in his 
experiments that people without a perceptual experience of certain areas of their visual field 
still perceptually represent information about this blind area. When forced to attribute a color 
to the visual area they cannot (consciously) see, they still give with a high probability a 
correct answer about the color. Goodale and Milner showed that only a part of visual 
processing is used for the conscious representations in visual experience (this processing for 
conscious representation is done in the “ventral stream” of the visual brain). The guidance and 
control of action heavily relies on visual information which is not conscious (and which is 
processed in the “dorsal stream“ of the visual cortex). People with damage in their ventral 
stream and therefore with blindness or heavy impairment of their visual experience can still 
accurately guide their behavior towards objects they cannot consciously see. In forced choice 
tests in which they are pushed to grasp into their invisible environment, they correctly reach 
an object in front of them. This grasping movement cannot be explained if we do not attribute 
the use of visual information to these people. These cases show that people still have 
perceptual representations (of color, object distance, object size or shape) without perceptual 
experience i.e. phenomenal consciousness of these representations. They still use these 
perceptual representations in their behavior without being conscious of them. Cases like these 
show that we cannot identify perception with perceptual experience i.e. with the perceptual 
states we are phenomenally conscious of.5 And a theory of perceptual representation should 
not exclude such cases where there is no phenomenal experience. Perception and perceptual 
representation extends beyond phenomenal experience. We have perceptual states which are 
conscious and others which are not. 
I distinguished earlier the mostly unconscious perceptual processing in our sensory 
systems from phenomenal perceptual experience. The perceptual processing in the sensory 
                                                 
5 For a similar position, see Brogaard (2011a), Prinz (2010). 
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systems has perceptual experiences as its output, but is much more extended than the states 
we are conscious of. What are now the perceptual states we are talking about when we do not 
want to limit perception to conscious perceptual states? Are these all states between the 
stimuli and the higher cognitive functions (belief, action) using perceptual information. Some 
philosophers situate perception more closely toward the stimulus (Dretske 1969 and 1995) 
and some assimilate it more to the higher cognitive processes, to conceptual classification 
(McDowell 1996) or perceptual beliefs (Armstrong 1968). It seems somewhat arbitrary where 
to situate perception. Are all states of the complex processes in the sensory systems and all 
their output perceptual states? Should therefore all these states have a representational 
content, if the representational view of perception is true? Obviously we must constrain 
somehow which states are classified as perceptual states. Here I will follow some attempts to 
define perceptual states by their functional role, as this has been attempted by Dretske (1978). 
Perceptual states can be delimited (1) by their etiology, by what causes them or what 
normally causes them. Here perceptual states should have some causal relation to external 
stimuli. (2) Perceptual states can be delimited by the function they have. Here perceptual 
states should serve some other cognitive or psychological mechanism, e.g. by providing for 
this mechanism some information about the environment. So, perceptual states can be defined 
by their functional role, by the causal relations to their input and output. 
(1) By perceptual states we mean some neurophysiologic state of the sensory systems, 
e.g. a firing rate of some neuron in the visual sensory system (visual brain). A lot of states in 
these systems do not carry any information about external conditions.6 They have a different 
physiological function and do not vary with any changes in the environment. Therefore only 
such states which do vary or which usually vary with external conditions, which therefore 
carry information about these conditions or have the function to carry such information can 
count as perceptual states. Perception cannot be restricted to states which actually vary with 
some external condition, because that would make perceptual illusions and hallucination 
impossible i.e. seeing a property or an object which is not there. There must be the possibility 
for perceptual states which seem to indicate some external condition although there actually is 
no such external condition. But generally we can say that this etiological condition for 
perceptual states fits well with the way neurophysiologists study perception by looking at 
those neurons which vary with a certain external stimulus presented to the tested individual 
(Hubel 1995). 
(2) There may be some states of my body which vary with external conditions, but which  
                                                 
6 I limit my investigation to external perception i.e. to the perceptions of conditions outside the body. I will 
explain on p. 21-22 this pragmatic limitation.   
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would hardly be considered as perceptual. For example states of my respiratory system may 
vary with the condition of the atmosphere; my lung may register poor oxygen in the 
atmosphere. A scientist could even “see” by looking at my lung that the atmosphere is poor in 
oxygen. It would indicate that external condition to him. But as this state of the lungs is not a 
state of any of my sensory systems, this would not fulfill the previous etiological condition.  
But there can be similar cases in our sensory system. For example the rhythm of 
internal organs of the body is regulated by day/night cycles, the circadian rhythms. These 
rhythms adjust to external conditions by using external cues, called “zeitgeber”. The light 
conditions are detected by the retina and sent to the brain (to the suprachiasmic nucleus in the 
hypothalamus). From there, this information is sent to different bodily organs which adjust to 
this cue. The states in the retina and in the brain vary with external conditions (intensity of the 
light) and at least the state in the retina is part of my visual system. But it would be strange to 
call this case of regulation by circadian rhythms a case of perception. The state which carries 
information about some external stimulus must serve some specific psychological system to 
be a case of perception. Dretske (1995), following Evans (1982), thought that a mental state 
must serve as input to some concept-using and reasoning system, contrary to non-mental 
natural representations i.e. states, like the states about “zeitgeber”, which carry information 
and are used by non-mental systems of the body.7 In an earlier attempt to define perception, 
Dretske thought that a state, to be perceptual, must make “stimulus information” available not 
to a part of a system, but to the system as a whole (the whole organism) (Dretske, 1978). A 
state which fulfills the right etiological conditions is a perceptual state, if it serves the desires, 
needs and the behavior of the organism as a whole and not only some sub-system of the 
organism. If we look at the dual process theory of vision, it is not appropriate to define 
perception as the input to only one specific psychological system or mechanism (for example 
only as the input for central and conceptual processing, or the “reasoning system“). Some 
perceptual states directly serve the guidance of action without serving the intermediary of a 
reasoning and concept using system. They serve a specific sub-system (action) without being 
accessible to other psychological systems (conscious experience). In this sense they do not 
serve as input to the organism as a whole.  
There is a further reason, why it is preferable not to restrict perceptual states to the 
states which serve as input to some central processing system, generally conceived as a 
conscious concept-using and reasoning system. The standard conception of the mind 
subdivides the mind into perception, central processing and action. Every perception is 
                                                 
7 Fodor (1983) also defines perception as an „input system“, meaning by that an input to central symbolic 
processing. 
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considered as an input to central processing and every action follows from central processing. 
This picture has been strongly criticized recently as the sandwich-picture or the input-output 
picture of the mind (Hurley 1998, Bermudez 2005). It is better to avoid this traditional view 
of the mind.  
I will therefore give the following definition of perceptual states: Perceptual states are 
those states of our sensory systems which are normally caused by some external stimulus and 
which serve some mental function or some psychological mechanism (e.g. cognition, 
guidance of action, emotion). 
A further distinction is necessary to delimit perception from higher cognitive 
processes. Perceptual states are distinguished from perceptual judgments and beliefs. We can 
have a percept without forming a corresponding perceptual judgment. Furthermore the 
content of beliefs and judgments is composed of concepts. Beliefs and judgments have 
therefore a conceptual content. This needs not to be the case for perceptual content. Although 
conceptualism identifies the content of perceptions with conceptual content, this identification 
is highly debated and contested (see Kelly 2001 for the arguments against conceptualism) and 
many philosophers defend the position that perception has a non-conceptual content (Dretske 
1995, Tye 2005). I will argue later against conceptualism and defend a version of non-
conceptual perceptual content (see chap. 5). But even if conceptualism is accepted, it is 
recommended to keep the distinction between perception and perceptual judgments.   
As the previous discussion showed, we cannot identify perception with phenomenal 
experience. Still we have a phenomenal experience of a lot of our perceptual states. The 
question has been raised how far perception extends into our phenomenal experiences. Is the 
feeling of pain a perceptual experience? Are emotions cases of the perception of bodily states 
(see Prince (2004) for a perceptual theory of emotions)? How far can the concept of 
perception be applied to the consciousness of inner states? I cannot answer these questions 
here and for pragmatic reasons, I will limit my investigation to so called external perception 
i.e. the perception of objects, events and properties outside of our body, the perception of the 
environment. The distinction is not always sharp and has to be somewhat softened where the 
perception of external objects relies partially on information about the body. The distinction is 
only pragmatic and I do not want to suggest an essential difference between the perception of 
internal states of our body and the perception of external things. I will not discuss here, how 
far the concept of perception can be applied to inner states and how far proprioception can be 
extended, from the unproblematic cases of the perception of the position and movements of 
our limbs to emotions or higher mental states (see perceptual theories of emotion and of 
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consciousness i.e. the higher order perception theory of consciousness). Equally, I will not 
discuss the question how far the representational view of perception can be extended to 
internal perceptions. Strong representationlists (Dretske 1995, Tye 1995) claim that all our 
phenomenal experience is explained by the representational content of these experiences, may 
that experience be of external objects or inner states.  
 
2. The Representational Theory of the Mind and the Concept of Representation 
 
After this delimitation of perceptual states, I want to address the question why many 
philosophers consider that perceptual states are representational states. But to address this 
question, I will consider first and more generally the appeal of the representational view of the 
mind, of which the representational view of perception forms just one part. The 
Representational Theory of the Mind (RTM)8 claims that all mental states are representational 
states. It can be seen as a restatement of the Brentano thesis (Chisholm 1957) that 
intentionality is the mark of the mental.9 But contrary to Brentano and Chisholm, the 
Representational Theory of the Mind tries to explain representation in a naturalistic 
framework. Brentano (and Chisholm) explained intentionality as a relation between a 
representation (some psychological state) and its content, the intentional object of the 
representation. Brentano considered the intentional object to be a non-existent object (he 
actually called intentionality “intentional inexistence”10). As every physical relation 
presupposes the existence of its relata, the intentional relation could not be in his view a 
physical relation. For Brentano and Chisholm mental states as intentional states were 
therefore non-physical. Contrary to this claim, the Representational Theory of the Mind wants 
to give a naturalistic (or physicalist) explanation of mental representation.  
The Representational Theory of the Mind was originally a “happy” combination 
between the mental states folk-psychology attributes to us and the computational conception 
of the mind developed by the cognitive sciences.11 Let us look first at the mental states folk-
psychology intuitively attributes to minds. We explain the behavior of people by attributing to 
                                                 
8 See Fodor (1985). 
9 I consider the terms “representational“ and “intentional“ as equivalent. Every state which has intentionality is a 
representational state and every representation has intentionality. Later (see chap. 3), I will distinguish 
“intentionalism” from “representationalism”, intentionalism being the general claim that mental states have 
intentionality, “representationalism” being a more restricted claim about consciousness which states that the 
phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content. “Intentionalism” was initially introduced and discussed 
under the name “Representational Theory of the Mind”, so I will keep in this chapter the older name. 
10 Brentano (1874/1955: 124-25). 
11 It seemed a “happy combination“ in the sense that our folk-intuitions seemed to give support to the scientific 
theory and because the scientific theory seemed to explain folk-intuitions. On this “happy” combination, see 
Ramsey (2007: chap. 2). 
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them mental states like beliefs and desires. Someone goes to see a movie because he believes 
the movie M is playing now and he desires to see the movie M. We have also the intuition that 
these mental states can be evaluated. They can be correct or true in the case of belief or 
fulfilled in the case of desire. Such folk-psychological notions as beliefs or desires are 
generally analyzed as propositional attitudes. The belief is a certain attitude toward the 
proposition expressed by the sentence “the movie M is playing now”, for example. This 
sentence expresses the content of the belief. The sentence and the proposition expressed by it 
it have semantic properties. The proposition means something, refers to certain states of the 
world and has truth conditions. The proposition is true if my movie theater actually is playing 
M. These semantic properties of the proposition, and therefore of the belief, can explain the 
intuitive evaluation of beliefs which take place in folk-psychology. We evaluate beliefs as 
correct or incorrect, as true or false and they are true or false because they have a semantic 
content which indicates truth conditions. As we have similar intuitive evaluations of our 
perceptions, as we also consider some of them as accurate and others as inaccurate, the 
representational theory of the mind suggests an explanation of our intuitions about 
perceptions on the model of the explanation of beliefs or other propositional attitudes.   
Far back in the history of philosophy, we can find theories which defend that mental 
states represent something because they have a content. And we can find the analysis of folk-
concepts like beliefs and desires in terms of propositional attitudes since Russell (1921). But 
the Representational Theory of the Mind as it was developed by Fodor (1980 and 1985), Field 
(1978) and Dretske (1981 and 1988) combined this analysis of propositional attitudes with the 
computational conception of the mind developed in the cognitive sciences. This conception 
explains mental processes on the model of computation. A mental process is composed of 
physical symbols and syntactical rules which specify how the symbols are combined, 
manipulated and transformed. The syntactical rules only take into consideration the physical 
properties of the symbols, their intrinsic properties. The rules indicate how a symbol with 
certain intrinsic properties (a symbol of type A) is to be transformed in a symbol with other 
intrinsic properties (symbol of type B). Such a purely syntactical computational description 
could explain how a belief follows inferentially from other beliefs by just giving the rules 
about how tokens of symbols are transformed into other tokens of symbols. But such a 
description does not take into account any semantic properties of the symbols i.e. what these 
symbols might mean or refer to. The advantage of this computational theory is that the 
physical implementation of such symbolic processing is no mystery and is already realized at 
a certain level of complexity in computers. The disadvantage is that the theory ignores the 
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semantic relations mental states seem to have to external events or objects. We do not just 
want to know how arbitrary symbols are transformed, but how beliefs about X are 
transformed into beliefs about Y, how for example a perceptual state about physical stimuli is 
transformed into a perceptual state about a 3-dimensional object. The Representational 
Theory of the Mind combines the computational theory with the idea derived from folk-
psychology that mental states have semantic properties, that they mean and represent 
something. For the Representational Theory the symbols of the computational theory have 
these semantic properties. They are the vehicles of representation. This representational view 
explains mental processing computationally and needs an additional theory to explain why 
symbols represent and what they represent.12   
We saw already how the Representational Theory of the Mind analyzes mental 
representations like beliefs or desires. But more specifically, which concept of representation 
is used in that theory? Representations are states which have content. Pictures, maps, 
linguistic expressions are representations and they have content. Their contents are the 
properties or objects represented by them. Contrary to these external and non-mental 
representations, we can characterize beliefs, mental images, perceptual states as mental states 
which have content.  
In a representation we have to distinguish between the vehicle of representation, e.g. 
the physical image (photo) or a neural state in the brain, and what is represented by that 
vehicle. We have therefore also to distinguish the properties of the vehicle and the properties 
represented by the vehicle and given by its content. A black and white photo of a person has 
the property to be two dimensional, to be made of paper with black and white areas on its 
surface. These are the properties of the vehicle of representation. But the represented 
properties are for example the properties of a person (legs, hands, face etc.), properties 
instantiated by the represented person. Sometimes the properties of the vehicle and the 
properties represented by the vehicle are confused. It is not the case that when we represent a 
red object, there must be some mental state which has the property “red” (a mistake sense-
datum theorists often make) (Harman, 1990).  
When I speak of the representational content, I refer to what is generally meant by 
intentional content, i.e. the content given for a state which has intentionality. Representation is 
here used synonymously with intentionality and we can define representation by the features 
of intentionality. Chisholm characterizes all “psychological phenomena” by intentionality, 
what he calls also “relation to a content” (Chisholm 1957: 168). He gives essentially two 
                                                 
12 For a good description of the combination of the computational theory with the representational view about 
mental states, see Sterelny (1991: chap. 2) and Ramsey (2007: chap. 2). 
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criteria for intentionality (Chisholm 1957: chap. 11)13:  
(1) The power to misrepresent. The content of intentional states may refer to 
something which does not exist. Intentional states have therefore the power to misrepresent, to 
indicate something which is not the case. From this property, it follows for any intentional 
content, that we cannot existentially quantify over statements which express this content. Let 
us take for example some ascriptions of belief: “Peter believes that the king of France is 
bald”, or “Peter believes that the Queen of England is married”. From the truth of these 
sentences we cannot conclude that there is an X which is king of France and bald or that there 
is a Y which is queen of England and is married. There is failure of existential quantification 
over the intentional content. The same is the case for perceptual states: “I have a visual 
experience of a white rat” does not imply “There is a white rat”. My experience of a white rat 
may be an illusion or a hallucination. 
(2) Intensionality. In an intensional context (in a that-clause expressing the content of 
a belief, for example) the substitution of co-referential terms does not preserve truth. In these 
contexts not only the extension of the terms, but also their intension plays a role for the truth 
of the proposition. In the case of intentional states like propositional attitudes, this criterion 
for intentionality applies easily. They have a propositional content and propositions are 
composed of concepts which have an intension. It is less easy to see how this second criterion 
may apply to the content of perception. What may be co-referential terms in the case of 
perceptual content, if we suppose that perceptual content is not conceptual? 
A representation must at least show one of these “marks of intentionality” to be 
qualified as a representation. In the philosophy of perception mainly the power of 
misrepresentation has been emphasized as criterion of perceptual representation (Dretske 
1986, Tye 1995: chap. 4). I turn now to the question how this concept of representation 
applies to perception.  
 
3. Perceptual Representation 
 
The representational theory of the mind was originally developed to explain the semantic 
properties of the propositional attitudes, but was then extended to perception (Searle 1983, 
Dretske 1986 and 1995, Matthen 1988, Tye 1995, Lycan 1996). A belief represents through 
the semantic properties of the proposition toward which we have the belief-attitude. The 
                                                 
13 We give these two “marks of intentionality“ the names they have now usually in the literature. Chisholm did 
not give them these names. But we follow Chisholm in his description of these “marks“ or criteria of 
intentionality. 
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representational theory of the mind conceives that perception is similar to propositional 
attitudes: a perceptual state represents by expressing some content (a proposition or some 
non-propositional content). 
Generally, the representational theories of perception state that a perceptual state X 
represents some property P of an object due to some regular correlation between the 
perceptual state and that property. Influenced by the causal theory of reference (Kripke 1980 
and Putnam 1975), this correlation is conceived as a causal one: the perceptual state X 
represents P, if P normally causes X. Drestke (1995) describes in the following way the 
condition for perceptual representation: some internal states of a sensory system represent 
some property P of the environment (for example shape), if the internal states causally vary 
with the values of property P. The internal states (x1, x3, x3…) of the sensory system represent 
shape if these internal states change with the shape of some external object (given that the 
shape of an object changes with our perspective on it). Perceptual states cannot represent 
every kind of property, but are limited to certain type of properties. For example in visual 
perception these properties are generally color, size, shape, orientation and distance of an 
object. We cannot perceptually represent abstract properties like “object” or general 
categories of things (kind properties) like “tree”, “animal” etc. We believe or judge that this 
thing we see is an animal, but we cannot perceptually represent that this is an animal. 
Perceptually only shape, size and color of the thing are represented.14
But for a theory of perceptual representation, the causal relation between the objects 
which has property P and the internal state is not enough. We need a further criterion to 
characterize the relation of representation, because if the relation between a perceptual state 
and its represented property is only defined by a causal relation, this would exclude the first 
condition of intentionality: if “P causes X“ is true, then it is also true that P and X exist. If X 
represents P only when it is actually caused by P, then X will never falsely represent P. 
Perception only defined by a causal relation would exclude intentionality, it would exclude 
the power to misrepresent and it would exclude perceptual illusions. For an explanation of 
perceptual representation by some causal relation, it has to be added that X represents P when 
it is normally caused by P or when it is caused by P under optimal conditions.  This lets open 
the possibility that X represents P also in the case where there is no P and where it is caused 
by some other property (the first condition of intentionality). In such a case X would be 
caused by Q but we could still claim that it represents P. P is normally its cause, but in this 
case the perceptual state is caused by some other property. X would falsely represent Q as a P. 
                                                 
14 For a defence of the position that kind properties are represented by perceptual experience, see Susanna Siegel 
(2010). I will discuss which properties can be represented in perception in chapter 5. 
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It would be a case of perceptual illusion.   
For a theory of perceptual representation we need therefore to give some coherent way 
to explain what these normal or optimal conditions might be. I will discuss in chapter 4 the 
conditions which must be met for a causal relation to be content-fixing. Without such a 
specification of the normal or optimal conditions, the causal relation between a property and a 
perceptual state can not be called a mental representation. It would not fulfill the conditions of 
representation given in the definition of intentionality.  
The second condition for intentionality is more problematic, because it implies the 
substitution of co-referential terms. A representation is intensional, if its truth-conditions are 
not preserved with the substitution of co-referential terms. This implies different modes of 
presentation which refer to the same thing or property. It is difficult to see how perceptual 
experiences can be different and refer to the same property. Block (1990) defends a view, 
where the same property can be represented through different sense modality. The same 
property, for example the shape of a ball can be represented by touch or by sight. In this case 
we would have two sensory modes of presentation of the same property, roundness. This 
implies the assimilation of perceptual content to concepts, to entities which have an extension 
and an intension (or to Fregean senses, a position defended by Chalmers, in 2006). As it is 
contested that there actually are such sensory modes of presentation, I consider the first 
requirement for intentionality, the power to misrepresent, as a sufficient condition for the 
attribution of the representational status.     
A further characteristic generally admitted in representational theories of perception is 
that perception is a natural form of representation and that it has original intentionality. A 
theory of representation must explain why certain entities are representations and what gives 
them this representational status. Or there are representations which can be explained in a 
derived manner. Pictures, instruments of measurement, language represent because we have 
certain intentional states when we use or interpret them. They are representations in a derived 
manner. Their representational status is derived from other representations, from other 
intentional mental states. Obviously, we cannot explain all representations by deriving them 
from other representations, because that would lead to an infinite regress. Therefore theories 
of mental representation accept that there are some mental states which are not derived 
representations, but non-derived, natural representations (Searle 1983, Dretske 1995). 
Perception seems to be of this non-derived type. They do not represent, because they are 
derived from other mental representation. They have what is called original intentionality. 
This implies that we have to explain why they are representations without recurring to other 
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mental representations. We have to explain that either by some intrinsic properties of these 
states or by some mechanisms which are simpler then mental representations. Naturalistic 
theories of perceptual representation have generally tried to explain why perceptions represent 
by some causal mechanisms and some teleological and functional properties of the perceptual 
states (Fodor 1990, Dretske, 1995, Millikan 1989 and 2004).15 These teleological or 
functional properties of perceptual states try to spell out what the perceptual states have the 
function to represent. If a perceptual state has the function to represent P, then we could 
explain how it can represent P even in those cases where it isn´t caused by P. I will come back 
in chapter 4 to the problem how to spell out a representational theory of perception through 
the causal and functional properties of perceptual states.  
It is essential for a theory of perceptual representation to be able to give the content of 
a perceptual state. A theory of perceptual representation must give criteria which permit to 
determine what the content of the state is.  Through these criteria we must be able to say 
which properties or objects a state represents. For beliefs we say that the content gives the 
truth conditions of the belief. As perceptual states can be partially true and partially false, we 
do not speak of truth conditions in the case of perception, but preferably of accuracy 
conditions. The content of a perceptual state therefore indicates the accuracy conditions of the 
state. It says which properties and objects must obtain in the world in order to make that 
perceptual state accurate.  
There are therefore several requirements for a theory of perceptual representation: 
(1) The theory must show that perception has the power to misrepresent. Perception has 
accuracy conditions. It must be possible that a perceptual state is inaccurate. In chapter 3, I 
will defend the view that perceptual states can be inaccurate. 
(2) The theory must show by which mechanisms perceptual states can have that power to 
represent. It must show which mechanisms explain this power to misrepresent. I will give in 
chapter 4 a description of the mechanisms which explain representation. 
(3) The theory must give the criteria which permit to determine what the specific content of a 
perceptual state is. In chapter 5, I will describe the specific contents of perceptual states. 
To fulfill the first condition, we could for example rely on our intuition that 
perceptions are sometimes inaccurate and can therefore fail to represent correctly certain 
properties of the environment. That would not explain how perceptual states represent but 
would just reflect our intuition that they do. As our intuition could be wrong, it is a further 
                                                 
15 Fodor (1987, 1990) explains representation only by some causal mechanism and rejects the use of biological 
functions in his explanation. Other theories of perceptual representation combine causal explanations with 
explanation by biological functions (Dretske 1988, Matthen 1988, Millikan 1989). 
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(second) requirement, to show through which mechanisms sensory systems represent and 
through which properties perceptual states have their representational status. That is what 
naturalized theories of mental representation generally try to do. They try to explain that 
perceptual states represent, because they are caused in such and such a way by certain 
properties or objects and that they have certain functions to provide information about these 
properties or objects. Still that might not be enough for a theory of perceptual representation, 
because these causal and functional relations may leave the content indeterminate. This is a 
central problem for representational theories. For example, a causal explanation of 
representation lets the content indeterminate, because the cause of a perceptual state is a 
sequence of events. It is not clear which element in that sequence determines the content. The 
same indeterminacy can appear in the explanation of content by biological functions. Is it the 
function of the frog´s eye to represent flies, small black dots or flying food. These are 
different properties. Which ones are part of the content of the frog´s perceptual states and 
which ones determine its accuracy conditions? As it is essential for perceptual representation 
to have a content which gives accuracy conditions, a theory of perceptual representation must 
be able to specify this content and these accuracy conditions. If these conditions cannot be 
met, it is tempting to claim that perception after all is not representational.  
Until now I have stated that the representational view is widely accepted in the 
philosophy of mind and I have stated the requirements for such a representational view. I have 
also indicated that it seems to many philosophers intuitively plausible that perception has a 
representational content. But I have not addressed the question what makes this intuition so 
plausible and strong. Certainly we think that perception can mislead us and that it can be 
inaccurate. And this impression is fueled by the phenomenon of perceptual illusions. Illusions 
seem to require an explanation of perception in terms of representations, i.e. in terms of states 
which can be false, erroneous or inaccurate. In chapter three, I will come back to the question 
how illusions were used and can still be used to defend the view that perception represents.  
 
4. The View from the Cognitive Sciences 
 
I discussed in the previous sections the representational view of perception as it is defended in 
the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of perception. In the psychology of perception, the 
term “representation” is also heavily used and many psychological theories of perception 
defend the position that perception is a form of mental representation. The question arises 
therefore if the psychologists use a concept of representation similar to the concept used by 
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philosophers. This question has to be clarified also, because philosophers often defend their 
views of perceptual representation by referring to the use of the concept of representation in 
psychological (or neurophysiological) theories of perception.  For example some philosophers 
(see Noë 2004) claim that perception is not a form of representation, because psychologists 
have strongly contested that in perception we construct a complex mental model of the 
external world, an internal model often called “representation“. Psychologists have often 
contested that view of perception as model construction by saying that such perceptual 
representations do not exist. But that rejection of “representation” is not a rejection of the 
representational view as defined in the previous sections. It is possible to reject such a 
complex representation and still think that perception has representational content. A neural 
state may have the perceptual content “red” without being an inner model of the external 
environment. It is therefore important to describe the different notions of “representation” 
used in the psychology of perception and to see how much these notions overlap or differ 
from the philosophical concept of representation defined as a mental state with intentional 
content.  
I will here distinguish three uses of the term representation in psychological theories 
of perception: (1) a mental representation is a mental state which indicates or informs about 
properties of the external distal stimulus. This use is more or less similar to the use in the 
previously described philosophical theories. (2) Representation as an inner mental model or 
picture, (3) representation as information storage in the mind or more specifically in memory.  
Only the first use corresponds more or less to the concept used in the representational view of 
the mind. The two other uses of the term “representation” do not directly affect the arguments 
for or against the representational view of perception as it is defended in the philosophy of 
mind.  
(1) In the psychology of perception, representation is often used to emphasize that our 
perceptual states cannot be explained alone by the properties of the proximal stimulus (for 
example in vision by the properties of the “image” on the retina). In perception this 
information at the proximal stimulus is used to get some information about the external 
objects (the distal stimulus).16 In this view of perception, what we see is the result of some 
constructive addition to the information present in the stimulus to get information about 
objects in the world, for example the information in the two-dimensional “image” on the 
retina is processed to get a three-dimensional representation of some object. The psychologist 
                                                 
16 I will use here the notion “stimulus” for the proximal stimulus and “object” for the distal stimulus. “Stimulus” 
refers to physical properties at the perceptual receptors and “object” refers to the properties of external physical 
things. 
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Irvin Rock (1983) calls such theories “constructive theories” of perception. With the rise of 
cognitive psychology and its computational description of mental processes, this constructive 
process in perception was described as a form of inference. Constructive theories of 
perception, as developed by Marr (1982), Rock (1983), Palmer (1999) or Pylyshyn (2003), 
describe perceptual processing as the constructive process whereby some inner principles and 
assumptions are used in the sensory systems to “infer” from the often poor information at the 
proximal stimulus the properties of external objects. Through this inferential processing a 
representation of external objects is constructed. Palmer (1999) states that perception is 
confronted with the so called “inverse problem” (Palmer 1999: 23): in our perceptual 
experience we have representations of properties which are not given in the sparse 
information present in the proximal stimulus. For example, we represent three-dimensional 
objects which have to be inferred from a two-dimensional retinal image. Quite different three-
dimensional objects can project the same two-dimensional image on the retina. How does the 
visual system “decide” which three-dimensional shape is actually in front of us? This is the 
inverse problem. Palmer supposes that we actually see in our perceptual experience the 
properties of distal objects and that these properties are the product of some inference solving 
the inverse problem.   
These psychological theories posit that perception is the result of some process which 
represents properties of external objects and events. This is expressed most clearly by Irvin 
Rock (1983), who writes: “External objects and events are represented mentally in the form of 
propositional knowledge. The very essence of intelligence in living creatures, in my opinion, 
is the capacity to “know”, to represent objects, events, and relations in a form that is subject 
to confirmation and disconfirmation. The claim, then, is that perception also is based on this 
form of representation.” (Rock 1983: 15) Later he adds: “perception is the mental 
representation of external objects and events that is based upon or in some way corresponds 
to the stimulation reaching our sense organs” (Rock 1983: 28).17 Perception is described here 
as a mental state which has semantic properties; a state which can be accurate or inaccurate 
(confirmed or disconfirmed). It can misrepresent. Palmer (1999) has a similar view, when he 
defines visual perception as “the process of acquiring knowledge about environmental objects 
and events by extracting information from the light they emit or reflect” (Palmer 1999: 5). He 
underlines that the information gained in perception can be evaluated for its accuracy.18 These 
                                                 
17 Emphasis added by me. 
18 That perception has accuracy conditions for Palmer is clear from the following passages: “Indeed, vision is 
useful precisely because it is so accurate. By and large, what you see is what you get. When this is true, we have 
what is called veridical perception (…): perception that is consistent with the actual state of affairs in the 
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descriptions of perception correspond quite closely to the philosophical view that perception 
is a representation which has intentional content specifying accuracy conditions. A similar use 
of representation can be found in neurophysiology, when scientists try to determine the 
function of certain neurons or group of neurons in the areas of the brain dedicated to the 
processing of information coming from the sensory organs, for example the functions of the 
neurons of the visual brain. Studies like those of Hubel and Wiesel (1962) tried to determine 
the function of specific neurons in the visual cortex of cats. They recorded the activation of 
particular neurons when a specific stimulus was presented to the cat. They showed that 
specific neurons react to only vertical long objects (black bars). These neurons are triggered 
by this type of stimulus. Sometimes in the neurosciences the notion of representation is just 
used as an equivalent of such a causal correlation between stimulus and a certain brain 
activity. A state is said to represent an external property, if it correlates with the presence of 
that property. Such a use of “representation” would diverge from the meaning of the term in 
the philosophy of mind. But generally, the neurosciences do not only describe causal 
correlations, but determine furthermore the function of certain parts of the brain, certain 
neurons or groups of neurons. Such was also the aim of the single neuron recording research 
done by Hubel and Wiesel. They wanted to determine the biological function of specific brain 
areas. In that sense a neuron can have the function to represent a certain color, even if it does 
not react in an actual case to that color and even if it can be triggered sometimes by some 
other internal or external event. It simply would be mal-functioning in these cases without 
loosing its function. Similarly, we would still attribute to a mal-functioning heart the function 
of pumping blood (see Neander 1995). Such neurophysiological theories of perception are not 
far away from a teleological theory of intentionality. 
We can therefore find in the psychology of perception and in the neurosciences the 
term and concept of representation used in a similar way as in the representational theory of 
the mind. But the term is also often used in other ways which diverge from the discussed 
philosophical meaning. We have to discuss these other uses in order to avoid confusions.  
(2) The psychology of perception often uses “representation” in a much broader sense, 
namely as an equivalent of an inner picture or inner model of the outside environment, of 
outside objects or events. It is supposed that perception is representational, because it consists 
in the construction in the mind of a complex and detailed picture-like layout or map of the 
environment. Artificial intelligence (Brooks 1991) as well as recent psychological studies on 
change blindness (Levin and Simons 1997a and b) and inattentional blindness have criticized 
                                                                                                                                                        
environment“ (Palmer 1999: 6). He also says: “vision provides spacially accurate information from a distance.“ 
(Palmer 1999: 6) 
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the idea that there actually is such an inner model or picture. Although we have virtually 
access to a great diversity of details in our visual environment, these experiments seem to 
indicate that we do not visually represent the environment like a rich and continuous 
photographic image. We pick up certain salient details and other sometimes massive aspects 
in focal vision escape our view or our attention. In a video testing the phenomenon of 
inattenional blindness, a gorilla dancing through a team of basketball players is not seen, 
when the observers are asked to attend (and count) ball exchanges (Simons and Chabris, 
1999). Some psychologists said therefore that this view of visual representation as a complex, 
rich and photographic inner picture is a “grand illusion” (O´Regan, 1992).19  
In artificial intelligence, Rodney Brooks (1991) also contested the necessity of a 
complex inner representation in order to fulfill the tasks of a complex interaction with the 
environment. For Brooks, it is sufficient for complex behavioral tasks in robotics that 
information is picked up just when it is needed and just those details that are needed without 
there being a need to construct a complex map or inner representation. Sometimes these 
developments in the cognitive sciences are used as arguments against the notion of 
representation in general. Certainly inner pictures and models were conceived as 
representations of the environment, but a rejection of such pictures and models only affects a 
certain type of representations. It mainly affects certain claims about the richness of 
perceptual representations. The described developments in the cognitive sciences show that 
perceptual representations are much poorer then thought, but they do not show that there is no 
perceptual representation. We can find psychologists like Pylyshyn (2003) who reject the 
picture view, but still defend the notion of perceptual representation as defined in (1). The two 
notions of representation are actually independent: it could be that there is some topological 
mapping between the structure of some external stimuli and some internal structure in the 
brain caused by these stimuli. There would be a picture-like relation between the stimuli and 
the brain region, but still these events in the brain may lack any semantic properties. They 
would not be representations in the sense (1). On the other hand a neuron could represent 
some external property without being a picture. It would just be an arbitrary symbol for some 
external feature without any similarity relation to what it represents. In this case we would 
have representations without any inner model or picture. Brooks also suggested that the 
information about the environment needs not to be given through a central model, but may be 
distributed in different parts of the robot. This distributed representation would preserve the 
                                                 
19 Based on this research, Alva Noë criticizes what he calls the „snapshot conception“ of visual perception. This 
snapshot conception is one example of a representation in the second sense discussed here, see Noë (2004: chap. 
2). 
 33
richness of the information about the environment without being bundled in a central picture 
or model. Each part of a robot (or of an organism) has just access to the information it needs 
for its behavior. In this case we would still have a representation without inner models or 
pictures. 
(3)  In the psychology of perception the notion of representation is sometimes used in 
the sense of preserved or stored information. In debates about change blindness the question 
whether perception is representational was assimilated to the question how extensively we 
store perceptual information between views (Simons 1996; Simons, Chabris, Schnur 2002). 
Psychologists claimed that visual information is mostly used online and is not preserved when 
the stimulus changes i.e. when there is some change in the visual field. This would explain 
why in change blindness experiments massive changes in seen videos were not noticed: from 
one screen shot to the next the information is just not kept. The information in the new 
screenshot cannot be compared to the old one and therefore the difference is not noticed. 
Simons et al. (2002: 78) say for example: “The pervasiveness of the inability to detect 
changes is consistent with the theoretical notion that we internally represent relatively little 
information from our visual world from one glance at a scene to the next. However, evidence 
for change blindness does not necessarily imply the absence of such representation − people 
could also miss changes if they fail to compare an existing representation of the pre-change 
scene to the post-change scene.” Here the “absence of representation” neither implies that 
perception cannot be evaluated for accuracy (sense (1)), nor that we do not have a complex 
model or picture of the environment (sense (2)), but only that in perception the information is 
mostly used online and is not stored. “Antirepresentationalists” in the philosophy of 
perception use often the argument that perception is not representational, because it is mostly 
an online access to the environment. We therefore use the world as an “external memory” 
(O’Regan 1992) instead of storing the information internally. This criticism of 
“representations” only rejects this third sense of the term. It neither implies that when we 
perceive something online, this perceptual experience cannot be evaluated for accuracy and 
does therefore have no content, nor does it imply that perception is no inner picture. It rejects 
representation as inner storage in memory. 
The three senses of the concept of representation in the psychology of perception (and 
in the cognitive sciences) are sometimes confused. It is not uncommon to encounter a general 
criticism of “representationalism” based on the rejection of representation in the second or 
third sense. When I will speak about the representational view of perception, I mean it in the 
first sense only, representation as an intentional, content bearing state. A rejection of that 
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representational view cannot just be based on the rejection of representation as inner picture 
or representation as internal storage. Certainly some aspects of representation as inner picture 
or as storage can be used in an argument against the representational view. For example the 
view that perception is mostly an online access to the environment without much storage can 
be used to argue for a relational view of perception. But online perception per se is not in 
contradiction with the representational view. A rejection of perceptual representation in the 
sense (2) and (3) does not per se imply a rejection of the representational view. It is therefore 
important to separate these different meanings of “representation”. 
 
5. Challenges to the Intentionality of Perception 
 
The representational view of perception has been confronted with different challenges. We 
can distinguish three types of challenges: (1) a general rejections of intentionality; (2) a 
rejections that specifically perceptions have intentionality; (3) challenges to specific versions 
of the intentionality of perception. Let us look at three types of challenges. 
(1) The rejection of intentionality in general: Such views, which can be called intentional 
irrealism, reject that any mental state has intentionality, therefore also perceptual states are 
not intentional states. Intentional irrealism rejects generally the notion of mental 
representation and intentionality for mental states. We can distinguish a computationalist 
version and an anti-computationalist version. The computationalist version accepts that 
mental processes are symbolic and governed by rules, but rejects that we can give a semantics 
for these symbols. Stich´s syntactic theory of the mind is such a position (Stich 1983). 
Dynamic systems theory is a more radical form of intentional irrealism, because it rejects also 
the symbolic processing of classical computationalism (Van Gelder 1995). There are only 
causal interactions between internal and external events which can be modeled 
mathematically by a series of differential equations. There is no specific difference of the 
interaction between mind and world to any other physical interaction in nature.  
The emphasis on extended cognition (Clarke/Chalmers 1998) is another development 
which tries to reduce the role of inner representations. Mental processes are seen here in 
interaction with bodily activities or continuous with processes external to the human body. 
Causal interactions between the brain, the body and the world are emphasized and the 
semantic relations between inner states and the external world lose their importance in this 
framework. But the extended mind hypothesis per se does not imply a rejection of the 
intentionality of mental or perceptual states and advocates of this thesis criticize the anti-
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representationalist rejection of intentional states (Clarke 2008). Only certain radical versions 
of extended cognition want to reject mental representations (see Chemero 2009). 
(2) A rejection of the intentionality only as far as it is applied to perception: Such 
views accept that there are mental states which represent and which have intentionality, but 
they reject the view that perceptual experiences or perceptual states are among these 
intentional states. Certain forms of enactivism (Noë 2006, 2009, 2012) reject the intentionality 
of perception, but mainly relationalism does so. For relationalism, we have in perception a 
direct contact to the entities we perceive. Perception has to be analyzed as a relation between 
a perceiver and the perceived entities. Relationalism denies that perceptual states have a 
content which may represent some properties in the absence of a relation to objects which 
have these properties. Perceptual states do not fulfill Chisholm’s first criterion for 
intentionality. These specific challenges to the intentionality of perception will be the main 
focus of the following chapters. 
(3) Challenges to specific theories of perceptual representation: These views do not 
reject the representational view of perception, but challenge only certain versions of it. It is 
not denied that perceptual states have content. The intentionality of perception is not rejected, 
but only certain explanations of that intentionality. Often these challenges are presented as 
some alternatives to the naturalistic theories of intentionality, given by causal or informational 
semantics or teleosemantics and their explanation of perceptual (and mental) content. Such 
alternatives explain intentionality by normativity or phenomenal consciousness and these are 
considered irreducible to a naturalistic explanation.  
Some philosophers for example reject the naturalistic theories of intentionality, but do 
not reject the project to attribute content to perceptual states. More specifically, there are 
positions which consider that a naturalistic theory of intentionality is impossible, given the 
normativity of content (Kripke 1982). It is claimed that normatively cannot be naturalized and 
that therefore intentional content cannot either.  
Another alternative to the theories of naturalized intentionality is the program of 
phenomenal intentionality (Horgan/Tienson, 2002). In this program the intentional content of 
perception is explained by the phenomenal character of our experience. The attempt to 
explain content by external causal or historical relations of the mental state is rejected. 
Theories of phenomenal intentionality reject the naturalistic theories of intentionality because 
they do not explain intentionality through phenomenal states (Kriegel 2013).  
As I said, the main focus of the following chapters will be on the challenges addressed 
to the application of intentionality to perception, i.e. the second type of challenges. The 
 36
challenges mentioned in the third point will be partially addressed in the defense of a 
naturalistic theory of perceptual content presented in chapter four. I mentioned only here the 
first type of challenges. As the topic of the present dissertation is not a general defense of 
intentionality, but considers intentionality only insofar as it is applied to perception, I will not 
address directly the arguments for or against intentional irrealism in the rest of the book but 
concentrate on the two other challenges. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Enactivism and Perceptual Content 
 
Introduction 
 
Enactivism defends the view that action is constitutive for perception, more specifically that 
we cannot have perceptual experiences with content when we lack knowledge about the way 
our sensory impressions change with our bodily movements. Someone who lacks or who 
loses such “sensorimotor knowledge” does not have perceptions with content. The main 
evidence Alva Noë (2004) gives for enactivism are therefore cases where a lack or loss of 
sensorimotor knowledge disrupts perception despite normal sensory stimulation. These cases 
of “experiential blindness” are used by enactivists to show that sensorimotor knowledge is a 
necessary constituent of any perceptual experience, given that in cases where it is absent, we 
have only confused sensory impressions which are not about any objects or properties in the 
world. The cases of “experiential blindness” are the central evidence in support of enactivism 
and need therefore a careful examination in any evaluation of the enactivist theory of 
perception. I will here focus on this evidence and will show that the empirical cases given by 
Noë in support of enactivism do not actually show that there is such a phenomenon as 
“experiential blindness” due to a disruption of sensorimotor knowledge. I will especially 
focus on the central experiment of the lenses inverting the visual field which is used by Noë to 
show the existence of such an “experiential blindness”. Contrary to Noë, I will claim that in 
this case sensorimotor knowledge is effectively disrupted, but this does not create a state of 
“experiential blindness”, a perceptual state without any content. It will be my contribution to 
the literature to establish that the lens experiments, this central evidence given for enactivism, 
do not support Noë´s view. In the other cases of “experiential blindness” (cataract operations) 
the failure of normal perceptual experience can be explained by other factors than the lack of 
sensorimotor knowledge. Given that the examples for “experiential blindness” are not 
conclusive, the central thesis of enactivism is highly questionable, namely that sensorimotor 
knowledge is constitutive for perceptual experience and for perceptual content. I will 
especially emphasize the consequences which follow for an explanation of perceptual content. 
Enactivism gives an explanation of perceptual content in terms of sensorimotor knowledge. It 
is the application of that knowledge to sensory impressions which gives content to perceptual 
experience. If in the cases of disruption of sensorimotor knowledge we continue to have 
perceptual experiences with content, then that knowledge cannot be a necessary condition for 
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perceptual content. I claim that in the case of the experiments with inverting lenses, there is 
such a disruption of sensorimotor knowledge, but at the same time a preservation of 
perceptual content.  The enactivist explanation of perceptual content should therefore be 
rejected. Content must be explained by something else than sensorimotor knowledge.  
I will first present Noë´s enactivism and the cases of “experiential blindness“ which 
are given as empirical support for that position (1), then I will discuss the criticisms which 
have already been addressed to Noë´s defense of enactivism (2). A special focus will be given 
to a critical examination of the central case for “experiential blindness”: the experiments with 
inverting and distorting lenses (3). Finally, the consequences of a rejection of enactivism for a 
theory of perceptual content will be analyzed (4). 
 
1. Enactivism and “Experiential Blindness” 
 
1.1. The Enactive View 
 
The enactive view of perception as it has been exposed by Noë and O´Regan (Noë and 
O´Regan 2001 and Noë 2004) is an ambitious theory which offers an explanation of the way 
our perceptual experience acquires content, the way it comes to be about features and objects 
of our environment. Enactivism is not only a thesis about perceptual content, but also a thesis 
about the qualitative character of perceptual experience. Two sensory modalities, and also two 
experiences, are qualitatively alike, if they are submitted to the same sensorimotor laws. 
Furthermore, enactivism is a thesis about the necessary components which form the 
supervenience base of perceptual experience: experience is not only based on the neural 
events in the brain, but also on our bodily activity and our interaction with the world. This is 
what Noë, following Hurley, calls vehicle externalism (Hurley 1998). Despite this wide scope 
of enactivism, I will restrict my investigation to implications the enactive view has for a 
theory of perceptual content.   
The enactive approach conceives perception as an activity, a form of doing or acting. 
Perception is described by enactivists as an active exploration of the environment and an 
interaction with the world. Through bodily movements the perceptual inputs change in a 
determinate way. When we approach an object, its visual size increases and it also 
increasingly occludes its background, its shape varies with our orientation and the perspective 
we have relative to it. When we hear a sound, its loudness (or amplitude) increases when we 
approach the source of the sound and it gradually covers other sounds in the environment. 
These regular changes of the visually or aurally perceived properties of the objects when we 
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move relative to them are called by Noë sensorimotor contingencies or sensorimotor laws. 
Through our experience, we acquire knowledge about these sensorimotor changes. We know 
how visual shapes changes when we move in such and such a way. And we use this 
knowledge about sensorimotor contingencies to guide our behavior. We expect the 
appearance of objects to change in a definite way with our movements. We can differentiate 
the appearances which change because we move in a specific way from those which change 
due to object movement. We use this knowledge and these practical sensorimotor skills about 
changing appearances to guide our actions and interact with the world in a successful way.  
But enactivism does not stop at these phenomenological descriptions of the intricate 
connection of action and perception. The enactive view goes one step further by claiming that 
sensorimotor knowledge and practical sensorimotor skills are constitutive for perception. We 
would not have perceptual experience about features of the world (objects and their 
properties) without that kind of sensorimotor knowledge and these practical skills which 
guide our interaction with the environment. Our perceptual experience acquires content only 
through the possession or exercise of sensorimotor knowledge: “All perception, I argue, is 
intrinsically active. Perceptual experience acquires content thanks to the perceiver´s skillful 
activity.” (Noë 2004: 3). For enactivism, the knowledge and mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies are not only required for a coordination of perception with action, but they are a 
condition of perception and perceptual content. Why this move from the intricate coordination 
of perception and action in the guidance of behavior to the more radical claim about a 
constitutive role of sensorimotor knowledge for perception? 
We can classify the reasons Noë advances in support of the enactivist view that we 
have only perception and perceptual content given sensorimotor knowledge into indirect 
reasons and direct reasons. The indirect reasons argue for enactivism from certain features of 
perceptual content. The claim is that the enactive view of perception is the best explanation of 
those features of content. The direct reason for enactivism comes from “experiential 
blindness”, certain empirical phenomena which seem to constrain us to the enactive view. Let 
us briefly look at the indirect reasons in the next section before turning to the central, direct 
arguments. 
 
1.2. The Enactive Explanation of Perceptual Content 
 
Noë argues for certain features of perceptual content. Given these features, sensorimotor 
knowledge would be a plausible explanation of perceptual content. So, the indirect reasons for 
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enactivism are a sort of inference to the best explanation, given a certain conception of 
perceptual content. Noë defends the view that perceptual content is conceptual, that there are 
always two dimensions of perceptual content and that perception has virtual content. If 
sensorimotor knowledge is constitutive for perception in general, it is much easier to explain 
the conceptual content, the two-dimensionality of content and virtual content of perception. 
But all these three positions on perceptual content are controversial and disputed. And all of 
these positions on perceptual content have been defended independently of enactivism (see 
McDowell 1996 and Brewer 2005 for conceptual content, Lycan 1995, Chalmers 2004 and 
Schellenberg 2011a for two-dimensional perceptual content, Merleau-Ponty 1945 and Husserl 
1907/1997 for virtual content). Therefore, even if one accepts Noë´s views on perceptual 
content, it is perfectly plausible to resist enactivism. Let us look closer at the conception of 
content defended by Noë. 
(1) Perception has conceptual content: The content of experience cannot derive from 
sub-personal processes in the brain, because these processes have no “semantic powers“. Sub-
personal brain processes cannot be about something else. Content can only derive from the 
conceptual capacities at the personal level (Noë 2004: 28-32). Noë follows here McDowell´s 
conception that content must be conceptual and that conceptual capacities are situated at the 
personal level and not at a computational or neurophysiological level (McDowell 1996). This 
view is strongly opposed to the theories of naturalized intentionality which attribute content to 
sub-personal states. As sensorimotor knowledge is a conceptual content used in action, itself a 
personal level capacity, it would be able to explain how perceptual experience can have such 
a personal level content.   
(2)  Perceptual content has two dimensions: Content is about the way things appear 
relative to our perspective, the perspectival or relational properties of things, and it is about 
the intrinsic properties of things, independently of our point of view. When we visually 
experience a plate, we see its elliptical shape from here (perspectival property) and we see 
also that it is round (intrinsic property) (Noë 2004: chap. 5). The enactive view could explain 
how intrinsic properties can be part of perceptual content, because we can experience these 
properties through the active variation of the perspectival aspects of appearances. 
Sensorimotor knowledge includes expectations that an object which looks elliptical from here 
is actually round.  Perception as an exploratory activity and sensorimotor knowledge could 
explain how experience is about intrinsic properties without rejecting the perspectival 
properties of appearances.  
(3) Perception has virtual content: Noë defends the view that we do not only perceive 
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the parts of objects which affect us causally in the actual moment, but we experience 
perceptually also the hidden or occluded parts of visible objects or the untouched parts of an 
object we touch. This virtual presence of some aspects of the object is part of the virtual 
content. The experiments on inattentional blindness and change blindness show also, that we 
do not attend to large parts of the phenomena in our visual field. Still we have the perceptual 
feeling of the presence of a continuous and detailed scene in font of us. This perceptual 
presence of the whole scene is explained by the virtual content of perception (Noë 2004: chap. 
2). The expectations of sensorimotor knowledge can explain perceptual presence and virtual 
content. 
But sensorimotor knowledge is just one possible explanation among others for these 
types of perceptual content. Noë needs another independent argument for enactivism, and he 
gives it with the phenomenon of “experiential blindness”. 
 
1.3. “Experiential Blindness” 
 
Enactivism would gain strong support from cases where perception is disrupted because of a 
lack or loss of sensorimotor knowledge. This would be an argument for the view that 
sensorimotor knowledge is a necessary condition of perception. Noë claims we can find such 
cases of impairment of vision and calls such phenomena “experiential blindness”. Let us see 
first what that phenomenon is and then see how it supports enactivism. In this chapter, I do 
not want to contest that phenomenon per se: there may be cases of “experiential blindness”. I 
just want to show that “experiential blindness” does not occur due to a disruption of 
sensorimotor skills or knowledge. Therefore I claim that we cannot find cases of “experiential 
blindness” which support enactivism.  
Noë introduces the term of “experiential blindness” to describe empirical cases, where 
people do not see properly although they have normally functioning visual organs, normal 
stimulation of their sensory receptors and normal sensations. A damage to retinal receptors, 
visual organs or a damage to areas of sensory processing in the brain would be cases of 
“normal” blindness. “Experiential blindness” is different. In these cases, people have sensory 
impressions, or sensations, but no perceptual experience of objects or features of the world. 
What they sense and feel has no perceptual content. These cases of “experiential blindness” 
can be used to show that sensory stimulation is not sufficient for perception and that 
perception has another necessary component. A case of “experiential blindness” mentioned by 
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Noë is the phenomenon of “Ganzfeld” (Noë 2004: 4 but first described by Metzger 1930).20 
In the experience of a Ganzfeld, one sees only a homogeneous quality, for example the white 
color of a dense fog, without seeing any objects and without the capacity to distinguish 
between different features in the visual field. Such an experience is not very different from the 
experience with closed eyes. One can only see vaguely the different levels of illumination 
falling on the eye-lids.21 The experience of a Ganzfeld can be called a case of “experiential 
blindness”, given that vision is not impaired by any sensory damages or malfunctioning. Still 
it is questionable if “experiential blindness” means an absence of perceptual content and if in 
the Ganzfeld experience “visual impressions (…) are bleached of content” (Noë 2004: 4). It is 
plausible to say that in the Ganzfeld our experience still has content, but just little content: one 
property situated in our close environment. But I do not want here to reject “experiential 
blindness” on the basis that we cannot have experiences or sensory impressions without 
content, an argument that representationalists about the phenomenal character of experience 
would use (Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996, Tye 1995). So, let us admit that there are cases of 
“experiential blindness” where perceptual content is dramatically reduced or absent, in a way 
analogous to blindness. We could find other cases of experiential blindness, for example in a 
specific form of synaesthesia where hearing sounds causes an intense experience of color. 
Some of these synesthets are declared legally blind, because in noisy traffic, they see a 
mixture of colors which disables them to see the road and the traffic.22 These synesthets have 
no impaired visual organs and they have perfectly normal vision in quiet environments. 
Perhaps there are similar cases of “experiential blindness” in the experience of strong vertigo 
or the abuse of narcotic substances.  
How does “experiential blindness” support enactivism? The mentioned cases of 
“experiential blindness” just show that visual stimulation is not sufficient for seeing objects 
and features of the world. But enactivism would be supported by cases where “experiential 
blindness” is specifically due to a lack of sensorimotor knowledge. Noë´s evidence for the 
enactive view is based on experiments where this seems to be the case. But even if such cases 
are admitted, we can still resist the claim that sensorimotor knowledge is constitutive for 
                                                 
20 “Ganzfeld” means total field or whole field in German and refers to experiences where the whole visual field 
seems one continuous, undifferentiated visual quality. 
21 Many people experience an undifferentiated and continuous visual field of grey or black, when they close their 
eyes. That would be an experience of a Ganzfeld. It is actually quite difficult to know what we really experience 
with closed eyes, see Schwitzgebel (2011: chap. 8). 
22  This case of synaesthesia was described by Berit Brogaard in a talk given at a Workshop on Synaesthesia at 
New York University in November 2010. The title of her talk was: “Does color synaesthesia differ 
phenomenally from visual imagery?” 
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perception and just admit that it is a necessary cause for having perceptions.23 Aizawa 
(Aizawa 2007 and Adams/Aizawa 2010) emphasizes this point, because he wants essentially 
to contest the extended mind thesis and the possible consequence from enactivism that 
perception is constituted by bodily sensorimotor skills. If Noë can show that a lack of 
sensorimotor knowledge and skill has “experiential blindness” as consequence, this would 
just show that this kind of knowledge and skill is a necessary cause of perception. It is another 
question whether sensorimotor knowledge is only a necessary cause or also a constitutive 
component of perception. But at least Noë would support a part of enactivism which says that 
there is no perception without these forms of practical skills and knowledge. 
 
1.4. Types of Blindness 
 
“Experiential blindness” is a special case of lack of visual capacities. It is special in its 
phenomenology and it is special in its etiology, in the causes which explain it. Concerning the 
phenomenology, Noë has to show that “experiential blindness” is quite similar to other cases 
of blindness in order to support the claim that it is actually a case of impairment of vision. 
Concerning the etiology, Noë has to show that this impairment is caused specifically by a lack 
of sensorimotor knowledge. Two questions need to be asked in order to explain the 
phenomenology of “experiential blindness” and to evaluate if it actually exists. First, which 
types of blindness are there and is “experiential blindness” similar to one of these types. 
Second, what is the relation of blindness to knowledge? Especially, can we be blinded by a 
loss of knowledge, of practical know-how or of conceptual capacities? I will address the first 
question in this section and turn in the next section to the second question.  
Loosely speaking, we could say that we are blind when we do not see. If we define 
“seeing” by accurate or veridical visual experience, seeing something when it is actually 
there, then we would not see in the case of visual illusions or visual hallucinations. In these 
cases we have a visual experience, things appear to us a certain way, they look some way to 
us, but the appearances are not accurate. In both cases we have visual experiences and 
therefore visual perception. When we are not seeing, because we have visual illusions or 
hallucinations, then this is not a case of blindness. Visual experience often fails and produces 
inaccurate visual experience. These failures of vision are not cases of blindness. Blindness is 
characterized by an absence of phenomenal experience or a reduced form of visual 
experience. Seeing can fail when we seem to see an object or property which is not actually 
                                                 
23  Besides Aizawa, Prinz (2006: 6) makes also this point. 
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there in the world. Blindness is different. It is not deceptive vision, but a lack of vision. Blind 
people lack information about what is there in the world.  Like for any disability, disease or 
impairment, blindness is a normative notion. It is also a gradual notion. You are blind if your 
visual system or some connected mental capacity (consciousness, attention) does not function 
normally and you are blind to a certain degree and at a certain level of impairment.24  
Blindess is not a unitary phenomenon. There are many different types of blindness. 
They can be distinguished by the type of phenomenal experience one has or by their cause. 
Let us start with the way it is like to be blind. Only 10% of people recognized as blind have 
no visual experience at all. They see nothing, cannot detect light and get no visual 
information. They are affected by total blindness, but the great majority of blind people have 
some visual experience (partial blindness). Partial blindness can affect only some visual 
properties (color, movement), or the whole or parts of the visual field. In both cases 
phenomenal experience is impoverished. When some properties normally detected by visual 
perception cannot be seen, the person may be color blind (achromotopsia), blind to movement 
(akinetopsia) or unable to see depth. This kind of blindness affects only certain properties of 
visual experience and lets the others intact. In color blindness one cannot see certain colors or 
sees no colors (except different grades of gray), but still sees objects, their movement, 
orientation or distance. Blindness can also affect some parts of the visual field. In strokes, 
people can lose their capacity to see in their left visual field (hemianopsia), glaucomas or 
cataract can obstruct vision in some areas of the visual field. In these cases, there is no vision 
in parts of the visual field, but normal vision in other parts. But parts of the visual field can 
also be affected by degraded vision, some parts in the visual field are blurred. This is the case 
in long- or short-sightedness or in a beginning obstruction of light in the lens through 
cataracts. A third type of partial blindness, besides impairment of certain visual properties or 
impairment of certain parts of the visual field, is the impairment of visual integration. In form 
agnosia or in apperceptive agnosia, people can see colors, movements, distances and edges, 
but they cannot integrate that visual information in order to see shapes and objects. They are 
for example incapable to draw what they are seeing. Here, basic visual properties (color, 
movement, edges) are not affected and no part of the visual field is impaired, but higher visual 
processing is defective.  
Is “experiential blindness” similar to the phenomenal experience of these types of 
                                                 
24 To define blindness, the World Health Organization draws a conventional line at a certain level of visual 
impairment: A person is blind if her visual acuity in seeing an object at 6 meters is less than normal visual acuity 
for seeing an object at 120 meters, or if the visual field covers an angle of less than 10o (normal visual field has 
180o). 
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blindness. It is no objection against cases of “experiential blindness” that these are not cases 
of total blindness. Most cases of blindness are partial and preserve some reduced or 
rudimentary form of visual experience. Enactivism does not predict that with the disruption of 
sensorimotor knowledge total blindness would follow. But “experiential blindness” should be 
at least comparable to the phenomenal experience of some type of partial blindness. It could 
either be a visual experience with poor phenomenal experience similar to the first type of 
partial blindness, lacking some or many of the visual properties normally detected in vision. 
This seems to be the case in the experience of a “Ganzfeld”. Or “experiential blindness” could 
be a rich visual experience, but where the visual information is not integrated in the right way, 
similar to the third type of partial blindness, where colors and movements are seen but no 
forms or objects. This may be similar to the experience after cataract operations. 
Besides a visual phenomenology similar to the defective vision in blindness, Noë 
gives a further criterion for “experiential blindness”. It is phenomenal experience without 
representational content. In total blindness, obviously, nothing is represented visually, 
because there is no visual information at all. But in all cases of partial blindness, there are not 
just phenomenal experiences which are about nothing. In very poor visual experience, the 
environment is represented as having only some properties. If a blind person is only able to 
see different levels of brightness, for example, the environment is represented as being 
brighter in one part of the visual field than in other parts. As in the experience of a Ganzfeld, 
there is little content, but not an absence of content. Similarly in the cases of blindness 
through lack of visual integration, the people represent movements, colored surfaces and 
edges in their environment, even if they do not represent whole objects. There are cases of 
representational visual content without phenomenal experience, for ex. in blindsight. But it 
seems that there is no case of partial blindness, i.e. some visual experience, without 
representational content. One could reject “experiential blindness” on the basis that there is no 
contentless visual experience in any kind of blindness or on the basis that we cannot have 
sensory impressions without content, an argument that representationlists about conscious 
experience would use (Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996, Tye 1995). I do not find this argument 
decisive against “experiential blindness”.  
First, Noë himself rejects the arguments given in Peacocke (1983) for anti-
representationalism, that is, for the existence of sensational content in experience which does 
not represent. Noë defends the view that all appearances are about some perspectival 
properties of the environment and rejects that they are non-representational properties of 
experience (Noë 2004: 82-4). Secondly, it is possible to interpret “experiential blindness” as 
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cases where content is degraded and impoverished but not absent. In a Ganzfeld, we are blind, 
because we have very little content, not because we have sensations with no content. Thirdly, 
Noë´s claim that there is no content in “experiential blindness” can just mean that with the 
disruption of sensorimotor knowledge the corresponding perceptual content and phenomenal 
experience disappears. As this disruption is always partial, the corresponding blindness is 
partial; some experience and content is still present. If we have still some visual experience in 
“experiential blindness” this is because there still is some sensorimotor knowledge and 
perceptual content which is preserved. If all sensorimotor knowledge were disrupted, then we 
would have a completely undifferentiated experience similar to total blindness. If it is possible 
to differentiate between properties, for example darker/brighter, then some sensorimotor 
knowledge and some content is still present. On this interpretation “experiential blindness” 
can neither be rejected with arguments from representationalism, nor because all partial 
blindness seems to have some perceptual content.  
Given the phenomenology of blindness, it seems perfectly reasonable to accept that 
there is something like “experiential blindness”. But “experiential blindness” is not only 
characterized by a phenomenal experience similar to that of the usual cases of blindness. It is 
also characterized by a certain etiology of blindness. “Experiential blindness” is due to a loss 
of practical knowledge or know-how. Or all the previously discussed four types of blindness 
(total blindness and the three cases of partial blindness) are due to damages to the crystalline 
lense of the eye, to the receptors of the retina, to the visual nerves or to the visual cortex. The 
four types of blindness are explained by damage to the visual system, not by a lack of 
cognitive processing outside of the visual system. 
There are cases of blindness with a similar phenomenology than the previously 
discussed ones, but with a different etiology. Blindness can be due to a lack of consciousness 
or a lack of attention, while the visual receptors and the visual cortex are not damaged. 
Blindness in half of the visual field can be due to damage to the visual cortex or to a neglect 
of the visual information received from this part of the visual field (hemineglect). Such 
patients pay no attention to one part of their visual field and have no conscious experience 
about that part although sensory processing is normal (Palmer 1999: 563). Cases similar to the 
third type of partial blindness, visual impairment by a lack of visual integration, can be caused 
by a disturbance of attentional processes while sensory processing remains intact. This is the 
case in the Balint syndrome. Patients with this syndrome cannot shift their attention from one 
object to the next or from one part of an object to another part. Their gaze and their attention 
remains fixed to one object in their visual field and all things which surround that object 
 48
disappear from their visual experience. They have strong problems to disengage their 
attention from that object and move it to something else. In one case of the Balint syndrome, 
when a drawing of two unconnected lines is shown, the patient saw only one line and could 
not consciously experience the other line next to it. (Holmes/Horax 1919, also Palmer 1999: 
566). In this syndrome, the world decomposes into unconnected details. This syndrome which 
affects attention has similar effects as the blindness in apperceptive or integrative agnosia, 
where patients cannot integrate edges into forms and objects or objects into scenes 
(Humphreys 1999)25. Can we be blinded because we lack some knowledge or some concepts 
as enactivism claims? I do not think that there are such cases of blindness and if enactivism 
can establish “experiential blindness”, that would be a new type of blindness, not because of 
its phenomenology, but because of its etiology. 
 
1.5. Blindness and Knowledge 
 
When we consider the causes of blindness, than people can be blind because their visual 
system is damaged (eye or visual cortex), they can be blind, given a normal visual system, 
when they lack consciousness or when their attention is impaired. “Experiential blindness” 
goes one step further by claiming that we can be blind because we lack a certain type of 
knowledge or because we lack certain concepts. Noë is inspired here by the Kantian claim 
that without concepts we are blind (Kant 1781/1992: 98, B51 and B75), cited by Noë in 
support of “experiential blindness” (Noë 2004: 9). It seems difficult to support that view by 
clinical cases of blindness. And it is clearly the ambition of enactivism to find such clinical 
cases with “experiential blindness”.  
The claim that there can be blindness by lack of knowledge or concepts does not find 
any correspondent in the recognized types of blindness. We have to distinguish blindness, 
lack of vision, from impairments where visual perception is present, but cannot be used by 
other cognitive capacities or by action. It can be sometimes difficult to distinguish these cases 
from blindness. When people pump into objects, it may be that they cannot see them, or it 
may be that they cannot use the visual information to guide their bodily movements. If people 
cannot use their knowledge and exercise their conceptual abilities by recognizing, naming or 
                                                 
25 Integrative agnosia was distinguished by Humphreys and Riddoch (1987) from appercetive agnosia, because 
in integrative agnosia, contrary to apperceptive agnosia, the patients are still able to draw what they see. But for 
them drawing is a painfully long process where they slowly align one edge after the other to form the whole 
image of an object. They cannot integrate the details and edges of an object into the visual experience of a whole 
object within one gaze. Apperceptive and integrative agnosias are impairments of the visual cortex, contrary to 
the Balint syndrome. 
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categorizing objects, it can be because they just do not see the objects, or it can be that they 
cannot apply their knowledge or concepts.  
It has been the task of psychology and the neurosciences to disambiguate cases of 
blindness from the cases where intact visual perception cannot be used by and integrated with 
action and cognition. Blindness is distinguished from visual ataxia and associative visual 
agnosia. Patients with visual ataxia cannot use visual perception to guide their movements, 
but they can recognize and name the objects around them. They can give perfectly satisfying 
verbal reports about their visual experience (Milner/Goodale 1995/2006). In associative 
agnosia, people cannot recognize the objects they see and they cannot name them 
(Humphreys 1999). This means that they cannot use their lexical concepts (names) in relation 
to their visual experience. Nor can they use other types of concepts (for ex. prototypes or 
exemplars) to recognize what they are seeing. They may still have these concepts or they may 
lose them, as it is the case for example for the lexical concepts in strokes which affect the 
language centers. Are they blinded by their lack of concepts or their incapacity to apply them 
to experience? No. Associative agnosias are generally diagnosed by the fact that patients can 
give an accurate drawing of what they see but cannot name or recognize what they see. They 
can report their visual experience, although they cannot name or describe it. Given these 
cases, we have to distinguish blindness from the inability to use accurately visual information 
in cognition or action. I am not aware of other cases than those given by Noë in his 
description of “experiential blindness”, where a disruption of knowledge or conceptual 
capacities seems to generate blindness. The heavier the burden of proof lies on the cases of 
“experiential blindness” and the more careful these cases have to be evaluated.  
The difference of the previously discussed examples from “experiential knowledge” 
may be that this kind of blindness depends on a special type of knowledge: sensorimotor 
knowledge. Noë says that sensorimotor knowledge consists of practical abilities and is not 
propositional (Noë 2004: 117f.). But it is also conceptual: it consists in the possession and 
exercise of “sensorimotor `concepts´” (Noë 2004: 183). He also says that there is no sharp 
division between concepts and experiences. So, sensorimotor knowledge does not consist in 
having certain propositions expressed by lexical concepts, but of conceptual abilities where 
the concepts are of a simpler form than the ones we use in sentences to express propositions. 
Enactivism does not claim that a loss of names and lexical concepts causes blindness and it 
does not claim that animals or infants do not see, because they do not have these kinds of 
concepts and do not have propositional knowledge. But given the conceptual skills 
constitutive of sensorimotor knowledge, does a loss of such kind of knowledge imply 
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blindness? That is what enactivism claims with its examples of “experiential blindness”. Does 
“experiential blindness” add a new type of blindness or are the cases given by enactivism just 
reducible to the known forms of blindness, where blindness is not due to loss of knowledge 
and conceptual capacities? Before I examine this question in the rest of the paper, some 
terminological ambiguities concerning sensorimotor knowledge have still to be cleared.  
It has been criticized that the terms “sensorimotor knowledge” and “skill” are 
ambiguous in several respects. Does enactivism claim that we must actually exercise this 
practical knowledge and these skills, or is it sufficient that we just possess this knowledge and 
these skills in order to see (Block 2005, Clark 2006, Prinz 2006)? Noë defends an embodied 
view of perception and this implies that the body (beyond the head), and possibly parts of the 
world, are constitutive components of perception. To defend vehicle externalism, Noë needs 
to affirm that some actual bodily activity is part of perception. But a weaker version of 
enactivism can claim that for perception we need only to possess sensorimotor knowledge and 
skills, which are possibly only realized in the brain. This weaker version can still affirm that 
bodily activity is necessary to acquire such knowledge and skills. But once this sensorimotor 
knowledge is acquired, it can be used without bodily movements. This weaker version is 
actually implied by Noë´s discussion of paralysis and optical ataxia (Noë 2004: 12-13). These 
impairments do not impair perception. People who cannot move, can still have the 
knowledge, practical understanding and skills necessary for perception. People who cannot 
use perceptual information to orient their bodily behavior (optical ataxia) still have acquired 
sensorimotor knowledge before their impairment and continue to use it now. For these 
reasons, I do not believe that Aizawa´s examples of paralysis and of anaesthetized patients 
who have perceptual experiences during their operations are counter-examples to enactivism 
(Aizawa 2007). As Aizawa is mainly interested to reject the view that perception is 
necessarily embodied (vehicle externalism), he needs to start from a stronger version of 
enactivism which does implies vehicle externalism. Aizawa supposes that sensorimotor skill 
is not only an understanding of sensorimotor contingencies but a “capacity to perform” 
(Aizawa 2007: 10). We use here the weaker version which just says that sensorimotor 
knowledge and understanding are necessary for perception, even when some bodily activity 
using that knowledge is impaired.  
But enactivism requires that the sensorimotor knowledge is actually present although 
the bodily activity could just have played a role in the past acquisition of that knowledge. It is 
not sufficient that sensorimotor knowledge just has played a role in establishing perceptual 
capacities in the past. Noë affirms that whenever that knowledge is lost, the corresponding 
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perceptual capacity and perceptual content disappears. So it must actually be present.  
 
1.6. Empirical Evidence for “Experiential Blindness” 
 
What are the cases of “experiential blindness” in support of Noë´s position? Mainly two 
cases: (1) the visual experience of cataract patients just after the operation and removal of 
their cataract. (2) the visual experience of people after putting on lenses which distort or 
reverse the visual field. Both cases are classified by Noë as “experiential blindness” and in 
these cases sensorimotor knowledge is either lacking (the cataract case), cannot be applied or 
is disrupted (the lens case). Noë claims in both cases that perception is disrupted, a case of 
blindness, because sensorimotor knowledge is missing or disrupted. Our experience loses 
perceptual content. Noë says therefore: “Taken together the two examples make a strong case 
for experiential blindness, and so for the enactive approach.” (Noë 2004: 7). Let us have a 
closer look at these two examples. 
(1) Cataracts are obstructions of the crystalline lens of the human eye and can be 
present from birth. Cataracts are not an impairment of the retinal receptors which may be 
normal in such blindness; they only obstruct the passage of light through the eye´s lens. In 
cases of congenital blindness from cataracts, the removal of the cataract creates a situation of 
“experiential blindness”, so Noë (Noë 2004: 4-5). Obviously, congenitally blind cataract 
patients could not develop visuomotor knowledge or skills. The sensory impressions they 
receive after the operation cannot be integrated with any such knowledge. Noë claims that the 
sense of confusion created by the new visual impressions on operated patients is due to a lack 
of sensorimotor knowledge although their sensory stimulation is normal. As one example for 
the sense of visual confusion, Noë cites the report of a patient (Virgil), given by Oliver Sacks 
(1995): 
 
“Virgil told me later that in the first moment he had no idea what he was seeing. There was light, there 
was movement, there was color, all mixed up, all meaningless, a blur. Then out of the blur came a voice 
that said, “Well?” Then, and only then, he said, did he finally realize that this chaos of light and shadow 
was a face⎯and, indeed, the face of his surgeon” (Sacks 1995: 114)26
 
This confusion of colors and movements is perhaps similar to the experience of the mentioned 
synesthets or to the visual experience at the moment of a strong vertigo and in that sense it 
can be classified as blindness despite normal visual stimulation. But in the next section, I will 
                                                 
26  Cited by Noë (2004: 5). 
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discuss reasons which cast strong doubts on the view that we have here a case of “experiential 
blindness”. There is strong empirical evidence that the visual stimulation after removal of the 
cataract is in no way normal in the case of congenital cataracts (Aizawa 2007, Adams/Aizawa 
2010). 
(2) Similar phenomenological reports about confused visual impression are cited by 
Noë from experiments where the visual projection on the retina is displaced and distorted by 
prism spectacles. He cites the report about the disruptive effect on visual perception after 
putting on these lenses, given in Kohler (1951/1964): “I felt as if I were living in a topsy-
turvy world of houses crashing down on you, of heaving roads, and jellylike people.”27 For 
Noë, these lenses have an effect of perceptual confusion and “experimental blindness” similar 
to the cataract operation case. Noë supposes that goggles with a right-left reversion of the 
visual image have comparable disrupting effects and cause “experiential blindness“. In these 
lense cases, sensorimotor knowledge is also partially disrupted. Objects move and transform 
in a strange way and we cannot use our learned expectations about their spatial location. The 
sensorimotor knowledge cannot be used to guide behavior and the acquired sensorimotor 
skills disrupt. So, is this a case of “experimental blindness” due to a lack of sensorimotor 
knowledge? In section 3, I will deny that the lense experiments are cases of “experimental 
blindness“, although sensorimotor knowledge is effectively partially disrupted.  
 
2. Criticisms of Enactivism 
 
The large attention received by Noë´s Action in Perception was followed by extensive critical 
reactions to the book. The criticisms are diverse, but can be grouped into three categories: (1) 
concerning his theory of perceptual content and qualitative character based on enactivism (2) 
the philosophical consequences Noë draws from enactivism, and (3) the empirical evidence 
for or against enactivism. I will mainly focus on the third point after briefly mentioning the 
other two.  
(1) The reduced role of inner representations in perception and the role of virtual 
content has been criticized (Block 2005, Prinz 2006, Jacob 2008, Nanay 2012) as well as 
Noë´s defense of conceptual content (Jacob 2006, Prinz 2006) and the two dimensionality of 
perceptual content (Siewert 2006, Campbell 2008, Martin 2008, Kelly 2008).  
(2) The radical consequences Noë draws from enactivism about intentionality and 
externalism have been questioned, especially the claim that enactivism implies a rejection of 
                                                 
27  Cited in Noë (2004: 8). The original German quote is in Kohler (1951: 43).   
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intentionality and of representational content (Lycan 2006). The claim that enactivism implies 
vehicle externalism has also been extensively criticized (Prinz 2006, Aizawa 2007, 
Adams/Aizawa 2010). Mainly, it has been criticized that even if bodily activity and skills are 
a necessary condition of perception, this does not imply vehicle externalism, namely the thesis 
that bodily activity is constitutive for perception rather than just a necessary cause of 
perception.  
(3) Concerning the evidence for enactivism, there is an internal criticism which 
contests that the empirical evidence given for enactivism actually supports the burden of proof 
(Aizawa 2007, Prinz 2006). And there is an external criticism which confronts enactivism 
with empirical evidence in contradiction with it. A special focus was given to the difficulties 
to square the enactive view with the largely accepted neurophysiological evidence for two 
separate streams of visual processing (dorsal/ventral stream as described in Goodale/Milner, 
1995/2006), (Goodale 2001, Block 2005, Clark 2006, Prinz 2006, Jacob 2008).  I will focus 
here on point (3) because it is essential to establish the enactive claim first. Especially I will 
examine the internal criticism of Noë´s evidence as developed by Prinz (2006) and Aizawa 
(2007). Both criticize Noë´s examples for “experiential blindness” and the implications Noë 
draws from them.  
Let us now turn to the criticism of Noë´s evidence for “experiential blindness” (in 
Aizawa 2007, Adams/Aizawa 2010 and Prinz 2006). It is essential for enactivism to show that 
“experiential blindness” is explained by a breakdown of sensorimotor knowledge, by 
“abnormal sensorimotor integration” and not by “abnormal sensations” (Noë 2004: 6). 
Abnormal sensations causing a state of blindness just show that seeing requires normal 
sensations, not that it requires sensorimotor knowledge or integration. Aizawa (2007) shows 
that this condition cannot be met by the example of post-operated cataract patients. There is 
ample empirical evidence that congenital cataracts not only obstruct the passage of light, but 
also prevent a normal development of sensory receptors and basic sensory processing. Aizawa 
draws on the research on the effects of cataracts which shows that even after the operation 
“patients suffer deficits in grating acuity, spatial contrast sensitivity, temporal contrast 
sensitivity, peripheral vision, stereo acuity, perception of global form, and perception of 
global motion” (Aizawa 2007: 13).28 Developmental studies on cats which have been raised 
from birth with sutured eye-lids show that basic sensory processing develops abnormally 
when visual stimulation is prevented. When the suture is removed, the cats show fewer cells 
which respond to normal stimuli, cells have abnormal receptive fields, the inhibitory 
                                                 
28  See the footnote given by Aizawa after this quote for the extensive neurophysiological literature on these 
sensory deficits in congenital cataract patients. 
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capacities of cells which are necessary for edge detection are impaired, motion detection by 
cortical cells is weaker and the use of binocular disparity (an essential depth cue) is lost 
(Aizawa 2007: 14).  From this research we can conclude that the poor visual capacities of 
patients after a cataract operation are at least partially due to deficits in sensory receptors and 
processing. The cataract example does not give a clear case for the claim that the deficits in 
sensorimotor knowledge and integration explain the phenomenal experience of blindness. The 
confused visual experience described by patients like the experience of Virgil cited by Sacks 
and Noë can be due to poor sensory processing. And given the research just mentioned, it is 
very probable that poor sensory processing explains their unusual visual experience.  
The cataract case has another inconvenience. Operated cataract patients had no or 
almost no experience of the visual modality before their operation.29 They do not know what 
seeing is like. The described confusion can be due to the shock of a totally new quality of 
experience and the complete lack of past experience with these visual impressions. The visual 
experience needs not be very different from ours to create a sense of confusion in the patients. 
Furthermore, post-operated patients have no capacities to recognize and conceptually classify 
what they see. In the quoted report, the patient Virgil has therefore to use the aural modality, 
the voice of the doctor, to recognize the doctor´s face. The confusion described by Virgil can 
be driven by the incapacity to recognize what he visually experiences. When Virgil reports 
that colors and movements seemed “all meaningless, a blur”, this may be interpreted as his 
incapacity to recognize what he sees. The reports of the first impressions of cataract patients 
are difficult to interpret and when a patient speaks of “a blur” that cannot be taken in the same 
sense as when we use such descriptive terms. We cannot take this description as a 
phenomenological report about an indistinguishable mix of sensory impressions similar to a 
state of blindness. 
The confusion in the experience of operated patients can be explained by deficits in 
sensory processing or by the shock and strangeness of the experience of a new perceptual 
modality. Both of these explanations of blindness have nothing to do with sensorimotor 
knowledge. Furthermore the phenomenal reports of patients have to be taken with caution and 
are unreliable. For these reasons the classification of this experience as a case of “experiential 
blindness” is quite speculative. And even if it is a case of blindness, there are strong reasons 
to believe that it is caused by something else than the lack of visuomotor knowledge of the 
patients. 
                                                 
29  In cases of congenital cataracts, the cataracts can still let light pass through the lense, given that cataracts 
become gradually more opaque after birth. The neonates can have some weeks of visual experience before losing 
their capacity to see with the increasing opacity of the cataract.  
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Noë concedes the weakness of the cataract example given that the blindness in this 
case could be caused by “abnormal sensations” (see Noë 2004: 6-7). He thinks that only the 
lense experiment together with the previous example can establish “experiential blindness” 
through loss of sensorimotor knowledge. Indeed in the lens experiments, the deficits of 
sensory receptors and processing can be excluded. And the difficulty to interpret phenomenal 
reports disappears also, given that the subjects wearing the lenses had normal visual 
experience and normal capacities to deal with that modality. Despite these better initial 
conditions, I think the lens case also fails to establish “experiential blindness” and enactivism. 
It is my specific contribution to the criticisms addressed to enactivism to show that the main 
evidence for the enactive view, the lens experiments, does not support that view. 
 
3. An Inverted and Distorted Visual World 
 
3.1 “Experiential Blindness” in Lens Experiments 
 
Lenses which change in a systematic way the visual input to the retina have been used since 
Helmholtz to test our capacity to adapt to such visual changes. Helmholtz diverted the visual 
field with lenses by 11o degrees to one side and showed that subjects can rapidly adapt their 
reaching behavior to the displaced visual world (Helmholtz 1867, see also Palmer 1999: 344-
45). George M. Stratton, a student of Wilhelm Wundt, reversed the projected image on the 
retina upside-down through prismatic lenses to test the adaptation to so-called upright vision 
(Stratton 1896 and 1897). As in Helmholtz´s experiment, Stratton showed a relatively rapid 
motor adaptation, i.e. bodily movements are changed in such a way that the unusual and non-
veridical visual information can be used again for walking, reaching and other behavioral 
tasks. But he showed also that after a longer period of uninterrupted use of the lenses, the 
reversed visual world seems “normal” again. The visual experience which conflicted with 
tactile, auditory and proprioceptive experience seemed to be again in harmony with the other 
senses. There has been perceptual adaptation: either vision adapted to the other senses or the 
other senses to vision. Numerous lens experiments have followed with displacements, 
inversions and distortions of the visual input (reviewed in Kohler 1951, Taylor 1962). The 
experiments showed generally motor adaptation, but the question of perceptual adaptation, 
whether and to which degree visual experience itself changes with longer use of  the lenses, is 
still disputed (Harris 1965, Linden et al. 1999).  
How can these experiments help to establish “experiential blindness”? And how can 
they show that blindness is actually explained by a disruption of sensorimotor knowledge and 
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skills? Let us remember under which conditions it can be shown that blindness is due to the 
absence of sensorimotor knowledge: If sensorimotor knowledge is absent, disrupted or lost 
(first condition) given normal sensory processing and “normal” sensations (second 
condition), then a phenomenology similar to blindness or to a qualitative experience without 
content can be attributed to (and explained by) the absence of sensorimotor knowledge. Under 
these conditions it can be defended that sensorimotor knowledge plays an important or 
essential role in perception and for having perceptual content. The cataract example failed, 
because it did not meet the second condition.  
Now, what are the examples for “experiential blindness” in the case of the lens 
experiments? In Action in Perception, Noë uses essentially two lens experiments: the 
experiment where the input is reversed right to left and another series of experiment by 
Kohler with displacing and distorting lenses (Kohler calls them “prism experiments“, Kohler 
(1951: 20-28))30. It is important to keep these two experiments apart, because they have quite 
different effects which are sometimes confused in the literature. I will show in the following 
pages, that the inverting goggle experiments are a cases of disrupted sensorimotor knowledge 
while sensations are normal, but they do not show any phenomenology of “blindness“. While 
in the “prism experiments” there is some phenomenology of confused, chaotic perception, but 
we cannot attribute that phenomenology to the disruption of sensorimotor knowledge. The 
“prism experiment” does not clearly meet the second condition about “normal” sensation. 
And the inverted lenses are not a case of “blindness”.  
Let us look first at the “prism experiment” with the distorting lenses, because Noë 
uses the phenomenological report of the subject, K, wearing these lenses as his main example 
for “experiential blindness” in his book.31 I quote entirely the phenomenal report of K used by 
Noë (2004: 8). The report describes the experience just after putting on the goggles: 
 
“During visual fixations, every movement of my head gives rise to the most unexpected and 
 peculiar transformations of objects in the visual field. The most familiar forms seem to dissolve and 
reintegrate in ways never before seen. At times, parts of figures run together, the spaces between 
disappearing from view: at other times, they run apart, as if intent on deceiving the observer. Countless 
times I was fooled by these extreme distortions and taken by surprise when a wall, for instance, 
suddenly appeared to slant down to the road, when a truck I was following with my eyes started to bend, 
                                                 
30  Kohler´s experiments with right-left inversion or up-down inversion were not done with prism lenses, but 
with a system of mirrors in goggles, while only the displacing and distorting goggles involved prisms. 
31  Although Noë used already the inverting lens experiments of Stratton and Kohler (up-down inversion and 
right-left inversion) in Noë/O´Regan (2001) to support the „sensorimotor account of vision“ and in Hurley/Noë 
(2003) as argument for neural plasticity, he introduces the idea of „experiential blindness“ only in Action in 
Perception (2004).  
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when the road began to arch like a  wave, when houses and trees seemed to topple down, and so forth. I 
felt as if I were living in a topsy-turvy world of houses crashing down on you, of heaving roads, and of 
 jellylike  people.” (Kohler 1951/1964: 43)  
 
Noë comments on K´s report, saying that “his visual world is distorted, made unpredictable 
and topsy-turvy. To this extent, K suffers blindness” (Noë 2004: 8).  
Concerning the other experiment with the right-left inverting goggles, Noë supposes a 
similar disruptive effect after putting on the goggles. He writes: “When you put on inverting 
lenses, you experience not an inversion of content, but a disruption or disorganization of 
content. (…) this “experiential blindness“ is to be expected from the enactivist standpoint” 
(Noë 2004: 91). Noë supposes that in both types of experiments, putting on the spectacles 
creates a disruption of perception and perceptual content. In both cases, the immediate effect 
of wearing the spectacles is “experiential blindness” and a loss of content. Content is only 
restored with motor adaptation, only when we develop a new sensorimotor knowledge 
adapted to the changed and disturbing stimulation. 
How plausible is the claim that the lens experiments are cases of “experiential 
blindness”? Aizawa, commenting on K´s report, thinks that the experiment is effectively a 
case of “experiential blindness”, not vulnerable to the objections of the cataract case (Aizawa 
2007: 17). Lycan, referring to the same report, is skeptical that wearing the goggles causes a 
loss of perceptual content. He remarks that K´s entire report is formulated in representational 
terms, not in a vocabulary of sensory impressions without content (Lycan 2006: 11). Prinz 
rejects that there is “experiential blindness” in the case of inverting goggles (Prinz 2006). I 
think, we cannot find a clear answer to these questions as long as we follow Noë´s tendency 
to treat both lens experiments on a par, a tendency often followed by his critics Aizawa and 
Prinz.  
Before we look at the distinctive features of the inversion experiment and the “prism 
experiment”, some general clarifications concerning both experiments are necessary. 
Effectively, in both experiments the spectacles cause a radical change of the sensorimotor 
contingencies (or laws). Normally, when I move toward an object, its apparent size increases 
and it seems closer to me. With the right to left inversion spectacles, when I approach the 
object seen on my left, its size decreases and it appears to get away from me, given that my 
move to the left increases the distance between me and the real location of the object on my 
right. And with the distortions in the “prism experiment”, movements change the apparent 
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shape of the objects in unusual ways.32 Because the sensorimotor contingencies are changed, I 
cannot use or apply my past sensorimotor knowledge and I cannot use the expectations based 
on that knowledge. I expect the objects to increase in apparent size when I approach and my 
expectations are deceived. I expect a cubical form to still appear cubical when I turn my head 
slightly, and my expectation is deceived again. And in both experiments, I cannot use my 
sensorimotor knowledge to guide my behavior. As expectations are constantly deceived and 
behavior fails, the sensorimotor knowledge has to be abandoned or disrupted. So, the lens 
experiments are a clear case of changed sensorimotor contingencies and a clear case of the 
disruption of sensorimotor knowledge. 
But the spectacles do not disrupt all sensorimotor knowledge, therefore we cannot 
expect, and Noë does not, that total blindness follows from wearing them. As sensorimotor 
knowledge is only partially disrupted, only partial blindness should follow. On the enactive 
view, only the perceptual content relative to specific disrupted sensorimotor knowledge 
disappears. With the right to left inversion, only some parts of spatial content are expected to 
be disrupted. This is also Noë´s response to the obvious objection that in K´s report on the 
“topsy-turvy world”, he continues to see trucks and trees and therefore does not lose 
perceptual content. Given that the distorting lenses disrupt only some sensorimotor 
knowledge, only some content is affected. But in this case, Noë still should show that some 
content is effectively affected. Lycan´s objection that nothing in the report is phrased in non-
representational terms is therefore still a problem for enactivism, because it suggests that no 
content is disrupted.   
Furthermore, although the spectacles only partially disrupt sensorimotor knowledge, 
the enactivist claim is still that a complete disruption of sensorimotor knowledge would lead 
to experience with no content at all. It is incompatible with the enactivist view to suppose, as 
Aizawa does, that “experiential blindness” is only a partial blindness, like achromotopsia 
(blindness to colors) or akinetopsia (blindness to movements) (Aizawa 2007: 17). It is not as 
if “experiential blindness” would only disrupt some “sensorimotor” part of perceptual content 
and leave other aspects of perceptual content unaffected, for ex. color. This misinterpretation 
of enactivism is one reason, why Aizawa concedes that the lens experiments show 
“experiential blindness”. On the enactive view, sensorimotor knowledge is constitutive for all 
perceptual content: no knowledge, no perceptual content at all. But, in order to defend 
enactivism, it is sufficient to show that, given the absence of sensorimotor knowledge relative 
                                                 
32  I come back to the exact character of these distortions on p. 63-65.  
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to one perceptual feature, the perceptual content relative to that feature disappears. If the 
sensorimotor knowledge relative to visual size is affected, then the perceptual experience 
representing size should be affected; and so for all the other properties represented by 
perceptual content. 
I turn now separately to the inversion experiment (3.2) and to the “prism experiment” 
(2) in order to show that they fail to support enactivism, although for different reasons. 
 
3.2. Inversion of Vision 
 
In the left to right inversion experiment, the objects which are actually at my right appear at 
my left and vice versa. The spectacles do not distort or deformed the objects. In Kohler´s case, 
used by Noë, the inversion was even done by a mirror system, comparable to the inversion 
seen in our ordinary mirrors. Stimulation is perfectly normal as they always were and 
therefore our sensations are also normal. Just the location of the objects has changed. So, the 
condition of normal sensation is met.33 As we noted before, there is also a partial disruption of 
sensorimotor knowledge. But in no reports on inversion experiments I know of, can we find a 
hint at a state similar to blindness or confusion of visual experience after putting on the lenses, 
neither in Stratton (1896 and 1897), nor in Kohler (1951), nor in more recent repetitions of the 
experiment (Linden et al. 1999, Miyauchi et al. 2004). Contrary to Noë´s claim, there is no 
hint at anything like “experiential blindness” just after putting on the spectacles, nor later. 
Stratton who used upside down inverting lenses notes that “all images at first appeared to be 
inverted; the room and all in it seemed upside down” and he adds that “these images were 
clear and definite”, although he did not have a sense of reality associated with these images 
(Stratton 1896). Stratton clearly states that this sense of unreality does not derive from his 
visual impressions, but from his memory and the habit to consider the real world upright. 
Given that in the left to right inversion the appearances are not awkward in the same sense, 
there should not even be such a sense of unreality in that case. The first visual impressions of 
Stratton are a clear vision of objects and their properties. The problem is not vision, but the 
lack of coordination of vision with action and the following difficulties in normal behavioral 
tasks. In Kohler´s right to left inversion experiments, a similar picture is given: behavior is 
difficult and mal-adapted to vision, but there are no signs that vision is confused, blurred, 
                                                 
33  Noë writes on inversion: „The light reaching his eyes is sharply focused and fully information-bearing. He 
receives exactly the stimulation he would receive were he looking at an object in different location without the 
inverting lenses“ (Noë 2004: 8). Unfortunately, Noë does not see that this description does not apply to the 
„prism experiment“, although he thinks so.  
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mixed up or that the disrupted behavior somehow affects perception (Kohler 1951: 15-19). 
The newer inversion experiments (Linden et al. 1999 and Miyauchi et al. 2004) mention 
equally the behavioral difficulties, but no failure to see.  
The only exception to this picture is the effect of “apparent movement” induced by 
inversion. In normal vision, a turn of the head to the left is accompanied by a flow of the 
visual field in the opposite direction, i.e. to the right. With the inversion, the visual field flows 
in the same direction as the movement of the head. Usually, the information from the 
vestibular system about head movement is taken into account by the visual system to keep a 
constancy of object position despite optic flow. This cooperation of the vestibular and the 
visual system does not work anymore in the first days of the inversion experiment (Palmer 
1999: 346). The coordination of the head movement and vision is physiologically explained 
by a reflex from the vestibular to the visual system. The reflex is complex in the sense that it 
can be changed and adapted to new conditions (see Berthoz 1997: chap. 2). Stratton already 
mentioned the effects of this lack of coordination of the vestibular and the visual system, as it 
appeared also in upside-down inversion. He gives the following phenomenal description: 
 
“The entire scene appeared upside down. When I moved my head or body so that my sight swept over  
the scene, the movement was not felt to be solely in the observer, as in normal vision, but was referred 
to both the observer and the objects beyond. The visual picture seemed to move through the field of 
view faster than the accompanying movement of my body, although in the same direction. It did not feel 
as if I were visually ranging over a set of motionless objects, but the whole field of things swept and 
swung before my eyes” (Stratton 1897: 343-344) 
 
So, the visual perception of position constancy and movement are affected by the inversion 
experiment. Movement appears faster than usual and objects within their visual field seem to 
move when they do not. But neither the perception of size, shape, color or distance of the 
visual objects is affected by the inversion. There are no “roads arching like a wave“, no 
“houses crashing down“ and no “jellylike people” and no “topsy-turvy world” as in K´s report 
on the “prism experiment“, but only apparent motion and a swinging of the visual field 
besides a normal and clear vision. 
Is there “experiential blindness” in the right to left inversion? First, when the subjects with 
spectacles stand still, vision seems completely normal. This is true for the first moments of the 
experiment and also later, when the changed sensorimotor contingencies have been noted and 
the old sensorimotor knowledge has been abandoned. The disruption of sensorimotor 
knowledge does not change or disrupt vision. Even movement is perceived normally. The 
only abnormal aspect in vision is that all spatial content is nonveridical, it is a case of 
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perceptual illusion. Secondly, when the subjects move, only the perception of motion is 
changed. Objects or the visual field seem to move, when they do not, and the subjects 
themselves seem to move, when they do not. Perceptual content concerning movement is not 
disrupted, but subjects have experiences with illusory kinetic content. There is neither 
“blindness” nor a disruption of perceptual content in the inversion experiment, no 
“experiential blindness”. Most properties of visual perception (color, shape, size, distance) are 
not affected by the disruption of sensorimotor knowledge, only motion perception is changed 
and may be affected by the loss of that knowledge.  
Even if the loss of sensorimotor knowledge does not create a situation of “experiential 
blindness“, does it change perception and its content in some way? Could there be partial 
“experiential blindness” limited to one feature of content? Sensorimotor contingencies 
relative to movement are changed and knowledge concerning movement is disrupted, but still 
there is kinetic content in vision. Although sensorimotor knowledge does not disrupt kinetic 
content, that content did change. Is the change due to disruption of sensorimotor knowledge? 
Perhaps. But there is a standard scientific explanation by the reflex coordinating the vestibular 
and the visual system (see Berthoz 1997). And it seems difficult to square the mechanisms of 
a reflex with the cognitive and conceptual operation of sensorimotor knowledge. 
Furthermore, enactivism predicts that sensorimotor knowledge relative to a particular 
property (size, shape etc.) is a necessary condition for perceptual experience with that 
property as content: If sensorimotor knowledge concerning colors is disrupted, perceptual 
experience should lose chromatic content. As mentioned previously, the inverting spectacles 
change radically the sensorimotor contingencies relative to size perception and distance 
perception: size decreases and distance perception increases when we approach an object. The 
corresponding sensorimotor knowledge is disrupted. But still, the perception of size and 
distance of objects is not at all affected or changed in the inversion experiment, contrary to the 
predictions of enactivism. We see objects at a certain distance and we see that they have a 
specific size relative to our perspective. Size and distance perception is even veridical. But 
still we have massively deceived expectations about the way size and distance change with 
our movements. 
I conclude that the inversion experiment is neither a case of “experiential blindness” 
nor does it show that perceptual content changes with the loss of sensorimotor knowledge. 
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3.3. Distortion of Vision 
 
Let us new turn to the other experiment, the “prism experiment”. When we read the report of 
K (see p. 57-8) about the first moments with the displacing and distorting lenses of the “prism 
experiment”, a massive change of perceptual experience is clearly noticeable. Shapes are 
deformed, things are aggregated into one and re-separate, stable things show impossible 
movements, for example streets move like waves. Noë comments on K´s report: “Crucially, 
the kind of blindness K suffers is not caused by any defect in sensation. K receives normal 
stimulation.” and he concludes: “The inability to see normally stems not from the character of 
the stimulation, but rather from the perceiver´s understanding (or rather failure of 
understanding) of the stimulation.” (Noë 2004: 8). So, Noë claims that the strange and 
confused perceptual experience of K (a case of “blindness“) is not due to “abnormal“ 
stimulation and sensation, but is due to the failure of sensorimotor knowledge (or 
“understanding“). Obviously, sensorimotor contingencies are changed in the “prism 
experiment“, and the corresponding knowledge is useless. The predictions based on that 
knowledge are mainly deceptive. But if we look at the details of the experiment, the claim that 
stimulation is „normal“ is untenable. Noë seems to extrapolate here from the inversion case, 
where stimulation was almost identical with the normal and common stimulation of the eyes.    
In the “prism experiment”, on which K´s report is based, the retinal image is not 
inverted, but only displaced by 7o and later by 10o. But through the specific optical refraction 
of light in the spherical prism, the retinal image is completely distorted. Figures from 
Kohler´s book (Kohler 1951: 36) show how a shape under conditions of normal vision (Fig. 
3a) appears visually through the distortions by the spherical prisms (Fig. 3b). 
  
 
 
Kohler gives a detailed description of the distortion of the stimulus in that experiment: Forms 
 63
and lines are bent (as seen in the figure), the visual field is distorted in such a way that objects 
on one side of the field are contracted and on the other side are extended, movements are 
different on one side of the visual field from the same movement on the other of the visual 
field, apparent movements are seen, on the edge of objects unusual colors are seen (an effect 
of the refraction of light in the prism) (Kohler 1951: 82-3)34. The stimulation in the visual 
experience reported by K is strongly distorted and changed if we compare it to normal visual 
stimulation. Almost all properties represented in visual experience are directly affected by the 
distortion of stimulation: shape, size, distance, orientation, color and movement.  
Although there are no deficits in sensory processing and in the sensory receptors, the 
case of the “prism experiment” is confronted with similar problems as the cataract case. The 
chaotic experience is not explained by unusual sensory processing, but it can be explained by 
the unusual refractions of light just before it encounters the sensory receptors. The visual 
experience can be compared to the one we have, when we look in distorting mirrors. We seem 
“jellylike” in them and the objects make strange waves. Certainly, our usual expectations 
about the way appearances change with our movements are deceived when we look in these 
mirrors. But not our lack of understanding and our failed expectations explain the funny 
shapes and distortions. They are explained by the distortion of light on the mirror, and so it is 
with the distorting lenses. 
Certainly the sensorimotor knowledge and skills are disrupted in the “prism 
experiment”. And it could be that this disruption has some effects on perceptual content. But 
there is the condition that we can only show a dependency of perceptual content from 
sensorimotor knowledge, when sensation does not change completely at the same time, i.e. 
the condition of “normal” sensation. The “prism experiment” does not fulfill that condition. It 
is impossible to exclude in this case that the confused visual experiment is just due to the 
properties of the stimulation. Even more, it is quite probable that the unusual stimulation 
explains the confused visual experience and the failure of sensorimotor understanding does 
not. The “prism” experiment” cannot be used to support the thesis that there is “experiential 
blindness” due to a failure of sensorimotor knowledge. It is not an evidence for enactivism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
34  This description is given for the experiment with prisms covering only the upper half of the visual field, but 
the effect of these prisms are the same as in the experiment with prisms covering the entire visual field, i.e. the 
experiment mentioned in Noë. 
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4. Perceptual Content beyond Enactivism 
 
Enactivism claims that our perceptual experience acquires content only if we have 
sensorimotor knowledge. Any perceptual experience without that kind of knowledge would 
be a case of “experiential blindness“, of visual experience which is not about anything. We 
saw that there is no evidence for “experiential blindness” and no evidence for a disruption of 
content when sensorimotor knowledge is actually disrupted. All to the contrary, the lens 
experiments show that perceptual experience continues to be about external objects and their 
properties, although our practical knowledge and skills have been massively disturbed or 
destroyed. Perceptual content persists without sensorimotor knowledge. This has several 
consequences.  
First, the content of perceptual states has to be explained by something else than 
sensorimotor knowledge. Another theory of perceptual content is needed. Secondly, although 
sensorimotor knowledge is not constitutive for perceptual content, it could still be the case 
that it influences the content of our perceptual content. Although content persists without that 
knowledge, a change of sensorimotor knowledge could change the perceptual content of our 
experience. Sensorimotor knowledge could still play a role, although a limited one, in the 
explanation of perceptual content. Thirdly, if sensorimotor knowledge has a reduced role for 
perceptual content or is completely independent of it, than it has to be cleared what its 
function actually is. A plausible explanation is that its main role is to use perceptual 
information for the guidance of action, for the adaptation of behavior to the conditions of the 
environment. On this hypothesis, sensorimotor knowledge shapes action, but is neither 
constitutive nor necessary for perceptual content. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is essential for enactivism to show that sensorimotor knowledge and skills are necessary 
conditions for perceptual content. The dependency of content on that kind of knowledge can 
only be established if there are empirical cases where experience fails to have content because 
there is no corresponding sensorimotor knowledge, i.e. cases of “experiential blindness”. Noë 
gives two examples of “experiential blindness”: cataract operations and lens experiments. 
Previous criticism showed that the experience of patients operated from cataracts is not a case 
of “experiential blindness” but of congenital sensory deficits. A similar failure to establish 
“experiential blindness” can be shown in the lens experiments. In these experiments, either 
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there is no experience with disruption of perceptual content, or there is a disrupted perceptual 
experience but only because of a distortion of stimulation. The lens experiments give no 
evidence that perceptual experience fails to have content whenever there is a failure of 
sensorimotor knowledge. The two main examples of evidence for enactivism do not support 
the burden of proof. More probable than the enactivist linkage of content with sensorimotor 
knowledge is their independence. Our knowledge about the way the perceptual properties of 
objects change with our movements is essential to guide our behavior and to adapt it to the 
conditions in the environment. It is essential to coordinate action with perception, but it does 
not shape and transform perception itself. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Relationalism and Illusions 
 
Introduction 
 
Recently, the view that perceptual experience is a form of representation and that it has 
content was criticized and rejected by a certain number of philosophers of perception. In 
opposition to the representational view (or the content view), they defend the view that 
perceptual experience is essentially a relation to external and mind-independent objects or 
properties. For this relational view, objects and properties enter into the perceptual experience 
as constitutive parts, but the experience does not represent these objects or properties and 
therefore has no representational, or intentional, content. In relationalism, the perceptual 
relation to objects and properties implies the existence of these objects or properties. The idea 
of an intentional content that represents some object (or property) which may not exist, to 
which therefore we cannot be actually related, is rejected in that relational view. But it was a 
central motive for the representational view to introduce intentional content as an explanation 
of perceptual illusions i.e. cases where it seems to us as if we see some property which is not 
instantiated in the object we are seeing. In the representational view, this property is just 
represented and is part of the intentional content, although it is not instantiated in the object 
we actually see. The relational view cannot give such an account of perceptual illusions. As 
relationalism rejects that perceptual experience is a form of representation, it cannot analyze 
perceptual illusions as cases where experience falsely represents certain properties of objects. 
Perceptual illusion cannot be analyzed as a case where perceptual experience itself is 
erroneous or misrepresents. In order to be a serious challenge for the representational view, it 
is essential for relationalism to give an alternative account of illusions. I will examine in this 
chapter the two main strategies of relationalism to give such an alternative account.   
The first strategy is to deny that in typical cases of perceptual illusion, the error has to 
be attributed to perceptual experience itself. As we cannot subjectively distinguish between a 
case of veridical perception and a case of illusion (for ex. two unequal lines and the Müller-
Lyer figure with its equal lines), this may be due to the fact that we are not related to the 
property which makes the difference between these two cases. I will argue that this 
explanation fails, because illusions involve a phenomenal difference in the perception of 
objects of the same type (or, symmetrically, phenomenal sameness in the perception of 
objects of different types). Relationalism requires that the phenomenal character of an 
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experience is explained by the perceived object, and therefore that any phenomenal difference 
between two experiences is explained by a difference in these objects. But in many illusions, 
that phenomenal difference cannot be explained by a difference in the perceived object. 
The second strategy is to attribute the seeming error of perception to other mental 
states than perceptual states. We think wrongly that our perceptual experience is a relation to 
a specific object or property when it is not. The error is attributed to judgment or thought. 
Although these higher mental states could explain error, they cannot explain why things 
phenomenally appear to us in a certain way in illusions. This strategy is confronted with the 
difficulty to explain how thoughts or judgments can explain the phenomenal character of 
illusory experience. Both relational strategies to explain illusions are confronted with serious 
problems. I will claim that, given these problems, the representational view still offers a better 
explanation of perceptual illusions and perceptual experience more generally.  
I will first present the different explanations of perceptual experience given by the 
representational view and the relational view (1). The two following sections will criticize the 
relational analysis of illusions:  the view that perceptual experience itself does not have to be 
analyzed as a form of perceptual error (2), and then the explanation of error in illusions by 
errors in thought or higher order propositional attitudes (3). As conclusion, I will claim that 
the representational view of illusions can still give a better account of illusions. A precise 
justification for that last claim will only be given in the last chapter (chapter 5), where I will 
also show that intentionalism can incorporate certain advantages of the relational view, while 
avoiding its shortcomings. 
 
1. The Content View versus the Relational View 
 
1.1 The Conflict 
 
When we perceive something, we stand in a certain relation to objects (or events) in our 
environment and their properties. Perception (as seeing, hearing etc.) consists in a relation to 
the objects we are perceiving. I would not see an apple, if no apple were in my environment 
and if I were not standing in an appropriate relation to that apple. So, perception is a factive 
relation, it implies the existence of a perceiver and of the object seen. This may be different 
for perceptual experience, the phenomenal experience we usually have when we perceive 
something. We can imagine cases where we have a visual experience of some object while we 
do not actually stand in a relation to such an object in our environment. We may dream, 
hallucinate or have the visual illusion of an apple. In these cases we have the visual 
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experience of an apple, while we do not perceive an apple. The impression we have that our 
perceptual experience can mislead us and can be non-veridical, that it can present something 
which is not there, was a strong argument for the view that perceptual experience is a form of 
representation. It is definitional for representations that they have a content and that the 
content can be accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical. In the philosophy of 
perception, it became quite common to treat perceptual experience on the model of 
propositional attitudes, where a mental state is a relation to some propositional or pictorial 
content (Searle 1983, Peacocke 1983, Harman 1990, Tye 1995, Dretske 1995, Lycan 1996). 
Although this view of perceptual experience has been called by some representationalism, I 
will call it, following Brewer (2006), the content view or also intentionalism, in order to avoid 
confusion with representationalism as a theory about consciousness and the nature of the 
phenomenal character of experience. It is important to distinguish the content view from 
representationalism as the view that the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience 
supervenes on  the representational content of the experience. The content view is neutral on 
this later question of the explanation of the phenomenal character.35  
We can summarize the content view by the following two theses:  
  
 (1) Perceptual experience has content (or is a relation to a content). 
 (2) Perceptual experience can represent P when there is no P (Intentionality). 
  
The content view does not specify what type of content experience has; it can be propositional 
content, pictorial content or scenario content. Important is only the fact that the content 
specifies accuracy conditions, i.e. conditions under which the perceptual experience is 
accurate or veridical. These accuracy conditions may be given by propositions or some non-
propositional scenario.36 The propositional content can be specified as a structured proposition 
or an unstructured set of possible worlds. A structured proposition is composed of 
components: objects, properties or concepts. These components are connected by a 
propositional relation. The relation of predication is for example a possible propositional 
relation connecting concepts, or connecting objects with properties.37 Generally two versions 
of structured propositions are defended, Fregean propositions (or content) composed of 
                                                 
35  See Peacocke (1983) and Block (1990) for a content view which rejects representationalism, but accepts 
intentionalism. Crane (2009b) emphasizes this distinction between the content view (or what he calls 
intentionalism) and representationalism. 
36  For scenario content, see Peacocke (1992). Peacocke conceives that content as non propositional. 
37 On the question of the propositional relation and the unity of the proposition connecting its components, see 
King (2009), Soames (2010). 
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concepts and Russellian propositions (or content) composed of objects and properties. Both 
versions of propositional content are defended in the case of perceptual experience (for 
Fregean content, see McDowell (1996), Chalmers (2006), Schellenberg (2011a) for Russellian 
content see Tye (2009)). Contrary to the definition of content as structured propositions, 
unstructured propositions can avoid to specify the components of the proposition and their 
relation. It defines a proposition as a set of possible worlds. The sentence “A table is red”, 
expresses a proposition defined by the set of all possible worlds containing a red table. If I 
perceptually represent singular objects, for example this red table, then the content is the set 
of possible worlds in which this table is red. If perceptual experience is conceived as 
representing objects from a specific point of view, then the content is a centered possible 
world, a world indexed on a perceiving subject and a specific time.38  
Having content or being related to a content does obviously not exclude being related 
to external objects or properties as it is the case in veridical perceptual experience. And it does 
not exclude that objects and properties enter the content as it is the case in Russellian 
propositions. In that case, being related to the content involves being related to the objects and 
properties which are the components of the proposition. But there are also other versions of 
the content view, where the relation to the content does not involve any relation to an object 
or property, but just involves that the world is represented in a certain way.39 On the view of 
Fregean content for example, the proposition is composed only of concepts or modes of 
presentation which refer to the world, but no objects or properties enter into the content itself.      
When I use the term representation, I will always mean the higher form of 
representation which implies the thesis of intentionality that the represented object may not 
exist. Representation in that form is different from the simpler form which requires only that 
the vehicle of representation stands in a causal or informational relation to the represented 
object and where the vehicle cannot represent without standing in that causal or informational 
relation to its object. Such a relation is factive in that it implies the existence of the relata, 
while the intentional relation to an object is not factive. The higher form of representations 
mentioned here have intentional content. Representation in that sense implies the possibility 
of misrepresentation and error.  
Recently, the content view has been criticized and it has been questioned that 
                                                 
38 In chapter 5, I will discuss which type of content is the most appropriate to characterize perceptual content. I 
will opt for structured, Russellian content. 
39  See Logue (2009) for the distinction between relation-including and relation-excluding versions of the content 
view. 
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perceptual experiences have representational content.40 Against the content view, it has been 
emphasized that perceptual experience is essentially a relation to external and mind-
independent objects and properties (Campbell 2002, Martin 2004, Travis 2004, Johnston 
2004, Brewer 2006, Noë 2006, 2009 and 2012). For this relationalist view, the factive 
perceptual relation is paradigmatic for perceptual experience: As we cannot see an apple if 
there is no apple, we cannot have a perceptual experience of an apple without there being an 
apple in the proximate environment. Generally, relationalism defines the relation involved in 
perceptual experience as the relation of acquaintance between a subject and external, mind-
independent objects or also their properties. Noë (2006) speaks simply of “a contact” with 
objects and situations of the world.  The external objects and their properties are constitutive 
parts of the experience and experiences differ with the objects or properties which enter into 
them. In opposition to the content view, the main position of relationalism can be described 
by the following theses:  
 
(1) Perceptual experience is a relation of acquaintance to objects, events,  situations or 
properties. 
 (2) Perceptual experience has no representational content. 
 (3) Perceptual experience can obtain or fail to obtain, but cannot be veridical or non-
veridical.  
 
A fundamental difference to the content view is the rejection of intentionality in perception. 
There is no perceptual experience of P, if the experience is not actually related to an actual P. 
But it is possible that, in the absence of P, it seems to me that I have a perceptual experience 
of P. In this case, I am just wrong about my perceptual experience. Relationalists do not deny 
that other mental states may have representational content; they just deny it for perceptual 
experience. They do not reject the representational theory of the mind, but just reject its 
application to perception. In that sense they are less radical than those philosophers who reject 
the concept of representation generally (as some defenders of a purely syntactic theory of the 
mind or of dynamic systems theory).  
Although some intentionalists defended the content view against the relationalist 
challenge (Byrne 2009, Schellenberg 2011a, Pautz 2009 and 2010), Siegel (2010) questioned 
                                                 
40 Some relationalists like Brewer (2006) or Travis (2004) reject totally the use of the term content in the case of 
perceptual experience. Others like Noë (2006 and 2012: chap. 3) reject only the attribution of representational or 
intentional content to perceptual experience, but continue to speak of content. But Noë means by perceptual 
“content“ only the objects and properties we actually stand in contact with. The difference is only terminological 
between those who reject to speak of perceptual content and those who reject any representational content in 
perception, but continue to call the objects or properties we are related to a “content“. 
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whether there really is such a strong opposition between the two views. Siegel distinguishes a 
weak from a strong version of the content view and claims that the weak version, which she 
calls the “Property View“, is compatible with most versions of relationalism. She claims that 
only the “Strong Content View” is in opposition to most versions of relationalism. The 
“Strong Content View” says that perceptual experience is a propositional attitude toward 
perceptual content. The weaker “Property View” says only that perceptual experiences 
involve “relations to properties presented in experience” (Siegel 2010: 71); a position most 
relationalists would accept. Siegel claims that such a relation to properties is already sufficient 
for the ascription of accuracy conditions to perceptual experiences. These experiences are 
accurate, if the properties they are related to are instantiated. So, if one admits that 
experiences are related to properties and that properties are instantiated, a weak version of the 
content view cannot be avoided. Only a radical version of relationalism (“Radical Naïve 
Realism”), which says that experiences are relations to objects, but not to properties, avoids 
the content view, so Siegel´s analysis. But it is questionable that a relation to properties is 
sufficient to establish a weak version of the content view. First, as Siegel admits, experiences 
can be relations to properties which do not specify any conditions in the environment and 
which therefore do not fix accuracy conditions. If perceptual experience is just a relation to 
properties of the subjective experience, for example to raw feels, or a relation to properties of 
sense data, then that experience specifies nothing about the environment. There are no 
specific conditions in the environment which would make that experience inaccurate.  The 
experience would have no accuracy conditions. So, experience must not just be a relation to 
properties per se, but must present these properties to be instantiated in some object. But then, 
it is unclear how such an experience, which presents property P to be instantiated in X, differs 
from a relation to a proposition representing P to be instantiated in X and therefore, how it 
differs from the Strong Content View, the view that perceptual experience is a relation to 
propositional content.  
But even if there is no sharp difference between Siegel´s weak and strong version of 
the content view, the Strong Content View itself, i.e. perceptual experiences conceived as 
propositional attitudes towards content, can be quite close to relationalism, as Siegel 
underlines (Siegel 2010: 74-75).  
First, intentionalists can accept disjunctivist explanations of perceptual experience and 
therefore give different explanations for hallucinatory and veridical experiences which seem 
subjectively indistinguishable (see McDowell 1996 and Tye 2007 for such a disjunctivist 
intentionalism). Disjunctivism was originally introduced to reject a presupposition of the 
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argument from illusion, namely that experiences which are subjectively indistinguishable 
must be explained in the same way (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990). In the argument from 
illusion (Ayer 1940), it was supposed that we can have veridical and illusory experiences 
which are subjectively indistinguishable. From there it was inferred that the phenomenal 
character of the two experiences must be explained in the same way. Disjunctivism rejects 
this. A disjunctive explanation of the subjectively indistinguishable perceptual experiences is 
possible: the veridical experience can be explained by a relation to the seen object and the 
same phenomenal character in the illusory case by something else, for example some 
representational content. A disjunctive explanation of indistinguishable experiences is 
possible. (for a review of disjunctivism, see Byrne and Logue 2008).   
Secondly, in the non-hallucinatory cases, propositions can involve or be constituted by 
objects and properties of the external world. Under these conditions, a relation to these 
propositions involves a relation to external objects and their properties. It is possible to 
formulate a version of the strong content view, where perceptual experience is conceived as a 
relation to a Russellian proposition constituted of objects of the environment and their 
properties (see Thau 2002 and 200741). Russellian propositions can also have some empty 
slots or gaps into which objects can enter. Tye (2009) proposed such a version of gappy 
contents.42 Such versions of the content view are quite close to relationalism. But can we 
conclude from this that it is merely a matter of terminology whether experiences are relations 
to object- and property-involving propositional content or whether experiences are only 
relations to objects and properties, a non-propositional content, which may give rise to 
propositions, as Siegel suggests (Siegel 2010: 75)?  On a view of propositions as discussed 
above, what differentiates intentionalism from relationalism is the way the objects and 
properties are related. If perceptual experience is a relation to a Russellian proposition, then 
its components, objects and properties, are united by a propositional relation, for example the 
relation of ascription or predication.43 The propositional relation ascribes the property to the 
object and this ascription (or predication) can be true or false. The object can actually 
instantiate that property or not. Although both relationalism and this kind of intentionalism 
would claim here that the experience is a relation to external objects and their properties, 
intentionalism has, with the propositional relation, a means to evaluate the accuracy of the 
                                                 
41  In Thau (2007) actually abandons the reference to propositions and suggest that a relational explanation of 
experience is preferable in order to avoid any reference to abstract entities which might be involved in 
propositions. In chapter 5, I will defend a view similar to Thau´s Russellian content in Thau (2002). 
42  See Tye (2009) for gappy content in Russellian propositions and  Schellenberg (2011a) for a Fregean version.  
43  For the question of the unity of propositions and the propositional relation, see Soames (2008) and King 
(2009). 
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experience itself, a means relationalism has not.44 Both the relationalist and the intentionalist 
can say that perceptual experience is a relation to objects and properties, but for the 
intentionalist perceptual experience, by its relation to a proposition, also indicates which 
property is ascribed to which object.45
Although there are versions of the content view which are in strong contrast to 
relationalism, versions in which the content is constituted of concepts or abstract objects 
which refer to the objects and properties of our environment, there are other versions where 
the difference to relationalism seems slight. But still, there remains the difference that 
experience is accurate or inaccurate, veridical or non-veridical in one case, but not in the 
other.  
 
1.2. Reasons for Relationalism 
 
I have described the conflict and opposition between the content view and relationalism, but I 
did not mention what makes relationalism attractive. I will now consider and evaluate four 
arguments which relationalists give in favor of their view: (1) The phenomenological 
argument, (2) the argument from particularity, (3) the argument from indeterminacy and (4) 
the argument from science.46
(1) The phenomenological argument: The main argument for a relationalist view of 
experience comes from considerations about the phenomenology of our perceptual 
experience. In visual perception we seem to be immediately presented with the external 
physical objects and their properties. I see my table, its blue color and the papers and 
computer on it. It does not seem to me that representations are involved in the experience of 
these objects. They are immediately present. Compare this to reading, where you see letters 
and lines covering a page and through them you get information about something else. 
Nothing resembles this mediated representation in our visual experience. We neither feel the 
presence of some vehicles of representation (as the letter in reading) nor any relation to a 
content other than the singular physical things themselves. Relationalists speak of the “sense 
of presence” (Noë 2006: 48) or of the sense of intimacy in perceptual experience and explain 
                                                 
44  If we adopt an unstructured view of propositions as sets of possible worlds, for example sets of possible 
worlds involving this particular object and its properties, the difference to relationalism may be stronger then on 
the structured view of propositions, given that sets of possible worlds are abstract objects. But the mentioned 
strong content views closest to relationalism, i.e. McDowell (1996) Thau (2002) and Tye (2009),  all use the 
structured view.  
45 I will give in chapter 5 a more extensive defense of an intentionalist view which conserves the advantages of 
relationalism. 
46  For an overview of the main arguments for relationalism, see Logue (2009), Siegel (2010) and Schellenberg 
(2011a). 
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this feeling by the specific relation of acquaintance a subject has towards the objects. We do 
not have this feeling of presence in other mental states like for example in beliefs or other 
propositional attitudes. The things we think about are not immediately and unavoidably 
present in the way they are in visual perception. 
This is certainly a strong argument against any version of indirect realism, a position 
which holds that we are aware of the external things by being aware of some other 
intermediaries. Classically, sense-datum theory was such a form of indirect realism and sense-
data were conceived as such intermediary objects of awareness. But intentionalism rejects this 
form of indirect realism. Most intentionalists accept the transparency of experience.47 
Experience seems transparent to us in the sense that we are only aware of external objects and 
their properties, but not of any properties of the experience itself. When we try to concentrate 
on any quality or property our experience has, we cannot avoid concentrating only on the 
qualities and properties objects seem to have. In that sense experience is transparent or 
diaphanous (Moore 1903).  
Furthermore, for the content view in perception, we are only aware of the objects of 
the environment and not of a proposition or accuracy conditions, even if perceptual 
experience stands in some relation to propositions. So, the phenomenological argument is 
strong against indirect realism and against intentionalists who reject the transparency of 
experience and accept “sensational content” and qualia, the awareness of intrinsic 
phenomenal properties of experience. But that argument is no real threat against 
intentionalists who accept that the phenomenal character of experience is wholly explained by 
representational content (representationalism). Still, intentionalists are confronted with the 
question, why perceptual experience gives rise to the feeling of the presence of objects while 
beliefs do not, although both are conceived as relations to propositional content. But this 
difference can be explained by the different nature of the content in beliefs and perceptions, 
for example by the view that perceptual content is non-conceptual, contrary to belief. If we 
further suppose that a belief stands in a relation to a proposition formed of concepts, while 
perceptual experience stands in a relation to a proposition composed of external objects and 
their properties, then the force of the phenomenological argument as an argument for 
relationalism disappears mostly.  
(2) The argument from particularity: When I see an object, for example the tree in 
front of my house, I do not only see some object which instantiates a certain number of 
properties, but I see this particular tree. I would not see this tree, if I had an identical 
                                                 
47  For intentionalists rejecting the transparency of experience, see Peacocke (1983), Block (1990), Crane 
(2009b). 
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perceptual experience somewhere else. Furthermore, my capacity to have singular thoughts, 
thoughts about this particular object, is explained by the fact that I have or had a perceptual 
experience of this singular object. Now, relationalists claim that they can explain in a better 
way our capacity for singular thought, because these thoughts derive from our perceptual 
relation to particular objects (Martin 2002, Campbell 2002). For relationalism, the particular 
object is a constitutive part of the experience and these experiences are individuated by the 
particular objects they are related to. For intentionalists, experiences are individuated by their 
content and this content may be independent of the particular object one is seeing. 
It is certainly true that some versions of the content view cannot account for any 
singular content of perceptual experience. Tye called the Existential Thesis the principle that 
the content of perceptual experience is specified without reference to a particular object. It is 
specified by propositions containing no objects, but only existentially quantified variables and 
properties (Tye 2009). But if this thesis is rejected, as it is in Tye (2009), singular objects can 
enter into the content of experience. The content is then given by a proposition which has 
singular objects as constituents. Under these conditions, the advantage relationalism derives 
from the argument from particularity can also be captured by the content view (see 
Schellenberg 2011b for such a view). So, intentionalism can accommodate singular content. 
But contrary to relationalism, it is not commited to singular objects. Singular objects can enter 
into its content, but also other entities as for example intentional objects. This is indubitably 
an advantage when it comes to perceptual experiences, where there seems to be no object, as 
in the case of hallucinations.    
(3) The argument from indeterminacy: Travis (2004) has argued that perceptual 
experience does not determine a specific content. Perceptual experience does not determine a 
specific way the world must be for the experience to be veridical. Given that experience has 
no determinate content, Travis rejects generally the idea of perceptual content. First, his 
argument is based on the presupposition that content is supposed to be given by the perceptual 
appearances. We attribute content to experience by attending to the appearances, the way 
things “look“, “appear” or “seem”. If something looks to be X, then we attribute content X to 
that perceptual experience. Secondly, Travis supposes that we get a correct analysis of what 
appearances are by looking at the comparative sense of appearance words (“look“, “seem“, 
“appear“)48: Looks are understood in the sense that something “looks like” X, “appears like“ 
X. If I experience the appearance of a cat, then something looks like a cat to me. The central 
argument then is that there is no one way that something looks like, but that what something 
                                                 
48 On the different senses or uses of appear words, see Chisholm (1957: chap. 4) and also Schellenberg (2011a) 
in her criticism of Travis.  
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looks like depends on the comparisons which are made in different contexts. An animal can 
look like a cat in one context and like a dog on others, for example from far away. There is no 
limit to such comparisons and the same experienced objects can sometimes seem as one type 
of thing and sometimes as another, sometimes look like a cat, sometimes like a dog. Given 
that the perceptual appearances in that comparative sense are highly indeterminate, the 
argument concludes that perceptual experiences have no content at all.  
For Travis, only thoughts about the perceptual experience give to it a determinate 
content. I see this specifically as a “black cat“, only when I apply these concepts to the 
perceptual experience, only when I think that it is a black cat. Before that, given only the 
perceptual experience, I could see it as something different. For Travis it is therefore a 
mistake to attribute a specific content to perceptual experience itself, because that content 
comes in only at a higher conceptual level, the level of thought and judgment. It has been 
criticized that this argument relies on a specific interpretation of appearance words, namely 
the comparative use of these words, which is only one possibility to interpret this kind of 
terms (Schellenberg 2011a). 
(4) The argument from science: In the last 30 years cognitive psychology has strongly 
emphasized the view that perceptual experience are the result of a complex constructive 
process where internal representations of the distal objects of the environment are constructed 
from the information available at the proximal stimuli of the senses. The function of 
perception is the construction of internal representations (for an overview, see Palmer 1999. 
chap 1). This empirical work was a strong support for the philosophical view that perception 
is a representation of distant external objects. But more recent developments in psychology 
have criticized the view that perception consists in the construction of internal representations. 
In the last years psychologists have emphasized the role of direct interaction with the 
environment and the use of the information immediately available in the environment without 
the necessity to construct complex internal representations. Experiments on change blindness 
and inattentional blindness could show, that the internal pictures of our environment the 
visual system was supposed to construct is much less complex and poorer in detail (Simons 
and Levin 1997 and 1998; Simons and Chabris 1999). Others have claimed that representation 
is not like an internal image, but is much more distributed. Information is distributed in order 
to guide different processes of interaction with the environment. There is no need to bundle 
this information into one internal model or image of the environment (Brooks 1991). Some 
psychologists have claimed that there is no need for the construction of internal 
representations in perception, because we can use just the bit of information present in the 
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environment in the moment we need it. Instead of complex internal representations, we can 
use the world as an “external memory” (O´Regan 1992). These recent developments have led 
to a certain skepticism about internal representations.  
Logue (2009: 62-63) stressed that the central role of representations in cognitive 
psychology is a problem for relationalists, given that this scientific concept of representation 
fits perfectly well the philosophical view that representations involve propositional content.49 
Logue concludes that there is an “argument from science” against relationalism. But given the 
growing skepticism about representations in certain areas of cognitive psychology, there is 
equally an argument from science for relationalism and for a view which emphasizes the 
direct access to and the direct interaction with the environment. Especially Noë (2004) 
emphasized that these developments in certain areas of the cognitive sciences make a 
relational view of perceptual experience more plausible. Noë emphasizes the active and touch 
like character of perception and the dynamical contact with the environment and questions the 
role of internal representation in perception. 
But cognitive psychology still dominantly uses the concept of representation, 
especially in the psychology of perception. And that concept is often used, in a way similar to 
its meaning in philosophy, as having content and expressing a proposition.50 Even if 
representations are conceived as less complex and rich, as distributed and extended in a 
dynamic way, they are still an obstacle to a view, such as relationalism, which rejects 
generally representations in perception. Sometimes relationalists avoid this problem by 
confining the representations of cognitive science to the sub-personal level or by denying that 
the representations postulated by the cognitive sciences have semantic properties and 
representational content (see Travis 2004: 59, Noë 2004: 28 f.). They argue that the concept 
of representation used in psychology refers only to causal processes at the sub-personal level, 
processes which have neither accuracy conditions nor content. This interpretation is 
questionable, given that psychologists explicitly say that perceptual experience can be wrong 
and can misrepresent the environment. Perceptual representations can be the product of the 
misapplication of hidden assumptions in the cognitive process. Perceptual illusions are 
explained by such misapplications of cognitive assumptions which normally generate accurate 
representations. These misapplications are explicitly taking place at the sub-personal, 
unconscious level (Palmer 1999: 8).51 The strategy of relationalists to confine the normative 
                                                 
49 See p. 30-32  for a similar argument. 
50 See chapter 1, section 4. 
51 See p. 31 for evidence that psychologists use representations in a way which attributes semantic properties to 
them. 
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and semantic evaluation of mental states only to the personal level is explicitly in 
contradiction to the position taken by many cognitive psychologsts. It is therefore 
questionable that such a division of labor of philosophy at the personal level and cognitive 
science at the sub-personal, semantic content at the personal level and purely causal processes 
at the sub-personal level can be maintained. 
The four arguments support relationalism, but are not decisive against the content 
view. But it is certainly so that intentionalists must move much closer to a relationalist view in 
order to disarm arguments like those given in (1) and (2). But the particular force of the 
content view lies in its capacity to explain the non-veridical cases of perceptual experience, 
the cases of illusion and hallucination. It is therefore particularly important for relationalism 
to address these cases and give an alternative account to the one which explains illusions (and 
hallucinations) by representational content. 
 
1.3. The Problem of Illusions  
 
I will first describe the problems for a relationalist account of illusions. I will then show how 
these problems are used in the argument from illusion against any direct realism. Ultimately, 
the argument from illusion fails against the relationalist version of direct realism, but the 
problems to account for illusions stay a challenge for relationalism.  
The relationalist claims that perceptual experience is a relation to objects and 
properties. These objects and properties enter into the experience and are components of it. 
When I see a black cat, I am related to that cat and this animal enters into my perceptual 
experience. As we saw with the phenomenological argument, relationalism wants also to give 
a plausible account of the phenomenology of our experience. When I see a black cat, a black 
cat appears to be in front of me and the fact that I stand in a perceptual relation to this cat and 
its property (blackness) explains the specific appearances. So, for relationalists the perceptual 
experience has a “world-revelatory character” (Logue 2009: 36). But this description of 
experience only works for “veridical” experiences, but not for perceptual illusions. In 
illusions we have the following situation: 
 
 (1) An object appears to have property P. 
 (2) The object does not instantiate property P (but property Q). 
 
What we seem to see is contradicted by the actual properties of the seen object. Two problems 
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arise for relationalism. The first problem is, how to give an account of the phenomenology of 
illusion, that is, how to account for condition (1). Some relationalists (Brewer 2006) explain 
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience by citing the object we see. But if no 
feature of the object can explain the specific phenomenal character of the experience, there is 
a problem. How can the relationalist give an account of statement (1)? Let us say, there is 
actually a black cat and it seems to me that there is a blown cat. The perceptual experience 
can only be a relation to the object or to property Q it instantiates (the cat and its blackness). 
As what I see does not instantiate property P, the perceptual relation does not explain what 
appears to be in front of me (property P, i.e. brownness). My relation to the actual black cat 
cannot explain the appearance of a brown cat. So relationalism has a problem to explain 
statement (1), i.e. the phenomenology in illusions.  Often it is even so in illusions that the fact 
that the object instantiates property Q, excludes that the object instantiates property P. The cat 
cannot be black and brown at the same part of its surface. So, the perceptual relation to that 
black part of the cat seems even to contradict the brownish appearance of that part in my 
phenomenology. 
There is a second problem for relationalism: given condition (2), how can we avoid 
saying that perceptual experience is erroneous. Error implies the attribution of false content. 
As relationalists deny that perceptual experience has representational content, they have to 
avoid the attribution of error to perceptual experience. The relationalist must avoid saying that 
perceptual experience presents something which is not the case or that experience is in some 
way erroneous. So he must either avoid to say that there is a mismatch between the 
appearance of P and the fact that the object is Q, or he must attribute that mismatch to some 
other mental state than perceptual experience, usually a mental state which, contrary to 
experience, has representational content. 
The two problems are connected in the following way: If in the case of illusions, the 
relationalist cannot explain the phenomenal character of perceptual experience by citing 
external objects and their properties, he will be forced to explain that phenomenal character 
by something else than these objects. The usual response is that in the case of illusion, the 
phenomenal character of experience has to be explained by the representational content. The 
attribution of error to experience has the same consequences; it forces to accept that 
experience has false representational content. In both mentioned problems of illusion, the 
relationalist is challenged to offer explanations of illusion which avoid the attribution of 
representational content to experience. 
Let us now turn to the challenge presented for relationalism by the argument from 
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illusion (Ayer 1940 and 1956; for analyses of the argument, see Robinson 1994, Smith 2002). 
Relationalism is a form of direct realism and the argument from illusion was especially 
developed against direct realism. The argument is supposed to show that we never directly 
perceive the external objects of our environment. If that were true, relationalism would be 
untenable. The argument begins from the case of illusion as described by statement (1) and 
(2) above and from the fact that a relational account of experience in this case of illusion is 
implausible.  The experience of P stated in (1) cannot be an experience of the external object, 
because that object does not instantiate P. The argument concludes from the fact that there is 
no external object which is P, that the experience must be of a mental object which 
instantiates P, a sense-datum. This conclusion presupposes the so-called phenomenal principle 
(Robinson 1994: 32). The principle says that if I have an experience of some property, then 
there must be some object which instantiates that property. That principle is contestable and is 
rejected by intentionalists. I can have an experience of P, when there is nothing which 
instantiates P. The experience of P is just explained by some intentional content and not by an 
object which is P. So the inference to mental objects like sense-data can easily be blocked 
with the rejection of the phenomenal principle. But still, the argument relies also on the 
difficulty to give a direct realist (or relationalist) account of the phenomenology of illusion, 
the first problem of illusion mentioned above. And this rests a problem for relationalism. 
The second part of the argument from illusion generalizes the inference to sense-data 
as objects of experience to all cases of perceptual experience, veridical or non-veridical 
experience. It starts from the subjective indistinguishability of the illusory experience from 
the veridical experience, i.e. from the case where instead of condition (2) above, we have (2´): 
the object does instantiate P. It is supposed that in both cases, (2) and (2´), it is possible to 
have experiences which cannot be distinguished by using introspection and reflection alone. 
So it is supposed that we cannot distinguish the case where the object does instantiate Q 
although it seems to instantiate P from the case where it actually instantiates P. A transition 
between the experience in the veridical and the illusory case could be seamless and 
unnoticeable. The argument introduces a further requirement, the “sameness clause“. This 
clause requires that we should explain the same phenomenologies of experience in the same 
way. This second part of the argument supposes that the phenomenology can be the same in 
the veridical and the illusory case and the first part of the argument concluded that in the case 
of illusions, the phenomenology is explained by a mental object or sense datum. Given the 
sameness clause, it is infered that the phenomenology of the experience in the veridical case 
has also to be explained by a mental object or sense datum. The thesis of direct realism that in 
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a perceptual experience we are directly aware of the external objects without being aware of 
intermediaries is therefore rejected. Now, the relationalists generally reject the sameness 
clause: it is not the case that, if we cannot subjectively distinguish between two experiences, 
we must have experiences of the same kind. Our capacities for introspection are limited and 
we could have different experiences without being able to distinguish them subjectively 
(Martin 2004). And if the perceptual experiences are different, then the explanations for these 
experiences can also be very different. So, even if a satisfactory relationalist explanation of 
the perceptual experience in the case of illusion is not available, the relationalist explanation 
of experience in the veridical case can be perfectly correct and satisfactory. Although we 
seem to experience P in both cases, we actually have two different experiences and are related 
to two different objects, to an object instantiating P and an object instantiating Q.  
The argument from illusion does not succeed to reject direct realism and relationalism 
concerning experiences in veridical cases. But still it is so, that the cases of illusion are quite 
problematic for relationalism. And it is essential for relationalism to give an account of 
illusions in order to be able to compete with intentionalism. I will discuss in the two next 
sections how relationalists address the two mentioned problems of illusion: the explanation of 
the phenomenology of illusion (why do I seem to see P when I am related to an object which 
does not instantiate P?) and the satisfactory account of error in illusions. And I will claim that 
in both cases relationalism does not give satisfactory solutions to these problems and for these 
reasons the intentionalist account of illusions stays the more attractive one. 
 
2. The Relational View of Illusions  
 
2.1. Blindness and Illusion 
 
For an adequate explanation of illusory perceptual experience, it is important to distinguish 
illusions from other types of perceptual experiences which are not illusory and deceptive. I 
will claim here that there are two different ways perception can fail. Perceptual experience 
can fail to present certain properties. In this case we have no phenomenal experience of these 
properties. They do not enter into our experience or are not represented by the experience. 
This failure is a case of lack of visual acuity, a case of blindness i.e. a case where we do not 
see or we have lost the ability to see certain properties. Such cases have to be distinguished 
from illusions where we have a phenomenal experience of a certain property, but the property 
we seem to see cannot, on closer inquiry, be found in the object we are seeing. In the first case 
our perceptual experience lacks acuity, in the second case the experience lacks accuracy. I 
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will claim here that the failure to see certain properties and the failure to distinguish one 
property from another are due to a lack of acuity. As relationalists reject the view that 
perceptual experience has content and accuracy conditions, they also reject that illusions 
should be explained by a lack of accuracy. Therefore relationalists try to explain illusions in 
some other way. Either they deny that actual cases of illusion involve error or they try to 
explain the visual failure in the experience of illusions by a lack of acuity. I will claim here 
that genuine cases of illusion cannot be explained by such a lack of acuity.  
Acuity is a gradual phenomenon. My vision can be more or less acute. My capacity to 
see small objects, to see fine-grained differences of shade or to hear sounds can be more or 
less sharp.52 Acuity depends on the constitution of the perceptual system. The perceptual 
systems in different animals show different degrees of acuity: humans can hear 340.000 
different sounds in the range from 15 to 15.000 Hertz. But cats can hear a more extended 
range of frequencies (from 30 to 70.000 Hertz) and the barn-owl has, compared to humans, a 
much higher acuity in the precise localization of sounds (Thompson 2000: chap. 8). 
Perceptual acuity varies also gradually with circumstances, either those external to the 
organism or internal to it. It diminishes gradually with the distance from the observer to the 
objects. The farther we are away from an object the less can we see the properties the object 
has. Acuity can diminish with fatigue, external circumstances (fog), aging of or damage to 
sensory organs. A typical case of diminished acuity is blindness. Color blindness is for 
example a diminished capacity to see and to distinguish colors. Acuity is connected to the 
capacity to distinguish between objects or between properties. The more acuity our perception 
has, the more properties can we see and the more are we capable to distinguish between them. 
Let us take the example of a distant tower. With greater acuity, we can not only see the two-
dimensional contour of the tower, but also its three-dimensional shape. We see the tower for 
example as round. This increases also our capacity to distinguish a round tower from a square 
tower, a capacity we would not have with less acuity. When we lack acuity, we may be 
incapable to distinguish the round tower from the square one.  
Accuracy is also a gradual notion in the sense that our perceptual experience can be 
more or less accurate. This distinguishes accuracy conditions from the truth conditions of 
sentences or propositional attitudes. A belief is either true or false. A perceptual experience 
can be partially non-veridical. I can for example see accurately the shape, size and texture of 
an object but inaccurately its color. Such an experience is partially accurate and partially 
inaccurate.  But accuracy means an absence of error and accurate experiences are completely 
                                                 
52 Siegel  (2010: 32) emphasizes that acuity can be characterized by the degree of resolution; low acuity would 
be a low degree of resolution.  
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true (Siegel 2010: 30-33). If the properties represented in experience meet the accuracy 
conditions, then the experience of that property is simply true, not only to a certain degree.   
The fact that the accuracy of experience is gradual has to be clearly distinguished from 
the fact that our perceptual experience has acuity only to a certain degree.  Our perceptual 
senses have no perfect acuity, but this does not imply that perceptual experience is only 
partially accurate. Traditionally some philosophers have defended that position: for them 
(Leibniz 1704 and Locke 1700) only perfectly acute experience can be accurate.53 Only if we 
distinguish all the properties of an object and represent them clearly, only then our perceptual 
experience is accurate and free of error. This is a much to strong constraint on accuracy. On 
this condition only a being with perfect acuity or infinite perceptual powers can have accurate 
perceptual experiences. We would not accept such a constraint for the content of beliefs, 
because it would imply that only a complete description of whatever object or fact we 
represent in our belief can be true. But there is no reason to think that a belief with a richer 
content is more accurate than one with poor content. Why should the belief “There is a cat” be 
less accurate than the belief “There is a black cat with a brown tail”. What the belief 
represents, and with how much detail, is just independent of the question whether that content 
is true.  
Acuity is independent from accuracy. Acuity says something about the richness and 
the fine-grainedness of perceptual experience, but it does not say anything about the accuracy 
of that experience. If we do not see certain properties of external objects, this does not imply 
any error or illusion in visual perception. Not seeing something does not imply that we see 
something wrongly. A lower level of visual acuity does not involve error and highly acute 
vision can be inaccurate or erroneous. A blind person capable only to distinguish luminous 
and dark areas in his environment can be perfectly accurate in his visual experience. He 
experiences this part of his environment as darker and it is darker and that part as brighter and 
it is so. His experience lacks acuity but is perfectly accurate. What he represents satisfies the 
accuracy conditions and is therefore a veridical experience. A person with very sharp visual 
acuity would not be immune against visual illusions and perceptual misrepresentation.  
As relationalists want to avoid saying that perceptual experience is erroneous, they 
have the tendency to reduce cases of illusion to cases of diminished acuity. They explain 
illusions by a failure of perceptual contact or failed acquaintance with the perceptual object. 
For them perception can fail to present certain objects or properties, but perception cannot be 
wrong. I will claim here that the failure of perception due to a lack of acuity is different from 
                                                 
53 Siegel (2010: 32 n.5) refers to some philosophers who conceived accuracy as acuity, so Locke (1700/1975: 
book 2, chap. 12, sec. 14) and Leibniz in his Nouveaux Essais (1704/1996: II, 23, § 12). 
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the failure in illusion. Illusions cannot be reduced to failed perceptual contact. Illusion appears 
when perceptual experience presents some property which is not instantiated. This does not 
depend on any degree of acuity. A highly precise and fine-grained visual experience can be an 
illusion. Intentionalism usually describes this kind of perceptual failure as inaccuracy. As 
relationalists reject the view that experiences are accurate or inaccurate, they need another 
account of illusions. But given the independence of acuity from illusion and error, the 
relationalist cannot explain the failure in illusions by a lack of acuity. 
 
2.2. Relationalist Explanations of Illusions 
 
There are different strategies to deal with illusions from a relational point of view. I will 
distinguish here three ways. All three ways try to avoid the conclusion that we are related to a 
property which is not instantiated in some external object or that we are related to an 
(intentional) object which is not actually present. The first of these relational strategies is the 
denial of illusion (1): It can be denied that a perceptual experience which is typically 
described as an illusion actually is one. The phenomenology which seems to be erroneous can 
be contested. Secondly, there is the failure to see (2): Illusion can be redescribed as a failure 
to see certain properties of the object we are seeing. The object instantiates for example the 
property Q, but I am unable to see that property Q. And finally the failure to distinguish (3): 
The object has a certain property and I see that property, but I am unable to distinguish this 
property from other similar properties. I see for example a cat from far away, but I am unable 
to distinguish it from a dog. Because of that inability, it may seem to me that I actually see a 
dog. The first strategy just denies that there are illusions and that there is some kind of failure 
involved in our visual experience, but (2) and (3) acknowledge that there is some failure 
involved in some cases of perception. I will discuss at the end of this section, if these types of 
perceptual failures actually can explain the typical cases of perceptual illusion usually 
discussed in psychology (cases like the Müller-Lyer or the Hering illusion). But before that, 
let us look more closely at the way relationalists use these three strategies in order to avoid the 
intentionalist explanation of illusion by representational content.  
(1) The denial of illusion: Relationalists often insist that many examples of perceptual 
illusions discussed by philosophers are not actually cases of illusion. Ayer classified for 
example the fact that objects appear under many perspectives as cases of perceptual illusions 
(Ayer 1956, chap. 3). A coin appears slightly elliptical from her and massively elliptical from 
there, but it is actually circular, not elliptical. If that is a case of illusion, than perceptual 
experience is massively illusory. And if we say that we have the perceptual experience of 
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ordinary objects like chairs and tables while what we actually see are concatenations of atoms, 
then all perception is a form of illusion. On such a view the manifest appearance of all objects 
of perception is an illusion (Eddington 1928).  
The relationalists are right to criticize the extensive application of the concept of 
illusion to many or most perceptual experiences (Austin 1962, Travis 2004). Noë (2004: chap. 
3.3 and 2006) for example contests that some kind of illusion is involved in the fact that 
objects look different from different perspectives. For him, objects do not only instantiate 
intrinsic properties, but also “perspectival properties”. Schellenberg (2008) defends similar 
properties of objects she calls “situation-dependent properties”. These properties depend only 
from the intrinsic properties of the object and situational features like distance from the 
observer or illumination. Let us look at Noë´s version: A round coin does have the objective 
perspectival property to look elliptical from that specific point of view. From that perspective, 
the coin covers an elliptical shape in the visual field of any observer or on any display of a 
camera. If we admit that objects have such perspectival properties, then our perceptual 
experience can be a relation to such perspectival properties. The fact that these properties 
appear in that experience does not involve any illusion or error in our perceptual experience. 
The fact that the coin looks elliptical is not a perceptual illusion, because its “ellipticality” is a 
perspectival property of the coin. It is also in accordance with our everyday understanding and 
our common sense classifications of illusions to exclude this change of the visual appearance 
of objects which themselves do not change from the category of illusions.  
Perspectival properties and situation-dependent properties are mind-independent 
relational properties (Schellenberg 2008). They depend on the relation between the intrinsic 
properties of objects and properties of situations or points of view. They are different from 
subjective and mind-dependent properties, like for example secondary qualities (if these are 
defined in a relational way). These mind-independent relational properties are objective, 
because they depend only on the objective features of external things and situations.  But 
there are illusions where the property we see can neither be explained by the intrinsic 
properties of the object nor by taking into account perspectival or situation-dependent 
properties i.e. the appearance of the object given a certain illumination and distance. 
Some relationalists go further and try to describe typical cases of illusion in such a 
way that the illusory and erroneous component of the experience disappears. Brewer (2006) 
gives such an account of the Müller-Lyer figure. In psychology that figure is typically 
classified as an illusion. In it, lines of equal length appear to have different lengths. That 
figure corresponds to the definition of an illusion I gave above: Each line appears to have a 
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specific length (P), but actually has a different length (Q), either longer or shorter than it 
appears. Intentionalism can explain that phenomenology by saying that the two equal lines are 
represented as lines of different length. But a relationalist like Brewer who wants to explain 
the phenomenal appearances by the relation to external objects has a problem with such a 
phenomenology. Brewer thinks it possible to contest that the two lines in the figure appear to 
have different lengths. The appearance of unequal lengths, so Brewer, is contradicted by the 
fact that, when we focus on any of the endpoints of the lines, they appear exactly at the place 
where they actually are. Given that they appear at these locations, the two endpoints of each 
line appear at an equal distance of each other. But this contradicts the fact that they appear to 
have different lengths. Brewer concludes that the intentionalist must suppose that the figure is 
represented at the same time as equal and as unequal in length. He must attribute an 
impossible content.  
An impossible content is not per se an objection to intentionalism. There are other 
illusions with contradictory content as for example the waterfall illusion54 and it seems no 
bigger problem to attribute a contradictory content to perceptual experience then to attribute 
such a content to belief. But besides this point, it is quite contestable to claim in the Müller-
Lyer case, as Brewer does, that the lines do not look to have different lengths. It seems quite 
arbitrary to contest the phenomenology most people report. A lot of perceptual illusions are 
constructed on the same model; two equal objects (lines, patterns, colors) are shown in 
different contexts and appear phenomenally different. In the Hering illusion (Figure 1) and the 
Wundt illusion (Figure 2) two equal lines appear to have different shapes and in the 
Checkerboard illusion (Figure 3) two square of the same grey appear as white and black 
respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
54 The waterfall illusion is a motion aftereffect. If one looks for some time at a moving stimulus (for example a 
waterfall) and than looks at a stationary object, this object seems to move in the opposite direction. At a certain 
moment we experience the object as stationary and as moving at the same time. 
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Fig. 1 and 2: Respectively the Hering and the     Fig. 3 Adelson´s Checkerboard illusion: Square 1 and  
Wundt illusion. The straight lines appear to         2 have the same shade of grey, although they look  
have different curved shapes.          different. 
 
It would be quite hard to deny in all these cases that these objects (lines or surfaces) do 
not appear phenomenally different. The denial of illusions also cannot explain the surprise 
people usually show, when they discover that the difference they seemed to see is not there. 
The surprise of people confirms the illusory phenomenology. If people did not wrongly see 
the lines as different, they would show no surprise when they are told that the lines actually 
are not different. So, there are cases like the perception of perspectival properties, where it 
can be sensibly denied that we are in presence of an illusion, but it would go against the 
largely acknowledged phenomenology to deny in such a way all illusions. The denial of 
illusions can hardly be extended beyond certain specific cases of apparent illusions. 
(2) The failure to see: When we see an object there are a lot of its properties we just do 
not see, hidden sides or the components beneath the surface of the object. It would be 
obviously absurd to claim that we have illusions because objects instantiate properties we do 
not see. In that case every perceptual experience would be non-veridical. But the two 
conditions of illusion I stated above (in section 1.3) say that there is an illusion, only if a 
property is presented in experience, but is not instantiated. Contrary to the case of illusion, 
properties which are not even presented in experience do not pose a problem for a relational 
view. We can just say that we are not related to them. Noë (2006 and 2012) tries to reduce the 
cases of illusion to such cases of failure to see something. If that strategy succeeds, the 
problems posed to relationalism by illusions would disappear. Noë gives the example of the 
perception of very distant objects like the stars in the sky (Noë 2006: 49). In that case, so his 
claim, our perceptual relation to these objects breaks down because of the huge distance. He 
insists especially on the fact that size constancy breaks down at large distance. Size constancy 
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in normal visual perception explains why large objects at distance appear bigger than their 
projected size would let suppose. A house at distance seems still big although its projected 
size may not be bigger than the book in front of me. But in the case of the stars, we see huge 
objects as tiny spots. Here, a normal perceptual relation breaks down. So, we cannot say that 
we stand in a perceptual relation to the stars; we just stand in such a relation with events 
caused by these stars, namely traces of light at a certain, much closer distance. Given this 
understanding of our perceptual relation to stars, it is no objection to relationalism to say that 
we experience stars which are extinct. We have no illusory perception of stars which are 
actually extinct, but we perceive veridically near traces of light coming from these extinct 
stars. For Noë, it is not these absent stars which enter my experience but the actually present 
traces of light. In the same way, we have no visual illusion, when we see the houses and cars 
from a plane as tiny objects, although neither cars nor houses are tiny. Here also, the 
perceptual relation fails. 
Can this kind of explanation be extended to other cases of illusion? Noë seems to do 
so in the case of a classical example of an illusion: a straight stick in the water which is seen 
as bent.55 It is not totally clear how to interpret Noë´s brief discussion of that case (Noë 2006: 
52), but Noë suggests that this case can be explained in a similar way than the case of the 
perception of stars. How could such an explanation go? It must say: I see the stick, but I 
cannot see all its properties. In the specific case of the stick, it is the shape of the stick which I 
seem to see wrongly as bent. Given that the stick is not bent but straight, I cannot stand in 
relation to its actual shape property. That property (shape) does not enter into my experience 
and I do not stand in a perceptual relation to it although I do stand in such a relation to the 
stick and its other properties. Therefore, in this case we avoid the situation described above by 
the two conditions for an illusion, namely that a property P (shape) is presented in experience 
but not instantiated in the object we see. Here, the exact shape of the stick (P), just is not 
present in my experience. I could see the distance of an object without quite seeing its shape.  
But given that shape is such a fundamental property of objects, how could I see the other 
properties of the stick, its color, texture, length or thickness and fail to see its shape. Color and 
texture fill out the shape of the stick, length and thickness are aspects of its shape. I could not 
see a stick and fail to see its contours. The explanation of illusion by the failure of seeing does 
not work in this case.  
On the other hand, Noë admits that we “misperceive the spoon as bent in the water” 
(Noë 2006: 52). The above explanation of the perception of the stick by the failure to see, 
                                                 
55  Ayer (1940) discusses this example of the stick as an illusion. Austin (1960) already discussed that example 
and contested that it is an illusion. 
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does not even touch the question how we can “misperceive” something. Misperception 
implies that we perceive something falsely. And this erroneous perception must be either 
explained or explained away by relationalism. The failure to see as in the case of the stars 
cannot do so. The failure to see something does not imply that we see something wrongly. In 
a case of failed seeing, we do not wrongly see some property Q (straight stick) as property P 
(bent), but do not see the property P or Q at all. The failure to see cannot explain the 
phenomenal difference there is between seeing a bent stick and a straight one (between 
property P and Q). I see a straight stick as bent and that is phenomenally different from seeing 
it as straight. It is not the case that I do not see its shape, but I inaccurately see its straight 
shape as bent. 
Even if in the case of the stick in the water the explanation by the failure to see does 
not work, there are many cases were such an explanation is possible. But in these cases it 
explains only cognitive error, not perceptual error or illusion. Let us take Austin´s example of 
a soap lemon which looks like a real lemon (Austin 1962: 50). I do not see the properties 
which distinguishes that fake lemon from a real one. I see only properties it shares with real 
lemons (color, shape, size, texture) and I am not in anyway wrong about these properties. I am 
wrong when I conclude from these properties that the soap lemon has also the other properties 
real lemons usually have. But drawing that erroneous conclusion is a cognitive error, not a 
perceptual error. So, the failure to see can explain cognitive “illusions“ (false beliefs), but not 
perceptual ones.   
(3) The failure to distinguish: the most important strategy of relationalists confronting 
illusions is based on the claim that our perception is in some ways indeterminate. Travis´ 
argument from indeterminacy says that the appearances do not determine a supposed 
representational content in a precise way (Travis 2004). When we have the appearance of a 
colored object, we cannot attribute to that perceptual experience the content “red apple”, 
because the appearance is similar to or even indistinguishable from other objects and other 
shades. Travis argues that it is only our thoughts or judgments which give a specific content 
(“red apple”) to mental states, but perceptual experiences themselves do not have such a 
content.  
Brewer (2006 and 2008) applies a similar reasoning to the case of the Müller-Lyer 
figure. What I called the “denial of illusion” was one possible account presented by Brewer to 
avoid the intentionalist consequences from illusions. Brewer gives a second possible account 
of that figure which would equally avoid these consequences. Brewer´s second account is the 
following: The perceptual experience of the Müller-Lyer figure is a direct relation to the 
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actual lines on the piece of paper. The lines themselves enter into my experience and these 
constituents of my experience happen to be of equal length. But at the same time, I am unable 
to subjectively distinguish that experience from an experience of two unequal lines (without 
hashes at the end of the lines). So, I have the experience of two equal lines which happen to 
be not only similar but also subjectively indistinguishable from two unequal lines. The 
subjective indistinguishability here does not mean that they are by no means distinguishable. 
It is easily possible to distinguish them by measuring them. It means only that I cannot 
distinguish them by using introspection and reflection alone. In the two perceptual 
experiences of the equal lines and of the unequal lines, I stand in a perceptual relation to 
different objects, but as my experience is not totally transparent to me, I am unable to 
distinguish subjectively the two experiences. Therefore, I am also unable to tell, if I 
experience equal or unequal lines. The threat to interpret the perceptual experience of the 
Müller-Lyer figure as a misrepresentation is also avoided. The experience is a relation to the 
actual lines and these lines are quite similar to unequal lines so that it is easy to be mistaken 
about what we actually experience. The mistake is not one of the perceptual experience but is 
situated at a higher level. The experience itself is not wrong, but I am wrong about my 
experience. My thoughts about the experience are wrong. 
The problem with that explanation of the Müller-Lyer case is that it presupposes that 
my perceptual experience is ambiguous and that I cannot tell whether the lines are equal or 
unequal. The experience is described as ambiguous and this ambiguity explains why it is easy 
to be mislead by it or to take it for what it is not. But that seems a curious redescription of the 
phenomenology of the experience in the Müller-Lyer case. It is not so that I cannot see 
whether the lines seem equal or unequal, they immediately struck me as unequal in length. 
And I am surprised when I hear that they are not unequal in length.  They do not “look like“, 
or seem to be “similar” to lines of equal length.  
There are perfectly good cases in perception where such an ambiguity exists. Let us 
take again the case of a the distant tower. I cannot tell whether it is a round or a square tower. 
Either I only see the two-dimensional contour of the tower, but cannot see its three-
dimensional shape at all, or at least the depth cues are ambiguous and I cannot visually 
distinguish its shape. In that case either the three-dimensional shape of the object does not 
enter into my experience or the perceptual experience is ambiguous. But this is not the case in 
the Müller-Lyer figure. Here I clearly experience one line as shorter than the other. I see a 
phenomenal difference between the two lines. Specifically that phenomenal difference 
represents a problem for relationalism, because there is no corresponding difference in the 
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perceived objects. That phenomenal difference cannot be explained by a difference in the 
objects I am related to in perception. Brewer assimilates the case of illusion to the case where 
we do not see a certain property or only see it in an unclear, ambiguous manner, as in the 
tower example. He assimilates an illusion to a failure to see a certain property. 
There is a phenomenal difference in the appearance of the upper and the lower line of 
the Müller-Lyer drawing: the upper line looks longer than the lower line. As I noted before, 
many perceptual illusions in psychology are constructed on the same model than the Müller-
Lyer figure. Two objects (for ex. lines) which share a certain property are presented and they 
seem to differ in that property (color, shape, size). The experiences of the two objects are 
clearly subjectively distinguishable. That phenomenal difference in the appearance of the two 
objects poses a problem for relationalism, because it cannot be explained by a difference in 
the objects. Brewer tries to assimilate these cases of perceptual illusions to the case 
encountered in the argument from illusion. There, two objects which are ontologically 
different are subjectively indistinguishable. It was presupposed in the argument that we do not 
notice a phenomenal difference in seeing both objects (the veridical and the illusory case). 
Brewer compares the Müller-Lyer figure to another drawing which is ontologically different, 
two lines of different length, but does not seem to differ phenomenally. He concludes that 
subjective indistinguishability of ontologically different objects is no argument against 
relationalism. Indeed, indistinguishability neither implies that the objects of experience are the 
same, nor that we must have the same perceptual experience. Brewer avoids the threat for 
relationalism coming from the argument from illusion. But he does not address the threat 
coming from illusion more generally, namely the fact that objects instantiating the same 
properties (ontologically similar) seem phenomenally different. How can that phenomenal 
difference be explained by the relational view? This question stays open.  
So, in the case of a failure to distinguish, we see two different properties, but are 
unable to distinguish them. Our visual acuity is not sufficient to see that difference. We may 
see two different shades of blue which could be distinguished by someone with higher visual 
acuity. But given our weaker acuity, we do not see the difference between, say, blue37 and 
blue38. We have only a capacity to distinguish for example 30 shades of blue, but not such 
fine-grained differences. The fact that we fail to see the difference is not a case of perceptual 
error, of a perceptual experience which fails to be accurate. If perceptual illusions are just 
such cases of failure to distinguish (a failure to distinguish equal from unequal lines in the 
Müller-Lyer illusion, a failure to distinguish straight from curbed lines in the Hering and 
Wundt illusion), then illusion does not imply error. It would just be a lack of acuity, but not an 
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inaccurate perceptual experience.  
There are two types of perceptual illusions: either we see objects with different 
properties and they seem the same to us, or we see two objects which share a property, but 
these objects seem different to us (see Fig. 1-3: the lines share their shape property, the 
patches share color). The first type shows phenomenal indistinguishablilty: the two properties 
seem phenomenally the same. The second type shows a phenomenal difference: the same 
property appears phenomenally different (the lines in Fig. 1-2 and in the Müller-Lyer figure, 
the shade in Fig. 3). In the first case where different properties appear to be the same, two 
interpretations are possible. One can say that we do not misrepresent any of the properties, but 
are just unable to distinguish them. Although the object of blue37 and the object of blue38 have 
different properties, they are seen as the same shade of blue, due to a lack of acuity. Another 
interpretation is that we do not distinguish the two shades, because we represent one shade, 
say blue37, wrongly as blue38. Both seem the same because one shade is misrepresented by 
perceptual experience. In one interpretation, the indistinguishability is due to a lack of visual 
acuity, in the other interpretation it is due to a misrepresentation and to perceptual error, a 
lack of accuracy of our perceptual experience. In such cases of indistinguishability, the 
relationalists opt for the first interpretation and thus avoid the attribution of error to perceptual 
experience. But in the second type of illusions, the one where we experience a phenomenal 
difference while seeing the same property, such an option is not possible. Two objects having 
the same property appear to differ in that property. Two lines of equal length appear to differ 
in length. In that case of illusions, it is not possible to appeal to a lack of acuity and to a 
failure to see (we do see the length of the lines in the Müller-Lyer case) or a failure to 
distinguish (we do phenomenally distinguish the length of the lines). In this case the 
relationalist three strategies to avoid the attribution of error to perceptual experience do not 
work. 
To summarize, we can say that relationalists give three solutions to the threat 
represented by the two conditions of illusion defined above (i.e. (1) an object looks P, (2) it 
does not instantiate P, but Q). The first condition said that an object appears to have property 
(P).That condition is changed in the following ways: 
 
Denial of illusion:   (1) The object appear to have property Q (not P). 
 
Failure to See:  (1) The object neither appears as P nor Q. 
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Failure to Distinguish: (1) The object appears to have property P and P is   
    subjectively indistinguishable from Q. 
    
 And in all three cases: (2) The object does not instantiate property P (but   
    property Q). 
   
In all these three cases, the mismatch between the first condition and second condition, the 
fact that the object we see actually instantiates property Q and not P, is avoided.  
But none of these three solutions can avoid a central feature of such illusions as the 
Müller-Lyer figure. Objects instantiating the same property appear to be phenomenally 
different. In the Müller-Lyer illusion we have the following situation: 
 
 (1) Object X appears to have property O and object Y appears to have   
 property P. 
 (2) Both object X and Y instantiate property Q. 
  
X and Y are the two lines. One appears as short (O) and the other as long (P). It may be that 
none of the lines is seen as it is (in that case O and P are different from Q), or it may be that at 
least one line is seen as it is (either O or P is identical with the length the lines actually 
instantiate, Q). But as O and P appear as different lengths and are phenomenally different, it 
cannot be that the actual lines instantiate both of these mutually exclusive properties. The 
Müller-Lyer illusion is an illusion about size, but illusions which present exactly the same 
situation have been constructed for other perceptual properties (shape, color, distance etc.). 
So, the problem presented here potentially extends to most features presented in visual 
experience. The three relationalist responses to the problem of illusions described here offer 
no solution for this problem posed by the Müller-Lyer illusion and similar illusions. The 
illusion cannot be denied by saying that both lines appear to have the same length. Given that 
we notice a difference in length, it cannot be claimed that we fail to see the length of the lines. 
And for the same reason it cannot be claimed that the lengths of the lines are 
indistinguishable. This phenomenal difference cannot be plausibly explained by a difference 
in the object. But there is still another option for relationalism. The phenomenal difference 
can be explained by a non-perceptual mental state. I turn to that option in the next section. 
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3. Explaining Error 
 
3.1. The Location of Error: Attitudes and Content  
 
Relationalism rejects that our perceptual experience can be accurate or inaccurate. Perceptual 
experiences do not have accuracy conditions and therefore there are no conditions under 
which they would be erroneous. On the other hand the notion of perceptual illusion involves 
error. When I have a perceptual illusion, I am deceived about the world and I am led to false 
beliefs about certain objects or properties in my environment. But if perceptual experience 
itself cannot be erroneous, as the relationalists claim, the error must lie in some other mental 
state different from the perceptual experience itself, in some higher order mental state. This is 
an option many relationalists take in order to explain illusions. I call here higher order mental 
state any state which is about my perceptual experience, beliefs, thoughts or awareness of that 
perceptual experience. Such a mental state of a higher order can be a propositional attitude 
about the experience or it can be the awareness of having that perceptual experience.  
To take the first case, we can have a propositional attitude about the experience: I can 
believe falsely that I have a perceptual experience of unequal lines when I have actually an 
experience of equal lines (to take again the Müller-Lyer illusion). In that case I have a false 
belief, a false propositional attitude about my experience, but the experience itself needs not 
to be erroneous. Secondly, we can have an erroneous self-awareness. It can seem to us as if 
we had an experience of unequal lines although we actually experience two equal lines. In 
that case our self-awareness is erroneous, but not the experience itself. I will discuss these 
possible explanations of error by higher order mental states in the following section (3.2). But 
before a discussion of these explanations of error, we have to question the presupposition 
which underlies these explanations of error. The presupposition that error must lie in higher 
order mental states, because only these states can be representational while perceptual 
experience is not representational and therefore not susceptible of errors. So, I will first 
discuss the assumption that error cannot be attributed to perceptual experience itself (in this 
section), and then I will discuss if errors which seem to be perceptual can be better explained 
by higher order mental states (3.2). 
There are some positions in the philosophy of mind, which reject generally a 
semantics for mental states. A purely syntactic theory of the mind as it was defended by Stich 
(1983) or specific philosophical interpretations of dynamic systems theory (Van Gelder 1995) 
questioned generally the attribution of semantic properties to mental states. They questioned 
that mental states can be true or false, accurate or inaccurate. They questioned that mental 
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states can be semantically evaluated. And they questioned the use of the concepts which 
involve semantic properties in an analysis of the mind, the concepts of representation and of 
mental content. Relationalists are not such radical anti-representationalists.56 Their rejection 
of representation and representational content is based on a specific view about perception 
and does not extend to other mental states like beliefs, desires or mental imagery, dreams and 
other hallucinations. Generally, for relationalists all these latter mental states are mental 
representations, they have content and can therefore falsely represent something. I already 
indicated some motivation to deny this for perceptual experience in veridical perception and 
illusion. Here I will discuss one further motivation.  
When we see an object, we stand in an actual relation to that object and when we see 
an object, we have a perceptual experience of that object. Is that a reason to believe that 
perceptual experience itself must always stand in a relation to an object? We have to 
distinguish here between perception as the state of seeing, i.e. seeing an object from 
perceptual experience.57 Perception is a state which is more complex than having a perceptual 
experience. When I perceive (see) some object, I have not only a perceptual experience of that 
object, it not only seems to me a certain way, but I stand also in an actual relation to that 
object which is before me. I cannot see a cat, if there is no cat in front of me. In that sense, 
having a perceptual experience of a cat is not sufficient to see a cat. An actual relation to a cat 
is a further condition for seeing, for the perception of cats. In that sense, perception is a 
factive state. Perceiving an object implies the existence of that object. Perception as a factive 
state is in that sense similar to action: I cannot ride a bike if there is no bike and I cannot hit a 
ball if there is no such round object before me. Relationalists take that analysis of perception 
as paradigmatic for any analysis of perceptual experience, the experience I have when I 
perceive, but that I could possibly have when I do not perceive, i.e. when I do not actually see 
an object or property. For them, having a perceptual experience implies standing in an actual 
relation to an object. But does the perceptual experience of a certain object imply the 
existence of that object in my environment? There is a suspicion that relationalists infer that 
perceptual experience is a relation to an actual object because the state of seeing always 
involves a relation to an actual object.  
Noë (2004: 96) defends for example that perception is touch-like and active. For him 
perception should be analyzed on the model of the active tactile exploration of the 
environment. It is quite plausible to say that exploring or touching X implies that there is 
                                                 
56 For a recent discussion of radical anti-representationalism, see Chemero (2009). 
57 For simplicity I speak here only about perception as seeing, but seeing can here be replaced by hearing, 
touching and the other sensory modalities. 
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some X. After all, touching and exploring is an activity in relation with X, as biking is an 
activity in relation to a bike. But Noë claims also that perceptual experience involves a 
relation to the experienced object. It seems often that the relationalist view of perceptual 
experience derives its force from the relational nature of the situation of perception, from the 
relational nature of the state of seeing. But given that perception is a relation, it does not 
follow that perceptual experience is relational. Given that the state of seeing always involves 
an actual relation to an object, it does not follow that one of its components, namely 
perceptual experience always involves such a relation. We can for example hit a ball while we 
believe hitting the ball. Even if the action involves a relation to the ball, the mental state of 
believing does not. The belief can occur independently of the action and the actual relation to 
the ball. And the relationalists would admit that. They accept that beliefs are representational 
states and can be false. Quite similar is the situation when I hit the ball while feeling that I hit 
a ball. But here again the mental state, the experience, could occur independently of the actual 
relation to the ball. There is no reason here to suppose that the experience is dependent on the 
actual relation to the object while other mental states like beliefs are not. So, what stronger 
motivation is there to assimilate the perceptual experience to such a relational state, the state 
of seeing?  
It can be argued that perception is similar to a factive propositional attitude, similar for 
example to knowledge. Having the attitude of knowledge implies that we have a true belief. It 
implies that the propositional content the attitude is related to, is true. Similarly, it can be 
claimed that perception necessarily implies that one stands in an actual relation to the seen 
object and implies having a veridical perceptual experience. I exclude here for the sake of the 
argument the possibility of unconscious perception, i.e. perception which is not accompanied 
by any phenomenal experience (as for example in blindsight). As seeing implies an 
experience and a relation to objects, any perceptual experience I have while seeing something 
stands in an actual relation to the seen object. But from the fact that the content in knowledge 
cannot be false, it cannot be concluded that knowing involves no representational content, no 
content which could be false.  
Action can be accompanied by different beliefs, either true or false ones, but 
perception of an object involves a perceptual experience of that object. In that sense 
perception (as the state of seeing) is factive, like knowledge. Knowledge as a factive attitude 
implies a true content. And similarly perception implies an experience which actually stands 
in a relation to the perceived object. In perception (as a state of seeing), the content of the 
experience cannot be false. Is that a reason to deny that perception has representational 
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content? No. First, even if the content of a factive attitude cannot be false, its content can be a 
representational content. In the case of knowledge, we still have a belief with representational 
content. Belief has a representational content, even if the belief is necessarily true, as in the 
case of beliefs in analytic propositions. So, the fact that perception implies experiences with a 
content that cannot be false does not exclude that the content is representational. Secondly, 
even if perception is taken as the standard case for perceptual experience, it cannot be 
excluded that we have a similar perceptual experience when we do not stand in a perceptual 
relation to objects, when we are not in the state of seeing. Similarly, if knowledge involves a 
true belief, we can have the same belief without that factive attitude. Having that attitude 
implies that the content associated with that attitude is true. But we can have that content 
independently of the attitude. And that content could be false. In the same way perception (as 
a state of seeing) implies having an experience which stands in a relation to an object. But 
having that experience does not imply that one stands in such a relation. So, we cannot infer 
from the relational character of perception (as a state of seeing) to the relational character of 
perceptual experience. In a similar way, we cannot infer from the properties of an attitude to 
the properties of the content attached to that attitude. If an attitude is factive, we cannot 
conclude that the attached content must be true in all circumstances. It is not a property of that 
content to be always true. Attitudes can have other properties like polarity, direction of fit or 
complexity. But it is a mistake to transfer these properties of the attitude to the content. 
Relationalists proceed in such a way, when they conclude from the properties of the state of 
seeing that the content of perceptual experience must have the same properties.   
It is an open question whether perceptual experience is relational. The fact that 
perception (as a state of seeing) is relational does not show that perceptual experience is also 
relational. Even if perception is factive, this cannot exclude that perceptual experience might 
be erroneous and that perceptual experience has representational content.  
 
3.2. Illusions as Errors of Thought 
 
The strongest argument against a relational view of perceptual experience is the fact that 
illusions are considered to be errors. A relation can only obtain or not obtain, but cannot be 
erroneous or false. We saw in section 2 how relationalists tried to avoid the conclusion that 
perceptual experiences involve error. But in cases like the Müller-Lyer figure where different 
properties are presented in phenomenal experience although the things we perceive have the 
same property, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that we are deceived about the object 
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we see. Now, if illusion implies error, then a relational view is only plausible, if the error in 
illusions can be explained without attributing error to the perceptual experience itself.  The 
error must be explained by some other mental states. Travis (2004), Brewer (2006 and 2008) 
and Noë (2006) attribute error only to perceptual judgments and beliefs or other non-
perceptual mental states, but not to perceptual experience. Noë (2006) and Martin (2004) also 
explain error by an erroneous self-awareness. We have a certain perceptual experience, but we 
are wrong about the experience we have. It seems to us as if we had a different experience. 
Our self-awareness of the phenomenal states we are in is fallacious. Let us look first at these 
two types of explanation of error by higher order mental states and then look at the problems 
of these explanations.  
Once it is accepted that illusion implies error and that in cases of illusion, we have 
mental states which deceive us about our environment, it is necessary to explain error. Travis 
(2004) and Brewer (2006 and 2008) accept that perceptual experience can be misleading, but 
only because we are mislead about the experience we have. When we see the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, the perceptual experience has to be explained, in the relationalist framework, by the 
relation to the actual object before us. So, we have in this case an experience of two equally 
long lines. But we can be wrong about the experience we have. Our experience can be 
undistinguishable from an experience of unequal lines. The two experiences are different, but 
we cannot subjectively distinguish between them. Given this indistinguishability, we can take 
the experience of the Müller-Lyer figure to be an experience of unequal lines. By “taking” it 
so, we are wrong, but the error does not lie in the experience, but in the way we take it to be. 
It is not very clear, what Travis and Brewer mean when they say that we “take” the 
experience a certain way.58 But it certainly involves some higher order mental state (a belief, 
thought or perceptual judgment) and the use of concepts. For Travis and Brewer, when we 
take an experience a certain way, we apply concepts to the experience. For Brewer, we think 
that our experience is erroneous, because we confuse the level of thought (or belief), the 
conceptual level, with the level of perceptual experience. Only at the level of thought and the 
application of concepts do we represent something and only at that level is error possible.  
Is that explanation of error plausible? It is only a plausible explanation for situations, 
where two experiences are subjectively indistinguishable. Relationalists insist on the fact that 
indistinguishability between two experiences does not imply that these experiences are the 
                                                 
58 Travis (2004) generally speaks about „taking“ the experience a certain way. „Taking“ means apparently in his 
use making a perceptual judgment, having perceptual beliefs about the experience or expressing the experience 
in the form of conceptual content. The „mysterious“ and „dark“ way to express himself does not always make it 
easy to get what Travis actually means. But our interpretation of „taking“ certainly corresponds to what Brewer 
means.  
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same. We cannot suppose that experiences are totally transparent to us and that we have 
infallible access to them (Martin 2004). For me, Italian and Spanish wines (a Chianti and a  
Rioja) may taste the same way. Nevertheless these could be very different experiences. I may 
not attend to the differences in the taste of the two wines or I may not be aware of those 
features which distinguish them. Someone more expert than me can notice strong differences 
between the two experiences. Experiences can be very different although they appear the 
same to us. A similar reasoning can be applied to illusions. We can be wrong to think that 
these two experiences are the same and that they present the same objects or properties. If I 
see a white wall which looks just like a yellow wall given a certain illumination, then I am 
wrong to think there is a yellow wall. My experience is a relation to a white wall (and a 
yellow illumination), not to a yellow wall. Yellow walls and white walls under these 
conditions of illumination are just indistinguishable and this can mislead me to false beliefs 
about the actual color of the wall.  
This explanation of error does not work for experiences which are phenomenally 
distinguishable, but where the objects of perception do not actually differ in the properties 
they seem to have. Relationalists like Brewer explain differences in the phenomenal character 
of experiences by a difference in the object. If experiences are phenomenally different, they 
must differ in their object. But in many perceptual illusions, it is difficult to find a plausible 
candidate to explain phenomenal differences between objects. In the Müller-Lyer case the two 
lines look phenomenally different. But which property of the lines explains that phenomenal 
difference in the experience. The equal length of the actual lines cannot explain that the lines 
appear phenomenally different in length. Either it must be some other property of the seen 
objects which explains that phenomenal difference, or the difference must be explained by 
some higher order mental state. The context of the lines could explain the difference in 
perceptual experience (the arrows at the end of the lines). But how can my relation to the 
arrows explain the phenomenal difference in the length of the lines? How can the property of 
one object (the lines) be explained by my relation to some other object (the arrows)? It seems 
arbitrary to explain the phenomenal difference between the lines by a relation to something 
different from the lines themselves. And even if this explanation is endorsed, this would not 
exclude error. I would attribute to the lines a property they do not have, given a property of 
something else, a property of the arrows. 
If the phenomenal difference cannot be explained by some difference in the perceived 
object, we can still recur to the explanation by higher order mental states. From a relationalist 
point of view, we experience in the Müller-Lyer case lines of the same length. So, in seeing 
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the two lines, my perceptual experience does not differ in that respect. But the lines appear 
phenomenally different, because we “take” one line to be longer than the other. Is it plausible 
to say that I experience lines in the Müller-Lyer case as phenomenally different, because I 
erroneously “take” them to be different?  But “taking” them to be different, does only mean 
that I think or judge that they are different. This does not explain why they phenomenally 
seem different. Thought or erroneous application of concepts does not explain a phenomenal 
difference in experience. Why does the higher order mental state add anything to the 
phenomenology? How can it explain the phenomenal difference between two similar objects 
(the two lines)? 
Brewer and Noë claim that beliefs, judgments or more generally conceptual states 
about the experience can change the way things look phenomenally. Brewer gives Gestalt-
switches as examples. Noë (2006) claims that the sensorimotor knowledge or skills we apply 
to our experience changes the way that experience seems to us. Let us first look at Brewer´s 
argument from Gestalt-switch cases.  
In ambiguous figures like the duck-rabbit, we do not only think alternatively that the 
figure is a duck or a rabbit, but we experience also a phenomenal change in the figure. This 
case from Gestalt switches should explain how thoughts can affect phenomenology. That 
argument depends on the thesis that phenomenal change in Gestalt switches is caused by a 
difference in thought or categorization. Only then could the illusory perception be attributed 
to some higher mental state. But this thesis is not well established. There is an alternative 
explanation of Gestalt switches which explains the phenomenal change in experience by the 
focus of attention. If we attend to one part of the drawing the figure appears as a rabbit, if we 
attend to another part, it appears to be a duck. In that case conceptual categorizations would 
not explain phenomenal change. “Taking” the same object one way or the other would not 
explain the phenomenal change in the perception of the object. Furthermore, only certain 
ambiguous figures have the peculiarity to change phenomenally although the object of 
perception does not change in its intrinsic properties.  
But even if the explanation is correct that the phenomenal change in Gestalt switches 
is explained by our way to categorize the experience, it is doubtful that these cases can 
explain most illusions. Most illusions do not show any kind of switch forth and back, which 
could be explained by the different ways we apply concepts to our experience. Brewer´s 
explanation of the duck-rabbit case is that the figure looks both like a rabbit and like a duck 
and the way it looks phenomenally depends on the way we categorize that figure. He also 
argues that the same ambiguity can be found in illusions like the Müller-Lyer figure: is it a 
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drawing of equal lines or one of unequal lines?  But first, there is no phenomenal switch in 
this case. The figure just appears on way to us without changing. And secondly, even if the 
figure leads us to doubt whether the lines are equal or unequal, this thoughts about the figure 
do not have any phenomenal effect. So, even if we follow Brewer and say that the figure is 
subjectively indistinguishable from a figure of unequal lines, whatever we finally belief about 
the lines has no effect on the way the figure phenomenally appears to us. Fodor already used 
this fact about the Müller-Lyer figure in his argument for the cognitive impenetrability of 
perception. When we come to believe that the figure is an illusion and that the lines, contrary 
to their appearance, are equal in length, this belief does not change the illusory perceptual 
appearances (Fodor 1984b). More generally the phenomenal appearance of illusions does not 
change when we come to know that we are fooled. If we look at Fig. 3, the shades still look 
different, although we believe now that they are not. And the lines in Fig. 1 and 2 do not 
straighten out when, after instruction, we come to believe that they are not bent.  
It is possible to contest the cognitive impenetrability of perception, but it is just not 
plausible to argue in the specific case of the Müller-Lyer figure that its appearances changes 
when we change our beliefs about that figure. There are arguments for cognitive penetrability 
of perception which say that mental imagery can change perception (Macpherson 2012) or 
that our memory about typical colors for objects influences our actual color perception 
(Hansen et al. 2006), but neither of these arguments for cognitive penetrability seem to be 
relevant in our cases of illusion. Brewer´s strategy was to concede that the appearance of the 
lines is erroneous, and to explain that error by some higher order mental state, belief or 
conceptual categorization. But this explanation of the appearances is quite implausible. 
Noë´s explanation of error by non-perceptual mental states is more plausible, but runs 
into similar difficulties (Noë 2006). Noë defends, like Brewer, the position that experience is 
a direct contact with some objects and their properties, but it may appear to us “as if” we were 
in contact with something different. It may seem to us that we see unequal lines, although we 
experience equal lines in the Müller-Lyer figure. Noë calls this erroneous appearance the 
“apparent content”. The “real” content for him is just the object or property we are looking at. 
Apparent content can explain error. And apparent content is not the content of the experience 
but of our thought about the experience. He states: “On an enactive, non-representational 
approach to experience, then, an experience is nonveridical when it has a different content 
than it seems to have, i. e. when what you contact is not what you might have thought” (Noë, 
2006: 53). Can thought explain “apparent content” and error? And can thought explain that 
apparent content has a certain phenomenal character?  
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Noë´s position has two advantages compared to Brewer. First, if “thought” is 
conceived as a higher intellectual or conceptual capacity that only higher creatures like 
humans have, this view would have the awkward consequences that lower creatures cannot be 
deceived by their senses. Only higher capacities of “thought” would make perceptual error 
possible (Johnston 2004). Contrary to Brewer, Noë wants to avoid this awkward consequence 
(Noë, 2006: 48-49). Secondly, on Noë´s view, error can be explained by an application of 
sensorimotor knowledge or skills to the objects we are in contact with. This knowledge and 
skills consist in expectations about the way objects change with our bodily movements. Such 
expectations about sensorimotor changes can be possessed even by lower animals.  
Can sensorimotor knowledge and expectations explain that things look phenomenally 
different when they are not? Can Noë´s sensorimotor knowledge explain the phenomenology 
of illusion? If we apply the same expectations to different experiences, they can seem to be 
the same. We cannot distinguish between different experiences because we erroneously apply 
the same skills to them and have the same expectations. And the same object and the same 
experience can also appear differently to us when different expectations are applied to them. 
Brewer has a problem to show how beliefs or thoughts influence the way things 
phenomenally look. Generally he explains the phenomenal character of experience by the 
object, but in the case of illusions, he must explain it by higher order mental states and that is 
a problem. On Noë´s view, not only erroneous phenomenology is explained by higher order 
mental states, but all perceptual phenomenology, in veridical and no veridical cases. An 
object like for example an apple appears a certain way, not only because we are in contact 
with its frontal surface, but also because we expect its surface to change a certain way with 
our movements around it. These expectations explain why the apple phenomenally appears 
round and three-dimensional. The hidden parts of the object are “present”, so Noë, and that 
“presence” is phenomenally experienced.  Higher order mental states have always a part in the 
phenomenology of the appearances. And the application of erroneous expectations explains 
why objects phenomenally appear some way they are not. Noë´s theory is therefore much 
better to explain the phenomenology of illusions by non-perceptual higher order mental states. 
But he has the same problem than Brewer when it comes to shifting expectations.  
Brewer´s explanation was unsatisfactory, because the change of beliefs or conceptual 
categorizations was not accompanied by corresponding phenomenal changes. Can we find 
cases where the appearance of the same object changes when our sensorimotor knowledge 
and our expectations change? The appearance of object changes when we change our physical 
relation to them or when we are in contact with different aspects or parts of the object. But it 
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is rarely, or perhaps never the case that their appearance changes when we revise our 
cognitive states about them. I expect the Müller-Lyer lines to be of equal length, but this does 
not make them look equally long. Goodale and Milner (1995/2006: 240-45) even showed that 
perceptual illusions (e.g. the Ebbinghaus illusion59) do not affect our sensorily guided 
movements and therefore do not affect our sensorimotor coordination. The sensorimotor 
expectations which guide our bodily movements are not fooled by the illusion. Our grasping 
behavior of a three-dimensional model of the illusion is not affected by the illusion. But in our 
phenomenal experience, we are still fooled by the illusion. If our sensorimotor expectations 
were to affect the way things look, than we should not be fooled by the Ebbinghaus illusion. 
Given this analysis, sensorimotor expectations guiding our bodily movements seem to be 
independent from the way things look phenomenally. Expectations do not change the way 
things look. And sensorimotor expectations may even be independent from the way things 
look. 
A further awkward consequence of Brewer´s and Noë´s explanation of perceptual 
illusions by higher mental states has been emphasized by Johnston (2004). Illusions require a 
mental capacity which is more complex than veridical perception. Higher order mental 
capacities are necessary to explain how we can perceptually be deceived. This creates a 
strange asymmetry between seeing and failing to see: perceptual deception requires higher 
cognitive capacities than veridical perception. This would also imply that creatures which do 
not have such higher cognitive capacities could not be perceptually deceived. It is also 
awkward from an evolutionary point of view that the ability to see deteriorates with the 
acquisition of higher cognitive capacities.  
 The explanation of illusion by non-perceptual higher order mental states is confronted 
with the major difficulty to give an account of the phenomenology of illusions. How can 
things appear a certain way although the things we see are not that way? It is implausible that 
such a phenomenology can be explained by higher order mental states, beliefs, thoughts or 
sensorimotor knowledge. This implausibility is increased by the fact that changes in these 
mental states do not cause changes in the phenomenal character of our experience. 
 
                                                 
59 The Ebbinghaus illusion consists of two colored circles of identical size which appear to have different sizes. 
One circle is surrounded by bigger circles which make it look smaller. The other circle is surrounded by very 
small circles which make it look bigger. Goodale/Milner constructed 3-dimensional circular shapes 
corresponding exactly to the circles in the Ebbinghaus illusions (see illustration p. 193). We still misperceive the 
size of these circular shapes. But our grasping behavior is not fooled by that illusion. Our grip before touching 
the object predicts fairly well the size of the objects we see.  If our grasping behavior would rely on erroneous 
size information, our grip would deviate from normal. But it does not in this case. The results of these 
experiments have been countered by some (see Stöttinger et al. 2010 on this debate). 
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Conclusion 
 
The relational view of perceptual experience develops an alternative view to the 
representational conception of perceptual experience, i.e. to the content view. But to be a 
viable alternative, relationalism must be able to explain perceptual illusion without recurring 
to false representational content of perceptual experience. A plausible view of perceptual 
illusion is essential for relationalism. There are two ways relationalists attempt to explain 
illusion. One way is to argue that most cases of illusions do not involve error and therefore do 
not need to recur to false representational content. Illusion can be reduced to cases where we 
are unable to see or blind to certain objects or properties and this inability to see or this 
blindness does not involve any error of perception. We claimed that all cases of illusion 
cannot be reduced to such an inability to see. Therefore this reduction is not a sufficient 
explanation of illusions. The other relationalist way to explain illusion is to attribute the error 
involved in illusions to non-perceptual mental states. If relationalists cannot avoid explaining 
illusion by error and therefore cannot avoid the attribution of false representational content, it 
is essential for them to attribute that content to some non-perceptual state and not to 
perceptual experience itself. We claim that the representational content of such non-
perceptual states cannot explain the specific perceptual phenomenology of illusions. In the 
first case relationalists can explain the phenomenology of illusion as long as it does not 
involve error. But the attribution of error cannot finally be avoided. In the second case 
relationalists can explain the error involved in illusions but cannot explain the specific 
phenomenology involved in illusions. Because of these difficulties for a plausible relationalist 
explanation of illusions the content view still remains the more attractive explanation of 
perceptual experience. We will turn to this intentionalist explanation of error and illusion in 
the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Attribution of Content 
 
Introduction 
 
In the next chapter, I will develop a theory of perceptual content which identifies that content 
with Russellian propositions. Before going into the details of such a propositional content, I 
will address in this chapter the problem how actually such a propositional content can be 
attributed to specific perceptual states. Which criteria do we have to say that this perceptual 
state represents this specific property or this specific object? It is essential to answer this 
question in order to determine if a given perceptual state accurately represents states of affairs 
or is a case of perceptual illusion. To distinguish perceptual illusions from accurate 
perception, we need a method to attribute content. So, this chapter will be preparatory for the 
next one. It will sketch a theory about the way content can be attributed to perceptual states at 
all. The next chapter will then analyze what that perceptual content looks like. 
 I will focus here on the naturalistic theories to determine mental content. They are still 
the most elaborate and most promising attempts to determine mental content. Naturalistic 
theories of content try to reduce intentional content to causal relations of mental states to their 
environment, or to functions of mental states. When a mental state stays in the right causal 
relation to some property or object or has a given function, we can attribute intentional 
content to it. Several naturalistic theories have been proposed. Causal theories explain content 
by causal relations alone. Teleological theories explain content by the biological or 
developmental functions a mental state has. Mixed or hybrid theories determine content by 
causes and by functions. Most naturalistic theories are either causal theories or hybrid 
theories. 
  I will defend here a hybrid theory of perceptual content which attributes content to 
perceptual states due to their causal relations and due to the functions these states have in the 
economy of the mind. I will show that the causal theories alone offer insufficient criteria for 
the attribution of content. But I will show also that a causal and information relation between 
environmental features and perceptual states are necessary, although not sufficient for 
perceptual content. I will therefore criticize teleological theories of content which determine 
content without looking at these causal and informational relations.  
 Teleological theories are generally subdivided into those which attribute content of a 
mental state by the function of the system which produces that state and those which attribute 
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content by the function of the system which uses a certain mental state. They emphasize either 
the function of producer systems or the function of consumer systems. I will defend a version 
of a hybrid theory which combines informational content of a perceptual state with the 
function of the consumer system of that perceptual state. Although most naturalistic theories 
of content offer theories of mental content in general, I will only attempt to propose a 
coherent theory for the attribution of perceptual content and not a general theory of all types 
of mental content. I do not claim that this theory of content is also applicable to other types of 
mental states (conceptual states, emotions, mental images).  
 After a short section on the conditions for the determination of content, I will criticize 
in a second part the insufficiency of the existing causal theories. Than in a third part I will 
stress the problems of teleological theories before I pass in a fourth section to a hybrid theory 
of perceptual content. In a final section, I will explain how such a hybrid theory of perceptual 
content can explain failed reference and the intentional objects in misrepresentation, 
especially in perceptual illusion.  
 
1. The Determination of Content 
 
Different methods have been proposed for the determination of content. First, one can use the 
phenomenal character of experience to determine its content (Siegel 2010). Secondly, on can 
look at the role a mental state plays (its functional or inferential role) (Block 1986). Finally, 
one can look at the causal relations of the mental state to features of the environment. The last 
method is often called a naturalized theory of intentionality, because it reduces semantic 
relations (content, reference) to non-semantic relations i.e. causal relations. I think that this 
last method is still the most promising way to determine the content of perceptual experience 
and I will therefore focus in this chapter on that method. 
A naturalistic theory of intentional content looks at the causal relations of mental 
states to the features of the environment in order to determine the semantic content of these 
states. Although the naturalistic theory of mental content has been developed initially to 
determine the content of concepts, it can equally be applied to other mental states which have 
content, may that be perceptual states (Matthen 1988, Dretske 1995) or emotional states (e.g. 
why the fear of snakes is about snakes) (Prinz 2004).  
A central element of a naturalistic theory of content is the so called naturalistic 
constraint that the semantic notion of content should be explained only by using non-semantic 
notions. This constraint requires the avoidance of any content-bearing states in the 
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explanation of mental content, be that language, propositions, propositional attitudes or other 
intentional mental states. If we explain the intentional content of a mental state by another 
intentional state, we would get into an infinite regress. We would have to explain how that 
other mental state (the explanans) gets intentional content. Furthermore the naturalistic 
constraint requires that the explanation uses only notions which are commonly accepted by 
the natural sciences. Usually naturalistic theories try to reduce intentional content to causal 
relations and to functions. It is questionable whether theories which derive content from the 
phenomenal character still obey the naturalistic constraint. That depends on the question 
whether consciousness and the phenomenal character of experience can be explained in a 
naturalistic way. Furthermore, if the explanation of content involves normative notions in a 
strong sense60, it is unlikely that the naturalistic constraint can be met. 
Naturalistic theories of content are explanations of non-natural meaning. Natural signs 
are regular causal relations between events. If fire always causes smoke, then smoke is a sign 
of fire. Such signs based on causal relations are called natural signs and they have natural 
meaning. No smoke can naturally mean fire, if it is not actually caused by fire. So, a natural 
sign requires the presence of what it means. Therefore natural signs cannot be wrong. There 
cannot be a smoke which means fire although there is, in this case, no fire. Non-natural 
meaning requires at least the first criterion for intentionality, the possibility to be about 
something which does not exist or is not present. Non-natural meaning implies that a sign can 
have an intentional object which does not exist.  Mental states generally have that form of 
non-natural meaning and that level of intentionality. It is clearly insufficient for a naturalistic 
theory, if it only explains natural meaning. It must be able to explain non-natural meaning.    
I will describe the general idea of such a theory of content and discuss which of the 
different versions of such a theory is best adapted to explain the content of perception.  
 
2. Causal Theories of Content 
 
2.1. Causal theories and the disjunction problem 
 
The causal theories explain the content of mental states by the events which cause these 
states. Different versions of the causal theories have been presented. They differ in the 
specification of the content fixing causal relation between external events and the mental 
state. Either the content fixing relation is a statistical relation, where the type of events which 
most frequently trigger a mental state is considered part of its content. Rupert´s Best Test 
                                                 
60 By a normative notion in the strong sense, I mean prescriptive norms. For discussion, see section 3.4 of the 
present chapter.  
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Theory (1999) and Dan Ryder´s SINBAD theory (2004) are versions of such a causal theory 
based on a statistical relation. Or the causal relation is a counterfactual supporting relation  
between external events and mental states. Dretske bases such a theory on an informational 
relation (Dretske 1981). Fodor´s asymmetric dependency theory explains content by a specific 
type of counterfactual supporting causal relation (Fodor 1990).  I will first explain the general 
idea of the causal theories and then address their problems. I will furthermore claim that a 
causal explanation is insufficient to solve these problems and to explain perceptual content.  
 A perceptual state stands in causal relations to its environment. External stimuli cause 
internal states in the perceptual systems of the brain. A perceptual state stands also in 
historical relations to its environment in the sense that states of the same type have been 
caused by external stimuli of the same type in the past. The causal theories of content explain 
the content of mental states by these causal and historical relations between types of external 
events and types of internal states. Such a naturalistic theory can be formulated in the 
following way.  
A perceptual state represents the property or the object which “normally” causes it. If 
the perceptual state S is “normally” caused by the property P, then S represents P. The causal 
relation can be defined either as a relation between properties or a relation between 
particulars. If it is defined as a relation between properties, we can say that a property in the 
environment causes perceptual states defined by a certain property: redness instantiated in 
external objects causes specific perceptual states characterized by such and such physical 
properties. In that case these perceptual states of a certain type represent redness. We can also 
say that particulars of a certain type cause mental or perceptual states of a certain type: if cats 
cause normally specific perceptual states, then these states represent cats. So, the content of 
the perceptual state is given by the normal cause of perceptual states of that type.  
Why is the content of a perceptual state given by the normal cause and not by the 
actual object or property which causes the actual singular perceptual state? Obviously any 
perceptual state is caused by some physical condition and there is no uncaused perceptual or 
mental state. If the content of any perceptual state is its actual cause, then perceptual error is 
impossible. A veridical perception caused by a black cat will have that black cat as content, 
but also an illusory perception, an experience as of a brown cat, caused by a black cat will 
have a black cat as content. And a hallucination of a black cat caused by some brain state will 
have that brain state as content. As in all these cases the represented content does actually 
occur in the actual world, all these perceptual states are acurate.  
It is impossible to define perceptual error on such a simple causal theory. Fodor (1990) 
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called such a simple causal theory the “crude causal theory”. The crude causal theory has the 
further disadvantage to admit a hodge-podge of different properties and objects as the content 
of a perceptual state. If the same perceptual state, the same type, can be caused by a black cat, 
by a hallucinogen or an abnormal brain state, then that state has a disjunctive content of the 
form: black cat or hallucinogen or brain state of type X. Such an attribution of disjunctive 
content is quite unsatisfactory. And if a perceptual state has as content a disjunction of all its 
possible causes, then there is no perceptual error. 
This is generally called the disjunction problem and more specifically the problem to 
explain error in representation (the “error problem”). A mental state has intentionality and 
intentional content only if it has the power to misrepresent. It must have the capacity to 
represent some property or object although there is no such object or no such property is 
instantiated. So, the possibility of error is a necessary condition for representation. If every 
cause enters into a disjunctive content of a mental state, then there is no error. The mental 
state has a disjunctive content and every cause falls under one of these disjuncts. “Cat”-
representations caused by cats and on some occasions by dogs would have the disjunctive 
content “cat-or-dog“. But if a “cat”-representation is caused by a dog, we want intuitively to 
classify the tokening of the “cat”-representation as an error. If the mental state has a 
disjunctive content, we cannot ascribe any error to the mental state. That is the error problem 
resulting from disjunctive content.  
In the case of perceptual representation the disjunction problem reduces to the problem 
of error, although the disjunction problem can also appear without false tokening of a mental 
representation. If someone asks me about my cat, I will token the concept “cat“ in my 
thought. It is not an error to token “cat”-concepts upon cat-questions. Still we want to avoid 
saying that “cat”-concepts represent the disjunctive content “cat-or-questions about cats”. 
Here, we have a case of the disjunction problem without the problem of error. For that reason 
the disjunction problem is more general than the error problem. But in perception, tokening a 
perceptual representation of a cat when there is no cat always involves error. Therefore the 
disjunction problem reduces to the error problem in the case of perceptual representation.  
In order to avoid the disjunction problem and explain perceptual error, it is necessary 
to distinguish the content-fixing causes from other, wild causes. We have to distinguish two 
types of conditions, namely the normal conditions where the perceptual state (of type X) is 
caused by black cats and the non-normal conditions where the same perceptual state is caused 
by brown cats under bad illumination or by black dogs seen from far away. In that case, black 
cats are the normal cause of perceptual states of that type and neither brown cats nor dogs are. 
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Given such a distinction between normal cause and other causes, we can easily explain 
perceptual error. If the property blackness causes the perceptual state of such type under 
normal conditions, if therefore blackness is the normal cause of that state, then the perceptual 
state is accurate if its actual cause is something black. It is inaccurate, if its actual cause does 
not instantiate blackness. If the actual cause is among the normal causes, the perceptual state 
is accurate, otherwise not. 
We can distinguish here between the content and the target of a perceptual state, 
following a distinction introduced by Cummins (1996). The target is the object or property we 
actually see, the actual causes of the perceptual state on one occasion. The content is the 
object or property which normally causes perceptual states of that type. If the target of a 
perceptual state is among its normal causes, then the perceptual state is accurate. 
All causal theories of mental content follow such a distinction between causes under 
normal conditions and wild or non-normal causes in order to explain error. To make that 
distinction, theories of mental content have to introduce, besides the cause, a further condition 
which explains what “normal” causes or causes under normal conditions are. Nobody defends 
a “crude causal theory” by explaining the content of a mental only by its causes. Content is 
explained by the causes and these normalcy conditions which permit to separate the normal 
causes from other causes, the content-fixing causes from the wild causes which do not 
contribute to the state´s content. The causal theories of mental content differ in the way these 
normalcy conditions are defined. The causal theories can be distinguished into the causal-
historical accounts which explain the normalcy condition by the causal history and the 
teleosemantic accounts which explain the normalcy condition by functions, biological or 
other.  
 
2.2. Solutions to the Disjunction Problem 
 
To solve the disjunction problem, causal theories either specify a certain type of cause as the 
content determining cause (1), or they specify situations in which the causes are content-
fixing and situations where they are not (2). 
 (1) The specific content-fixing cause can be defined as the most frequent cause of a 
specific perceptual state (type). In that case normalcy is given by a statistical norm. Rupert 
defends such a version of a causal theory with his “Best Test theory” (Rupert 1999). The 
cause which has the highest probability to trigger the mental state is considered as the content 
of that mental state. To determine that cause, we look at the state which has most frequently 
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triggered that state in the past. The states with a lower probability are not content determining.  
With his asymmetric dependency theory, Fodor (1990) gives a different criterion to 
select the right, content-fixing causes. Fodor distinguishes causal relations which are 
dependent on other causal relations and those which are not. The content-fixing causal 
relation is the one which is not dependent on another causal relation. For example, brown 
dogs would not cause black-cat experiences if black cats never did cause black-cat 
experiences. There is a dependency of the causal relation between brown dogs and that 
perceptual experience upon the causal relation between black cats and that experience. There 
just would not be black-cat experiences, if black cats did not sometimes cause these 
experiences. But there could very well be black-cat experiences, if there were no dogs causing 
sometimes such experiences. There is therefore an asymmetric dependency of the dog − 
black-cat-experience relation upon the black cat − black-cat-experience relation. In Fodor´s 
theory, the content is given by the non-dependent causal relation (Fodor 1987 and 1990). 
(2) Other causal theories do not define a specific causal relation, but a specific 
situation in which the causes of a state are content-fixing. This situation is contrasted with 
other situation, where the state can be caused by objects or properties which do not enter into 
the content. Sometimes these theories are called type-one theories, because they define type-
one situations which are content-fixing, distinguished from “type-two” situations where 
causes do not determine content (Neander 2004). I will discuss here the versions of Stampe 
(1977) and Dretske (1981) of such a type one causal theory and emphasize their problems. 
Sometimes the situations in which the causes are content-fixing are defined as optimal 
situations.  So, a state may have as its content the object which causes it under epistemically 
optimal situations (Stampe 1977). The cat-appearance has as its content a cat, because under 
epistemically optimal conditions such appearances are caused by cats, for example at optimal 
distance and under good illumination. Under non-optimal conditions they can be caused by 
other animals (e.g. dogs from far away), but these conditions do not determine content. So, 
the disjunction problem is avoided. 
But it is difficult to define what epistemically optimal conditions are and it is quite 
arbitrary where to draw a line to non-optimal situations. Furthermore, we have to introduce 
normative considerations to make the distinction between optimal and non-optimal situations. 
Such normative considerations involve our normative judgments. But it would violate the 
naturalistic constraint to introduce other intentional mental states (normative judgments) to 
explain content. So these theories which define optimal situations are problematic because 
their criterion for content-fixing situations is arbitrary and threatens to violate the naturalistic 
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constraint. 
Dretske tries to avoid these problems. He differentiates the content-fixing causes and 
the other possible causes of a mental state by a distinction between a learning phase and a 
post-learning phase (Dretske 1981). In the learning phase, all the causes of a certain mental 
state are content-fixing. A mental state (or a concept) has as content the objects which cause 
that mental state in the learning phase.  If my concept “fox” is caused only by foxes in the 
learning phase than “fox” represents foxes.   
Furthermore, Dretske conceives this causal relation as a counterfactual supporting 
relation. Dretske´s conception of mental representation is based on the notion of information. 
“Fox” represents foxes if the mental state corresponding to “fox” carries information about 
foxes. Or, he has a strong notion of information where the effect (the mental state “fox”) 
carries information about the cause (foxes), only if the conditional probability that there is this 
cause given the effect is 1 (see Dretske 1981: 65).  So, given the tokening of the mental state 
corresponding to “fox”, the probability that there is a fox must be 1, in order for the concept 
to carry information about foxes. Foxes could sometimes have other effects than that mental 
state, but given the mental state, there must be foxes as its cause.  Information about foxes in a 
mental state requires the following counterfactual to be true: If there were no fox, there would 
not be any tokening of the mental state corresponding to “fox”. 
Fodor (1984a) emphasized several problems with this conception. First, it is unclear 
when the learning phase stops and when the post-learning phase begins i.e. the phase where 
causes are not content-fixing. In the learning phase, a dog causing a “fox” tokening would 
change the meaning of the concept into “fox-or-dog“. Indeed both causes, foxes and dogs, 
would be content-fixing. But if dogs cause the concept “fox” only in the post-learning phase, 
then “fox” only represents foxes and is falsely applied to dogs in the post-learning phase.  But 
how can we distinguish the two phases? The theory requires a clear-cut distinction between 
the phases, but there is no clear criterion to tell when one phase stops and the other begins.  
More important is another of Fodor´s objections concerning counterfactuals. The 
distinction between learning and post-learning phase was introduced to avoid the disjunction 
problem. But the causal relation between a mental state´s cause (foxes) and this state (the 
concept “fox”) must be counterfactual supporting, at least in the learning phase, given 
Dretske´s strong notion of information discussed above. After the learning phase, the mental 
state can be caused by something else (e.g. dogs). This possibility is required in order to 
permit error and misrepresentation. But if in the post-learning phase, dogs can cause the 
tokening of the concept “fox”, it is arbitrary to suppose that this couldn´t also happen in the 
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learning phase. Although, actually, only foxes cause the tokening of the concept “fox” in the 
learning phase, the counterfactual that dogs would cause the concept “fox” is also true for the 
learning phase. As the content-fixing causal relation is a counterfactual supporting relation, it 
is true already for the learning phase that foxes or dogs would cause the tokening of the 
concept “fox”. Given that the content-fixing causal relation is counterfactual supporting, the 
concept “fox” represents the content fox-or-dog. The disjunction problem reappears despite 
the distinction between learning and post-learning phase. 
 Given these problems for the explanation of type-one situations by a learning phase, 
the content-fixing situation has to be explained in some other way. In the learning phase, a 
teacher can arrange the learning situation in such a way that only foxes cause the tokening of 
“fox”, but that does not avoid the problem posed by counterfactuals. We can appeal to 
teacher´s intentions by saying that the teacher meant “fox” to represent foxes and not dogs. 
But in this case we would violate the naturalistic constraint to explain intentional states 
without the appeal to other intentional states, in this case teacher´s intentions.  
 It seems that content-fixing situations cannot be defined only by a causal relation 
without introducing other intentional notions or some normative constraints. Intentional 
notions violate the naturalistic constraint. Normative constraints able to distinguish the 
content-fixing situation need to be defended independently of the causal relation.  
There are several possible answers to such objections to a causal theory of content. First, even 
if we introduce further intentional notions to explain content, as it was the case with the 
introduction of teacher’s intentions, we can still hope for a naturalistic explanation of these 
further intentions. Papineau adopts such a view when he states, that we can explain mental 
representation only if at least a psychology of desire is already given in the organism having 
these representations (Papineau 1993). But he intends furthermore to give a naturalistic 
explanation of these intentional states, desires.61 So, even the introduction of intentional 
notions does not condemn a naturalistic explanation. 
 Secondly, an epistemological argument could save the seeming impossibility to 
distinguish on a causal level between content-fixing and wild causes, between situations of 
type one and the other situations. It may be that there is such a difference, but that we are 
unable to know it or detect it. We may just not have epistemic access to that difference 
although there is one.  
Thirdly, it can be argued that the constraints adopted for a reduction of content to 
                                                 
61 Papineau (1993) defends a teleosemantic view of mental content and not a causal theory, but his strategy to 
introduce intentions which can be explained naturalistically could equally be adopted in a causal theory of 
content. 
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causal relations are too strong. It may be that in philosophy we almost never fulfill the 
constraint to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the reduction of one concept to 
another. It may be that the reduction of content to causal relations alone fails just because of 
such demanding constraints on reduction.  
But the most widely followed way to save a reductive explanation of content is to 
explain content by causal relations and something else; and in many naturalistic theories that 
something else are functions. Mostly, causal theories try to get that normative constraint from 
the normativity of biological or developmental functions. I will come back to that option in 
the section on teleological theories of content. But before that, we have to consider another 
problem for causal theories, the problem of indeterminacy. 
 
2.3 The Problem of Indeterminacy 
 
 A general problem for the causal theories is the so-called problem of indeterminacy. One 
version of the indeterminacy problem arises from the fact that causes are part of a long causal 
chain. Given such a chain, it remains indeterminate which property in that chain is singled out 
as the cause of the mental state and therefore as the content of that mental state. In visual 
perception, light reflects first upon the surface of an object. That reflection causes light-waves 
of a certain length, distributed in a certain way in our environment. These light waves cause 
an activation of nerve-cells (cones and rods) in the retina. The activation of these cells causes 
further activations in the optic nerve, then in the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN, an area 
beneath the cortex) and then in the visual cortex. If we locate the visual state somewhere in 
the visual system of the brain, then we have to ask which property in that long causal chain 
leading from the light and the surface of the object to the brain state is actually represented by 
the brain state. A series of properties is part of the causal chain, reflectance properties of the 
distal object, properties of light-wave, activation properties of the retina, chemical properties 
in the cones and rods of the retina and the electric action potentials of diverse brain cells. 
Which of these properties enters the content of perception on the causal theory of content?  
A theory like the “Best Test Theory” cannot answer this question. If we find a 
property which causes most frequently a certain perceptual state, then all the intermediary 
steps from that property to the brain also cause the perceptual state.  
Fodor gives a response to the indeterminacy problem arising from causal chains 
(Fodor 1990: 117 f.). He introduces a further criterion for semantic content besides the 
asymmetrically independent causal relation, namely “robustness“. A semantic relation must 
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be robust, that is, a state S can only mean property P, if S is normally caused by Ps, but can be 
caused by something else than Ps. If only Ps can cause S, then the P-S relation is not robust 
and cannot be a semantic relation. Alternative causes of S guarantee the “robustness” 
necessary for a semantic relation. But if we suppose that we can have the same perceptual 
experience through a causal chain from the object to the brain or through hallucination i.e. 
though a perceptual state caused only by an internal process of the brain, then most of the 
relations between the brain state and the properties in the causal chain are robust. Therefore, 
even with the supplementary criterion of robustness, the intermediary steps in the causal chain 
could all be part of the content. If that is the case, robustness is not an answer against the 
threat of indeterminacy due to causal chains.  
The indeterminacy problem I discussed here is only one version of a more general 
problem about the indeterminacy of content which arises in causal theories of reference from 
the so called qua-problem (Devitt 1981). If the cause of a mental state determines its content, 
to what does the mental state refer to in that cause. As mentioned, there is first the problem of 
the causal chain. Secondly there is the problem of the representation of aspects or whole 
objects. If one object is singled out in that causal chain, does the mental token represent an 
aspect of it or the whole object. Thirdly, which properties of the object does the mental token 
represent? Does it represent only the most determinate properties like the specific shade or 
shape of the object or more determinable properties, for example the property to be blue or 
colored, or the property to be a fox? 62 For perceptual content, the second problem of the 
representation of aspects or the whole object is the less problematic one as it is generally 
accepted that perception only represents some aspects of an object and not the whole. But 
besides the problem of causal chains, a theory of perceptual content has to address the 
problem of the representation of determinate or more determinable properties. 
Causal theories of content have either a problem to solve the disjunction problem or 
the indeterminacy problem. And it seems that these problems cannot be solved by an appeal 
to causal content-fixing conditions alone. Even if it is possible in a causal theory of content to 
define some normal or optimal conditions which are able to specify the content determining 
causal relations, the problem of indeterminacy requires a further criterion to determine which 
property is represented in the content-determining causal chain. Teleosemantic approaches to 
content were developed to solve not only the problem to distinguish the normal causes from 
                                                 
62 I mean here that a property is determinable when there are still more determinate properties falling under the 
determinable property. Usually, the difference between determinates and determinable is only relative. A 
determinate property (“turquoise“) is determinate relative to a less determinate property (“blue“), but is itself a 
determinable to a more precise determinate property (a specific shade of turquoise, e.g. “celeste“).  
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wild causes, but also to answer the indeterminacy problem.  
 It is especially the difficulty to say which event in a causal chain is actually 
represented that constrains to look for an explanation which goes beyond just the causal 
relations of a mental state. Why do many naturalistic theories of intentionality then introduce 
functions? First, functions are not themselves intentional notions and do therefore not threaten 
to violate the naturalistic constraint. Secondly, functions can themselves be explained by the 
causal and historical relations an organism has to its environment. They can be explained by 
notions which are perfectly acceptable for the natural sciences. If a causal theory is 
complemented by intentional notions (beliefs, desires), as it was the case with teacher’s 
intentions or desires, then a naturalistic explanation of content is just shifted one level higher. 
We have to give a further explanation of the introduced intentional notions. If content is 
explained by consciousness and phenomenal states or if it is explained by prescriptive 
normativity, the further problem of a naturalistic explanation of norms or of conscious or 
phenomenal states is introduced. And a naturalistic explanation of these notions seems much 
more problematic or on some accounts even impossible. So, if a purely causal theory is 
insufficient for an explanation of representational content, as I argued before, the introduction 
of biological or developmental functions seem to be the best candidates available for the 
program of a naturalistic explanation of intentionality and content.  
 
3. Teleosemantic Theories of Content 
 
3.1. Functions 
 
The teleosemantic approach to perceptual content gives a better answer to the indeterminacy 
problem. Teleosemantics combines the causal theory of mental content with an account of the 
function and purpose of mental states. The function can be either the biological function of 
certain physiological systems, for example the function of the sensory systems, or it can be an 
ontogenetically acquired function which developed through the adaptation of an individual to 
certain circumstances. Dretske (1988) defends ontogenetically acquired functions especially 
for the mental content of propositional attitudes, but emphasized in the case of perception the 
role of phylogenetically developed biological functions (Dretske 1995: 15). The function of 
perceptual systems is mainly hard-wired and does not change with the circumstances and the 
context in which an individual develops. In perception, biological functions play certainly a 
bigger role than for the content of concepts. Besides this difference between the acquired and 
innate functions, the teleosemantic theories can be distinguished into those which derive the 
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function from the producer system of perceptual states (Dretske 1986, 1988 and 1995, 
Matthen 1988, Neander 2006) and those which derive the function from the consumer 
systems of a perceptual state (Papineau 1984 and 1993 and Millikan 1984 and 1989).  
Why introduce functions? They are supposed to explain the normalcy condition and 
can therefore differentiate the content-fixing causes from other wild causes. Furthermore, they 
can solve the indeterminacy problem. I will follow here the etiological view of functions 
(Millikan 1984 and Neander 1991) and define a function as a selected effect. The function of a 
system, for example a physiological system, is the effect which the system was selected for. 
In the case of the heart, that organ produces diverse effects; it contracts, makes a regular noise 
and pumps blood. On the etiological view of functions, the function of the heart is that 
specific effect it was selected for, that effect which explains why it was selected. The heart 
was selected because it pumps blood, not because it makes noises. That is the effect which 
explains why the heart continues to exist in living beings. Had the heart only made regular 
noises without pumping blood, it would not have been selected. The noise has no biological 
function and is only a side effect of contraction. Such a view of function needs not to be 
limited to biological systems. Behaviors or mental states can be “selected” in an individual´s 
development because they have an advantageous effect. They are “chosen” or “selected” 
because of this effect.63
Now, the teleological theories of mental content apply that view of function to mental 
states, or more precisely either to the systems which produce (producer systems) or to the 
systems which use mental states (consumer systems). A token state cannot directly have a 
function, because functions depend on a history of selection. But the system which produces 
or uses a mental state can have a history of selection and a function. We can and generally do 
attribute functions to the perceptual system which produces a specific perceptual state (token). 
We can also attribute functions to the system which uses perceptual states, for example our 
motor system which uses perceptual state for orientation and locomotion or the reasoning 
system which uses the information of perceptual states. In both cases, i.e. the attribution of 
function to producer systems or to consumer systems, the token perceptual state can derive its 
function from the function of the system. Let us take again the example of the heart, it has the 
function to pump blood because of its evolutionary history of selection. A single contraction 
of the heart derives its function from the function of the organ. We can attribute to that token 
state, that contraction, the function to pump blood and say that it is malfunctioning, if it fails 
                                                 
63 „Selection“ is not meant here in the biological sense of natural  selection. A behavior or mental state can be 
„selected“ in an individual by a method of trial-and-error. It is neither selected in the biological sense nor is it 
chosen through an intentional decision of the individual. 
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to pump blood. In the same way, we can say that a perceptual state has the function to 
represent features of the environment, if the perceptual system was selected to do so.  
I will discuss in the next sections, how the content of mental states can be derived 
from the function of the producer system of the state or from the consumer system which uses 
the mental state.   
 
3.2. Functions of producer systems 
 
For Dretske (1988 and 1995) perceptual systems have indicator functions. They have the 
function to indicate certain properties to the organism which uses that information in diverse 
ways, for example for the guidance of action. Dretske takes the example of a very simple 
perceptual system, the magnetosomes in marine bacteria (Dretske 1986). Magnetosomes are 
sensory mechanisms which detect gradients of the magnetic field in the environment of the 
bacteria. They are used by that organism to orient its movement in the direction of the 
magnetic pole. The bacteria orient their movements towards the pole and that means in the 
direction of deeper waters, the region with a low level of oxygen, the only condition where 
that microorganism can survive. That primitive sensory mechanism was selected, because it 
indicates the direction of magnetic north, a direction which correlates with favorable 
conditions of survival.  
Content derives from indicator functions of the perceptual state. It is the function of 
that sensory system to indicate the direction of magnetic north. Such an attribution of 
functions to sensory systems can be used as the content-fixing property. A perceptual state has 
that property as content which it has the function to indicate. On that view, not all the causes 
are content-determining, but only those causes which the sensory system (and therefore the 
states it produces) has the function to detect. Content derives from the indicator function of 
the state. The functions of a state are therefore content-fixing and can resolve the problem of 
disjunctive contents. A perceptual state has the function to indicate a certain property in the 
environment. If that state fails to do so, if it is not actually caused by that property, it fails to 
indicate that property although it is its function to do so. If a state has the function to indicate 
foxes, but is caused by a dog, it still has its function to indicate foxes but fails to do so. Its 
content is “fox” and it misrepresents its cause as “fox“.   
Dretske´s theory combines an informational semantics of indicators with the 
teleological notion of function. In that sense his version of teleosemantics represents a hybrid 
theory. Only states which stand in a regular causal relation to some specific cause, which are 
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indicators or natural signs of this cause, can acquire an indicator function, the function to 
indicate that cause. So, there must first be a causal relation between an external feature C (the 
cause), and a mental state E (the effect). The mental state E indicates C, when it carries 
information about C. In order to do that, there must be a regular relation between C and E in 
the domain were E is selected. In that domain, all Es are caused by the environmental feature 
C. Once E acquired its indicator function, E can be caused by other features of the 
environment. If E is caused for example by some feature D, it would misrepresent that 
feature. So, besides the causal relation between the mental state E and its cause C, there must 
be an explanation about the teleological component of the theory: How does the mental state 
(E) acquire its function? 
There are two ways a mental state can acquire a function in Dretske´s theory. A mental 
state can acquire an evolutionary function through natural selection or a developmental 
function through a learning process (Dretske 1988: chap. 4). A system producing mental state 
E can be selected to cause certain movements or activities of the organism, because these 
movements caused by indicators of feature C are more beneficial. Dretske gives the example 
of the noctuid moth´s auditory system which has been selected to guide its movements. Such 
movements guided by sounds permit the moth to avoid the sound of its predator (the bat) 
(Dretske 1988: 91). The auditory system was selected to play a function in the guidance of the 
bat´s movements. And it was selected because it is an indicator of external features (bats). It 
was selected because the system produces bat-indicators. It is the function of the system to 
produce bat-indicators and of its perceptual states to be bat-indicators.   
Developmental functions are explained by a process of learning. A mental state (E) 
which is an indicator of a certain feature (C) is recruited as a cause of a certain movement or 
activity (M). Dretske explains this by a system of reward and reinforcement. If the movement 
M is more beneficial, when it is caused by the mental state E, then the reward for M reinforces 
the causal relation between the mental state (E) and the movement (M). The mental state is 
recruited as a cause of M, because it is an indicator of certain external conditions (C). E 
acquires therefore the function to indicate these external conditions (Dretske 1988: 95 ff.).  
Fig. 1 gives a schematic representation of the causal relations involved. 
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Fig. 1: Schematic Representation of the causal relations in Dretske´s theory. 
 
On the evolutionary explanation of function, E, a C-indicator, is selected for its advantageous 
effect on M. Movements caused by E are beneficial and advantageous for the system, 
therefore E gets a function in the system, due to the fact that it is an indicator of C (Es which 
are not caused by C would not be thus selected). On the developmental account of function, E 
gets its function, because E-caused movements M have a rewarding effect (R). The reward 
reinforces the connection between E and M. E gets recruited as a cause of M through the 
repeated rewards to E-caused movements M. Through these processes of selection or 
recruitment, the mental state E gets the function to indicate external condition C. Would it not 
indicate C, it would not be selected. Therefore, it is the fact that the mental E is an indicator of 
C which explains why the mental state is selected and gets its function. Being mostly an 
indicator of C, M gets the function to indicate C. And from that indicator function derives the 
content of the mental state. Due to its function E is a representation of property C. 
 If we apply that explanation to the often discussed example of the content of a frog´s 
mental content, we get the following picture: An internal perceptual state of the frog is caused 
by flies and is therefore a fly indicator. The fly indicator (E) gets selected because of its 
positive effect on the frog´s behavior (M). Snapping behavior is more successful, if it is 
caused by fly-indicators than by other mental states. Through this process of selection the 
mental state E gets a function in the system, it gets the function to indicate flies. Even if, once, 
E is not caused by a fly, it keeps its indicator-function which determines content. It keeps its 
content “fly” and misrepresents the wild cause as a fly.   
 This attribution of content through indicator functions solves the disjunction problem. 
E does represent flies, not flies-or-wild causes (beebees). It is less clear if it can solve the 
different indeterminacy problems, especially the causal chain problem. Does the frog 
represent flies or fly-patterns in the ambient light? Neander (2004), for example, denies that it 
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solves that indeterminacy problem. If E was selected, because it indicates flies, it was also 
selected because it indicates all the intermediary causal chains. Therefore it has also the 
indicator-function to indicate fly-patterns and retinal fly-images.  
But it is more plausible that the attribution of indicator functions can resolve the 
indeterminacy problem which arose from causal chains. What selective advantage would it 
have for an organism to represent the properties of its retina? To monitor the well-functioning 
of these physiological processes? That does not seem to be a very plausible explanation. And 
therefore, it is not plausible to ascribe to the visual system the function to monitor the retinal 
processes. On the other hand, the detection of surface properties of objects, for example 
reflectance properties, seems to be a very useful information in the selection of food or the 
detection of predators. It is a much more plausible ascription of function to say that the visual 
system has the function to detect surface properties of distal objects than that it has the 
function to monitor the retina. Given that plausible ascription of function, we can say that 
visual perception represents the surface property of objects and not some or all other 
properties in the causal chain. The teleosemantic ascription of function is therefore a plausible 
solution to the indeterminacy problem. 
 Does this teleosemantic theory resolve the problem of indeterminacy, the problem 
whether determinable or more determinate properties are represented? Does the frog represent 
flies or frog food (the determinable/determinate problem)? I will come back to that question 
in the next section. 
 But the attribution of indicator function to mental states is problematic for another 
reason. Teleological theories of content accept generally the etiological view of function. But 
on that view the function of a state is attributed by looking at its effect. For example, the 
function of the heart is its effect on blood flow and it is selected for that effect. When a mental 
state has an indicator function, it has the function to indicate its cause. Papineau (1993) and 
Millikan (1989) emphasize that it is strange on an etiological view of function to ascribe to a 
trait the function to be caused by something. The function of a trait must be one of its effects 
not its cause.   
 Mental states get their indicator function, because they have an effect on other mental 
states or bodily movements. They cause other activities or movements and have this effect, 
because they are indicators. They can play their role relative to these activities, because they 
are indicators. But then the indicator function only derives from the effects of that mental 
state.  The mental state (E) has an effect on other activities (M) and that is its function. It can 
only satisfy that function if it is an indicator of C and it is selected for that function, because it 
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is an indicator of C. But that means that E’s function is different from its indicator function. 
The function is an effect on M. The causal relation between a mental state and its cause only 
play a role in that state’s function. Dretske´s attribution of function does not say what the 
mental state’s function is, i.e. what its effect is for which that state was selected. He only 
emphasizes that the mental state gets that function because it is an indicator and gets therefore 
an indicator function besides its “real” function. What is missing in Dretske’s approach is an 
analysis of the mental state’s effect and therefore an analysis of that state’s function. It is 
arbitrary to derive an indicator function from a mental state’s function without making 
explicit what that state’s function actually is. Teleological theories of function which focus on 
the consumer system of a mental state more explicitly try to attribute functions by looking at a 
mental state’s effect. Let us look next at these versions of teleosemantics. 
 
3.3. Functions of consumer systems 
 
In opposition to the input oriented teleosemantics which derive content from the causal 
relation of a state, Millikan (1984, 1989 and 2004) and Papineau (1984 and 1993) developed 
an output-oriented or benefit based view of the function and content of mental states. For 
them, the content of a mental state derives from that state’s function, independently of the fact 
whether that state carries information about its cause. The content derives from the effect that 
state has on a consumer system, i.e. a system which uses that mental state. While Dretske’s 
input-based account does not look at a mental state’s effect to determine its content, this 
output-oriented account does not look at the cause of the state to attribute content. I will 
defend here the view that the later option leads to serious problems in the determination of 
content. But let us briefly state the theory. 
 On the teleological view based on consumer systems, the content of a mental state 
derives from the function of the system which uses that mental state. If a mental state is used 
to orient toward food, then that state is used by the foraging system, for example. To attribute 
content, we have to look at the function of that foraging system, the function of that mental 
state’s consumer system. Millikan and Papineau follow the etiological view of functions 
defined as selected effects (Millikan calls them “proper functions”). The function of that 
consumer system is to get food. That system was selected because it provided food to the 
organism. The mental state is used by that system, because it contributes to satisfy that 
system’s function. In Millikan’s theory, it does so by representing the normal condition of the 
proper functioning of that system.  
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 There are two elements which explain the representational properties of a mental state, 
two conditions for being a representation. First, the mental state must correlate with the 
normal conditions for the proper functioning of the consumer system. And secondly, it must 
be used by the consumer system to fulfill its function. Let us say, a mental state regularly 
correlates with the presence of frog food (it is for example a perceptual state correlating with 
flies). The presence of frog food is a normal condition for a well-functioning foraging system. 
That system functions normally only if there is frog food nearby. The mental state’s 
representational property derives from the fact that it is used by the consumer system to 
satisfy its function. The system satisfies its function (getting food) by using a state which 
correlates with food. Thereby that state comes to represent the conditions (presence of food) 
which are necessary to fulfill the function. The state has as content the presence of food, i.e. 
the normal condition of functioning of the consumer system. 
 To make explicit the causal relations involved in that attribution of content, let us get 
back to the schematic representation of these causal relations in Fig. 1.  The consumer system 
is represented by M, a system which was selected for some of its effects, namely the effect R 
(to be selected, it is sufficient that M sometimes has that effect). So the consumer system’s 
function is to do R (e.g. get food). The system M does get food (R) only under certain 
condition, namely when there is food nearby. Similarly the heart does only pump blood, its 
function, when there is blood in the veins.64 These are the normal conditions necessary for the 
satisfaction of the function. These normal conditions, some external conditions in the 
environment of the organism, are represented in our figure by C. So M does actually R, only if 
this condition C obtains. Otherwise it fails to satisfy the function (it does T instead of the 
beneficial effect R). Now, we can see how the two conditions for representation can be met. If 
some state in the organism, E, correlates with this condition C and if E is used as a sign by the 
system, then E represents that condition C. It is easy to see the benefit for the system M in 
using E. If E correlates with C and causes the activation of M, then M will work under the 
conditions which are necessary for the desired effect R. The consumer system M avoids 
activation when the conditions for success (condition C) are not met. It avoids activation in 
situations where it fails to do R.  
 To summarize the theory: from the observation of the causal history of M, we can see 
for which effect (R, not T) the system M was selected. R is the function of the system and 
                                                 
64 Obviously, the heart differs from a system which has representations. The heart has a function (pumping) and 
there are conditions (presence of blood) in which it functions properly. But no state in the heart does represent 
these conditions. Given that there is always blood, it does not even need, in order to function well, to represent 
that blood is coming. Contrary to the heart, an organism which lives in constantly changing conditions has an 
obvious advantage to represent those conditions in which his functions can be satisfied. 
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from its function we get the normal conditions of proper functioning C. From all mental states 
which co-vary with C and which are used by the consumer system, we get the mental states 
which are representations. And from the states they correlate with plus the normal conditions 
of M we get the content of these representations. The theory only uses causes and effects of 
physical states and correlations between them to determine intentional content. 
 The relation between a cause C and a mental state E is not sufficient for 
representation. Correlations between types of events are ubiquitous in nature. If they were 
enough for representation, everything would be a representation. So, function is a further 
necessary condition. But on the consumer-based theory, neither a causal relation nor an 
informational relation between C and the mental state E is necessary. Correlation is sufficient, 
if the correlating mental state is used by some consumer system. If a mental state co-varies 
per pure chance with the normal conditions for the consumer system, that is enough. While 
the producer-based teleological theories do not consider sufficiently the effects of a mental 
state, the consumer-based theories reject the causal and informational relation of the mental 
state as a necessary condition for content. We will see that this poses a problem especially for 
perceptual content. But before, let us look at some other objections to teleological theories 
and more specifically to the consumer-based theory. 
 
3.4. Objections 
 
First, I will defend the teleosemantic views in general against some objections, the 
normativity objection (1) and the swampman objection (2), before addressing some special 
objections to the consumer-based view (3 and 4). 
(1) Normativity: Sometimes it is claimed that linguistic meaning is essentially a normative 
phenomenon (Kripke 1982) and also that intentional content is such a normative phenomenon 
(Boghossian 2003, Wedgewood 2009, for an overview see Glüer/Wikforss 2009). If 
intentional content presupposes norms and if norms cannot be explained in a naturalistic way, 
then the claim of the normatively of intentionality becomes a refutation of naturalistic 
explanations of intentional content.  
First, Boghossian´s normativity claim for meaning (Boghossian 1989) does not apply for 
perceptual content. Boghossian´s “simple argument” derives normativity from correctness 
conditions for states with meaning. It is generally agreed that propositional attitudes have 
correctness conditions. On the intentional view of perception, perceptual states have also 
correctness (or accuracy) conditions. Boghossian claims that from meaning, we can derive a 
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prescription that we ought or should apply that term in a certain way. If “green” means green, 
then it is correct to apply that concept to green things. From that is derived the prescription 
that we ought or should apply “green” to the conditions of its correctness. But for perceptual 
states, the correctness conditions cannot imply any prescription. Prescriptions are generally 
formulated in deontic terms like “ought“ and “should”. But “ought” and “should” imply 
“can”. One cannot prescribe that we should avoid perceptual illusions, if we cannot avoid 
them. As perception is not a voluntary tokening of mental states, we cannot be prescribed to 
token them in a certain way. 
 We saw for some causal theories that they made appeal to normalcy conditions to 
explain mental content. Content-fixing causes defined as causes under epistemically optimal 
conditions presuppose norms which define what “optimal” conditions are. We saw that 
Dretske’s content-fixing causes in a learning phase may involve some norms of the teacher, 
who tries to assure a correlation between the “right” causes and concepts. But I claimed that 
the involvement of such norms was an objection to these theories, because they failed to meet 
the naturalistic constraint. It was the claim of the teleological theories of content, to give a 
naturalistic explanation of the distinction between content-fixing situations and other 
situations. In that sense they try to give a naturalistic explanation of “normal” situation of 
content-fixing causes. Do the teleological theories of content, the theories discussed in this 
section (§3), also presuppose norms? 
 We derive normative claims from functions. Given that the heart’s function is to pump 
blood, we say that it “should” pump blood. But by saying that, we do not prescribe the heart 
anything. The normativity we derive from functions is no prescriptive normativity. In the 
same way, when we say that we “failed” to see something and that it is “incorrect” or 
“inaccurate” to see that property, we derive normative claims from the content of perception. 
But here again, these normative claims are no prescriptions. Those defending the etiological 
view of function admit the normativity of function, but that normativity is descriptive and not 
prescriptive (Neander 200465). Functional norms are like statistical norms; they do not 
prescribe something, but just describe certain regularities. The heart’s function is to pump and 
the perceptual system’s function is to be accurate because that enhances survival. But these 
functions just describe that individuals whose perceptual systems and hearts do that are more 
likely to survive. Nothing prescribes them to survive, even if most creatures want to survive.  
 The claim that intentional content is normative generally presupposes prescriptive 
normativity (see Glüer/Wikforss 2009). Or teleological theories and functions only involve 
                                                 
65 See also Neander´s unpublished paper “The Narrow and the Normative”, a paper for the NYU series on 
Mental Causation, available at http://philpapers.org/rec/NEATNA 
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descriptive normatively. Their ascription of meaning does not involve any normativity in the 
strong prescriptive sense. From that descriptive normativity of functions there is no threat to a 
naturalistic explanation of content. 
(2) Swampman: On the producer-based and the consumer-based teleological theory of 
content, the attribution of content depends on functions selected in natural evolution, although 
developmental functions are not excluded. Generally, it is conceived in these theories that the 
content of perceptual representations is fixed by evolutionary functions (see Dretske 1995: 15; 
for Millikan the proper functions determining content are biological functions). But if content 
depends on functions selected in the evolutionary history of a species of which the individual 
organism is a member, then individuals without evolutionary history would have no content.  
 The scenario of swampman exploits this consequence that, without an evolutionary 
history, there are no biological functions and without function no content. Davidson (1987) 
invented the example of a creature which by sheer accident formed next to him (in a 
thunderstorm in a swamp). The creature formed by chance as a molecular duplicate of 
Davidson and replaced him. Swampman goes home like Davidson would have done and 
continues his live. Swampman has no evolutionary history. He is the product of a storm. 
Neither is he a copy of a creature with an evolutionary history (the storm did not copy 
Davidson but caused swampman by pure chance). It has no functions, although he behaves 
like Davidson. Given that mental content depends on biological functions and history, 
swampman would have no mental content. He represents nothing and his mental states and his 
perceptions are about nothing. But given that swampman is a molecular duplicate of 
Davidson, it behaves like a normal human being. 
 The swampman scenario challenges the idea that content depends on causal or 
selectional history. It seems intuitively implausible that swampman has no mental content. 
But if it is implausible, content cannot depend on history and the teleological theory of 
content would be false. Neander (2004) weakens these strong intuitions against the 
teleological account. She emphasizes that swampman can have narrow content, the content 
which depends only on the physical constitution of the individual and not on its causal and 
historical relations to the environment. If we suppose furthermore that phenomenal states 
supervene on the individual’s (narrow) physical constitution, then swampman can also have 
phenomenal states. So, swampman’s mental states need not to be completely different from 
ours. They can be phenomenal and can have narrow content. That makes it perhaps less 
implausible that swampman behaves like us. Still he lacks an essential aspect: wide content.  
 Swampman represents indubitably a problem for teleological theories and there is no 
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convincing defense against that example from defenders of teleosemantic views of content 
(see Papineau 2001, Neander 2004). The only strategy until now is to make the intuitions 
triggered by swampman against historical theories of content less strong; or to question more 
generally the force of intuitions triggered by counterfactual scenarios.  
(3) Indeterminacy of Function: Functions were introduced to eliminate the indeterminacy of 
mental content. As I discussed the different qua-problems, we saw that causes do not 
determine content in a precise way. The hope is that functions permit to reduce that 
indeterminacy. But if functions are themselves indeterminate and content derives from them, 
then the determination of content stays indeterminate. There are two arguments which state 
that functions are too indeterminate for a precise ascription of content.  
 The first argument says that mental content has intensionality, but functions are 
extensionally defined notions. Therefore they are not fine-grained enough to explain 
intensional notions (Rosenberg 1989, Fodor 1990). Mental states, for example beliefs, can 
differ in meaning although they refer to the same entities or extension. They have 
intensionality. Biological functions are explained by (past) causal relations and causality is 
extensional. We have the same causal relation, if we substitute expressions with the same 
extension to describe the relata of the causal relation. It is claimed that function cannot 
explain the fine-grained intensional differences of content. This argument has no force against 
perceptual content, because it can be doubted that this content has intensionality.66
 The second argument comes from the fact of chains of functions (Neander 1995, 
Papineau 1998). That argument is problematic especially for the consumer-based theory of 
content. We saw already about the causal theories of content that it remains indeterminate 
which events in a causal chain of a mental state are actually the content of that state. A similar 
threat arises with functions. Biological functions are interconnected. A certain foraging 
behavior has the function to get food. Getting food has the function to satisfy the digestive 
system. That system has the function to give the body the necessary energy. And these 
cooperating systems of the organism have all the function to increase the chances of survival 
and reproduction. With different functions, we get different ascriptions of content. Which of 
these functions should actually be used to determine the content of the perceptual state used in 
getting food?  If the most general function is used, then the perceptual state represents the 
normal conditions which guarantee survival. That is too general to attribute any determinate 
content to that state. The problem of the chain of functions can be blocked, if we determine 
the most immediate function of the consumer system. Neander (1995) proposed that we 
                                                 
66 See Chap. 5 for arguments against the intensionality of perceptual content.  
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determine the immediate function by looking at the effects of the system which would be 
absent, if the system were malfunctioning. The foraging system may fail to provide energy or 
increase the chances of survival, because the digestive system is not working. Food gets into 
the system, but is not used in the appropriate way. But these effects (no energy, no increased 
survival) cannot be attributed to the foraging system and therefore cannot be its function. The 
foraging system would be malfunctioning, if it does not get food. Therefore, its immediate 
function is getting food, not producing energy or increasing survival. A mental state used by 
the foraging system represents the conditions which satisfy that function, namely food.  
 Another solution for the problem of chains of functions is provided by Papineau (1998 
and 2003). He limit’s the ascription of content to systems which have desires. The content of 
a state used to satisfy a desire is given by the conditions which satisfy a desire. We get the 
content once we determine the given desire. The threat of chains of functions is avoided. The 
problem of that solution is its use of another intentional notion, desire, to determine content.67  
(4) Pietroski´s Objection: The most serious problem for the consumer-based theory is the fact 
that it divorces the attribution of content to a mental state from the cause of that state. Such a 
divorce is particularly counter-intuitive in the case of perception. We generally think that the 
perception of an object is caused by that object. It is also intuitively plausible that the content 
of perception is related to the object which causes the perception. Or on the consumer-based 
theory, that needs not to be the case. Pietroski invented a fictive scenario which shows 
particularly how counter-intuitive a divorce of content from cause can be. Pietroski (1992) 
invents a selectional story for a type of perceptual state which is totally divorced from the 
cause of that state. He imagines a color-blind animal (the “kimu”) which is often eaten by its 
enemy (the “snorf”). The kimu live in plains where also its enemy lives. At a certain moment, 
one new-born kimu has the capacity to see red and a desire to see red objects. In its 
environment only the morning or evening sun is red. The new capacity and desire drives the 
kimu to watch sunrises and sunsets in the hills where no snorfs live. As snorfs hunt in the 
morning and evening he generally avoids them. Through this selectional advantage, the 
capacity to see red spreads through the kimu population. The capacity to see red is selected 
because it makes kimu avoid its enemy. That is the selected effect, and therefore the function, 
of the capacity. Normal conditions for the proper functioning of that capacity are snorf-free 
space. Given this selectional history, the content of red percepts is “snorf free space”. The 
content has nothing to do with the cause of the state, red objects. And the content is “snorf 
free space” although it may be that a kimu never actually saw any snorf, given that kimu now 
                                                 
67 See p. 115 on that problem. 
 130
live in hills when their enemy hunts in the valley. 
 That somewhat bizarre biological scenario shows that the function of a mental state 
can be completely divorced from its cause. If we accept the consumer-based theory of 
content, content of a state can be completely independent of its cause. Especially for 
perception, that consequence is highly counter-intuitive. Neander (2006) emphasizes a further 
disadvantage of that divorce of content of a state from the cause of that mental state. 
Cognitive science generally explains perceptual states by their causal and informational 
relation. Ignoring these relations in a theory of perceptual content would divorce such a theory 
from the usual explanations of perception given by cognitive science.  
 Given the disadvantage of a divorce of content from cause, especially for a theory of 
perceptual content, and given the problem of indeterminacy for a purely causal theory of 
content, I will defend in the next section a hybrid theory. Such a theory combines the cause of 
a perceptual state and its function to attribute content. Versions of such hybrid theories have 
been presented by Dretske (1988 and 1995) and Neander (2006). 
 
4. A Hybrid Theory 
 
In the previous sections, I emphasized some short-comings of the existing naturalistic 
semantics. For the causal theories, I emphasized the fact that a restriction to causal relations 
alone will not resolve the disjunction problem and therefore distinguish the content-fixing 
causes from other causes. For the theories ascribing indicator functions to mental, and 
perceptual, states, I emphasized that indication is a relation to a cause, but function is a 
relation to effects. And it is not clear how the function to indicate a cause can emerge from the 
effects of a mental state. For the theories which derive content from the function of consumer 
systems, I emphasized that they ignored in the ascription of content to a mental state the cause 
of that mental state and the information that state carries. 
 I will propose here a hybrid theory which combines elements of the causal and 
informational theories of content and elements of the semantics based on the function of 
consumer systems. I think, against consumer based teleosemantics that we have to look at the 
cause of a perceptual state to determine its content. It is not enough to look at the conditions 
of proper functioning of the consumer systems to tell what the content of a perceptual state is. 
Against indicator semantics, I think that the best explanation why a perceptual state acquires 
the status of a representation is to look at the effect of that perceptual state on other systems 
and at the function of these systems. 
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For an explanation of perceptual representation, we have to distinguish two aspects, 
first the content a perceptual state has. Here we have to look at the cause of that state. 
Secondly, we have to look at the way a perceptual state acquires its representational status. 
What makes a causal relation between a certain property and a mental state into a 
representation? What gives the perceptual state that representational status? In the explanation 
of the representational status, I will follow the consumer-based teleosemantics by looking at 
the effect a perceptual state has.  So, I will differentiate here between an explanation of the 
representational status of a perceptual state and an explanation of the content of a perceptual 
state. Let us look first at the explanation of representational status.  
(1) Representational Status: The explanation of the way a mental or perceptual state acquires 
a representational status will depend on the function a perceptual state acquires and especially 
the function to indicate certain properties (Dretske 1988, Neander 2004 and 2006).  But how 
does a state get such a function? We can claim, like Dretske and Neander, that perceptual 
representations have an indicator function, but through which process does a state acquire that 
function and therefore the status of a representation?  
 Following the etiological theory of functions, any type of states or any system gets a 
function, if one of its effects is selected. The selected effect will be the function of this type of 
states or of the system. What can be the selected effect of a perceptual state or more generally 
the effect of a perceptual system? A perceptual state will get a function, if it has an effect 
which is advantageous to the organism. Let us look again at the example of the perceptual 
system of the frog. Frogs try to catch preys (frog food) and try to avoid predators (Neander 
2006). The behavioral system dedicated to catching prey (moving and orienting toward the 
prey, snapping at the prey) will succeed only, if there is some frog food in its vicinity. There 
is no point in snapping at something which is no frog food. A condition of the success of the 
behavioral system dedicated to catching preys is that there actually is some frog food around 
and no fake frog food. If there is no frog food or fake frog food, the prey catching system will 
fail. It will not fulfill its function. Millikan called the conditions of success of a function the 
condition of proper functioning of that system (Millikan 1989). We may more generally call 
them the success conditions of a function. A system will fulfill its function, if these success 
conditions obtain and fail otherwise.  
 A perceptual state which indicates the conditions of proper functioning of a system, or, 
in my terminology, its success conditions, will be of a great advantage for that system. In the 
case of the frog’s snapping behavior, that behavioral system will highly increase its success if 
it snaps only when the success conditions for snapping behavior obtain, i.e. when there 
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actually is frog food.  A behavioral system dedicated to catch preys will have a great selective 
advantage, if it is connected to a perceptual system indicating the success conditions of that 
behavioral system.  
 The relation of a perceptual system or a state of that system to the success conditions 
of other activities of the organism can explain why perceptual states get a function. If a certain 
activity (e.g. prey catching) is controlled by (perceptual) states indicating success conditions 
of that activity (frog food), then the success of that activity will greatly increase and be 
advantageous for the organism. In the frog example, different perceptual states have different 
effects on the prey catching system, some perceptual states trigger approach behaviors and 
snapping, some other perceptual states inhibit approach, and perceptual states can also orient 
locomotion in a specific direction (for details on frog’s prey behavior, see Neander 2006). 
Perceptual states not only have these advantageous effects on behavior, but were also selected 
to have these effects, because they greatly increase the success of that behavioral system. We 
can call all these selected effects of perceptual systems and states upon some activity the 
control function of that perceptual system or state. In the frog example, perceptual states have 
the function to control approach and snapping behavior.  
 The control function of perceptual states, their effect on other activities of the 
organism, is explained by their relation to the success conditions of these activities. They 
exercise control over activities, because they increase the success of these activities. And they 
increase the success of these activities, because they indicate some properties related to the 
success conditions of these activities. The control functions of perceptual states can explain 
why they have indicator functions. They have effects on certain activities and therefore get 
control functions, the function to have these effects on behavior, only if they indicate certain 
conditions in the environment. They get indicator functions, because they have the function to 
control certain activities in such a way that they are exercised in advantageous conditions. The 
perceptual states exercise that control, if they indicate these conditions or properties which 
correlate with them. So, the function to represent some properties of the environment can be 
explained by the effects of perceptual states, by their effect in the control of other activities 
(or behaviors). 
Millikan (1989 and 2004) supposes that the states used by the consumer systems 
represent the conditions of proper functioning of the consumer system, i.e. the success 
conditions of the consumer system. The frog’s perceptual state has as content “frog food” 
because that is the condition of proper functioning of the consumer system (the prey catching 
system or the frog’s digestive system). But the frog actually has no “frog food“-detector. No 
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state in the frog correlates only with frog food and not with fake frog food (e.g. beebees). It 
would be certainly selectively optimal, if frogs had a frog food-detector, but it is questionable 
that they actually have such a highly advantageous system. They do not have a capacity to 
distinguish frog-food from fake frog-food, flies from beebees. It is questionable to ascribe the 
conditions of proper functioning (the success conditions) as content to perceptual states. But 
the success conditions certainly explain why perceptual states acquire their control function 
and their indicator function and therefore their representational status. Only insofar as a 
property indicated by a perceptual state correlates with the success conditions, does this 
perceptual state acquire a control function and an indicator function; only insofar does the 
perceptual state acquire the status of a representation.  
 We can sum up in Fig. 2 the developed explanation by improving on the drawing 
given previously (in Fig. 1). C (e.g. a black flying dot) is the cause of a perceptual state E 
which has effects upon the system M (e.g. snapping behavior). We can say that E exercises 
some control over the activity of system M (it gets a control function: it has for example the 
effects of triggering, inhibiting or orienting the snapping and hunting activity of M and has the 
function to do so). It does so, if E-triggered Ms are more successful than non-E-triggered Ms. 
To determine the success of M, we have to know its function: If Ms function is R (e.g. the 
function of the snapping behavior is to catch a prey), then M is actually successful, if it does R 
(catch frog prey or frog food). The success of M depends on some external conditions 
(success condition SC, e.g. the presence of frog food). If that condition obtains the activity of 
M has the “desired” effect R, otherwise not. Now, it would be selectively advantageous for 
any system M, if it were controlled by a mental or perceptual state which correlates with its 
success conditions (SC) in such a way that M gets triggered when the success conditions (SC) 
obtain and inhibited when they are absent.  
 
Fig 2: Causal relations involved in a perceptual representation (arrows indicate causes, the 
line between C and SC just a correlation) 
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The most advantageous would certainly be an indicator of the success conditions (SC), but it 
is sufficient if E indicates some property (C, e.g. flying black dots) which correlates positively 
with the success conditions (in a specific frog environment, most flying black dots are frog 
food, although perhaps not all). Such a C-indicator could already be selected to control the 
activity of M in such a way as to increase its success. Therefore such a C-indicator could 
acquire a control function and a function to indicate Cs, even if it does not indicate the 
success conditions of M (success conditions are frog food, not flying black dots, i.e. flies or 
beebees). So the success conditions of some system which “uses” perceptual states explains 
why these states acquire representational status, although the success conditions need not 
themselves be the content of these perceptual states. A perceptual state (E) gets the function to 
indicate a property (C), if that property correlates positively with the success conditions of the 
consumer system of the state. 
I did not say anything until now about the type of correlation between the represented 
property (C) and  the success conditions (SC). C may be identical with SC (e.g. a mental state 
may indicate “frog food“), C may be a determinate property of the determinable SC (e.g. “fly“ 
as a determinate of the determinable “frog food”), C may partially overlap with SC (C may be 
“flying black dots“ where some of them are frog food and some are not) or C may just locally 
correlate with success conditions. This is the case with the example of the marine bacteria 
which has an internal state indicating a property (C) of the magnetic field (or magnetic north), 
a property which correlates in that specific environment with anaerobic conditions (SC), the 
conditions in which the bacteria can survive. The correlation is not a lawful one, but just a 
local correlation. But that is sufficient for the indicator of the property of the magnetic field to 
get selected and acquire an indicator function. The weaker the relation between C and SC the 
likelier it is that the perceptual state does not fulfill its function to control activities (M) in 
such a way that the activity M is successful, i.e. satisfies the function it was selected for 
(namely doing R). 
(2) Content: In the previous paragraphs, I showed how representational status is explained by 
the success conditions of the consumer systems of a perceptual state. Here, I will emphasize 
that in the case of perception, the representational content of perceptual state is the property 
that state has the function to indicate. I will follow here Dretske’s explanation (Dretske 1988) 
that a perceptual state is an indicator of property P, if it was caused by that property in the 
past. A state can be an indicator of property P, only if P causes that state. Such an indicator of 
P can acquire an indicator function. Given that indicator function, this type of perceptual state 
can represent also P if it is not actually caused by P. But it cannot acquire the function to 
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indicate P, if it was not caused by P in the past.  
 The way a mental state acquires representational status is not limited to mental states 
which indicate their cause. We can have mental representations which were not caused by the 
properties, objects or facts they are about. Why limit the content of perceptual states to the 
actual cause or past causes of these states?  
Generally it is considered a case of misrepresentation when we see a property or object 
which did not cause that perceptual state or perceptual experience. If we have an experience 
as of something red but nothing red caused that experience, we consider that the perceptual 
experience deceived us. This is not the case with other types of mental states. We can very 
well believe something although the fact we believe did not cause that belief. That would not 
be a reason to doubt the veridicality of the belief.  
 Millikan supposed that the content of perceptual states can go beyond the cause of 
these perceptual states. In the case of the marine bacteria, she attributes the content “anaerobic 
water” to the states of the bacteria’s magnetosomes, although these states are caused by some 
properties of the magnetic field and not by the level of oxygen in the water. But the anaerobic 
water is the condition of proper functioning of the bacteria’s consumer system, therefore on 
her view also the content of the state. Neander (2006) rejected this view for the reason that 
this attribution of content goes beyond the discriminatory capacities of perceptual systems. A 
bacterium could not distinguish between a magnetic field in anaerobic conditions and such a 
magnetic field in aerobic conditions. It can only distinguish between different properties of 
the magnetic field. Neander defends that argument in a close analysis of the frog example. 
The perceptual system of frogs is incapable to distinguish between flies and beebees. Frogs 
react exactly the same way to these two objects. Frogs react only to a certain combination of 
shapes and movements (e.g. long objects moving in a horizontal direction, like worms). To 
attribute to these perceptual states the content “frog food” would go far beyond the 
discriminatory capacities the frog’s perceptual system has. For Neander, we should not go 
beyond the discriminatory capacities of perceptual systems in our attribution of content and 
not beyond the causes of these perceptual systems.   
 If the content of a perceptual state is limited to the past causes of that type of state, 
then there is still the problem of determining which object or property in the causal chain is 
represented. A plausible answer is that a perceptual state represents that cause which 
correlates closely with the success conditions of its consumer system. A perceptual state has a 
large spectrum of causes (all the properties in its causal chain), but it has the function to 
indicate only a certain property, namely that one which is responsible that the perceptual state 
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gets some control function relative of a consumer system. It is because the perceptual state of 
the frog indicates flying black dots that it gets its specific function in the control of the 
snapping behavior of the frog. Would it only indicate retinal stimulations of flying black dots, 
it would not get that control function and therefore it would not acquire an indicator function. 
Or, what a perceptual state represents is only determined by the property it has the function to 
indicate and not all the properties it indicates. 
 So the cause of a perceptual state gives the range of possible contents, and the actual 
content is picked out of one of these causes, namely the cause the indication of which has a 
selective advantage. If that cause is closely related to the success conditions of the system 
which uses the perceptual state, that cause will be picked out from the chain of causes. 
 I will argue in the next chapter that basic perceptual properties like edges, shape, 
color, size and movement are represented in perceptual content (in this case of vision). Higher 
order properties like kind properties, dispositional properties or causality may be represented, 
but it is questionable that all these properties can be so represented by perception. I will 
especially argue in the next chapter that perception does not represent kind properties like 
being a fly or being frog food. So, what is represented by perception and what is picked out 
from the cause of a perceptual state are the basic properties of objects and configurations of 
such basic properties, additionally perhaps dispositional properties, but not kind properties.68 
To take again the frog case, what he perceptually represented when he sees a fly is flying 
black spots, a configuration of basic visible properties of the fly (blackness, movement, 
shape). 
 I did still leave open the second problem of indeterminacy related to the question 
whether the more or the less determinate properties of an object are represented. We represent 
for example the color of an object (one of the mentioned basic properties in visual 
perception). But do we represent the object as being blue or as being turquoise? At which 
level of determinacy do we represent color? A plausible explanation is that in perception we 
represent the most determinate property we get information about.69 If the reflectance 
properties of turquoise1 and turquoise2 cause the same perceptual state in us, then we do not 
get information about the specific property turquoise1 but we only represent perceptually that 
the object is turquoise or only that it is blue, a less determinate property than the specific 
shades of turquoise1 or turquoise 2. Given Dretske’s notion of information, there is information 
about a property X in a state S, only if the probability of X given S is 1. If both turquoise1 and 
turquoise2 would cause the perceptual state S, then we have neither information about the 
                                                 
68 On basic properties, see p. 156. 
69 I presuppose here the notion of information as developed in Dretske (1981). 
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specific shade-properties turquoise1 nor turquoise2 at S. But we have still information about 
the less determinate property turquoise at S. Whenever there is perceptual state S, the 
probability that it was caused by something turquoise is 1 (while the probability that it was 
caused by something of the specific shade turquoise1 is less than one). We also would not be 
able to discriminate between these two shades of turquoise. Given these conditions of the flow 
of information, we can say that S represents the less determinate property turquoise, but not 
the more determinate one turquoise1 or turquoise2.  
That explanation is plausible, first because we cannot shift between more and less 
determinate properties in our perceptual representation without changing our relation to the 
environment. It depends on the conditions of the flow of information and not on the deliberate 
way we categorize or conceive some external object or event, contrary to the case in 
conceptual representation (beliefs). We cannot see an object once as instantiating the property 
blue and once as instantiating the property turquoise (although we can switch in such a way in 
our doxastic representation of the object). So, we do not visually represent the determinate 
property turquoise and all the less determinate color properties, but a property only at one 
level of determinacy. Secondly, it is plausible that we cannot perceptually represent a property 
we do have no information about. Or, in the case of illusion, we cannot represent or 
misrepresent a property the perceptual state does not have the function to get information 
about. So, we cannot represent a determinate property of an object if the perceptual state has 
only the function to get information about a more determinable one.  
 
5. Intentional Object and Failed Reference 
 
Intentionality is the capacity to refer to objects or properties which may not exist. It is one 
defining feature of intentionality that the existential quantification over the intentional relation 
fails.70 If I have a perceptual experience of a red object, this does not imply that there exists a 
red object. Given that the intentional object of perceptual experiences may actually not exist, 
it is supposed that what we perceive in that case is some intentional object of a different 
nature than the common external objects of our environment. The intentional object is 
sometimes conceived as an abstract object (Lycan 1996) or as uninstantiated properties 
(Dretske 1995). It is supposed that we perceive these abstract objects or properties when we 
have an experience of some object although such an object is lacking in our environment.  
 On the view developed in the previous sections, perceptual states are perceptual 
                                                 
70 See chap. 1, section 2 
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representations, if they have indicator functions. A perceptual state has the function to 
indicate or refer to some property, for example something red, and it succeeds to refer to that 
property (redness), if there actually is some object in the range of our visual field which 
actually has that property. If there is no such object which instantiates the property redness, 
then the perceptual state fails to refer to that property. The perceptual state still has the 
function to refer to that property although it fails to do so. A perceptual state with such an 
indicator function is a representation of redness which fails to accomplish its function. When I 
have such a perceptual state, I token a perceptual representation of redness which fails to refer 
to something red.  
 We can compare failed reference in perception to indexicals. The indexical “this cat” 
has the function to refer to cats. It should indicate cats and not dogs. When I point to a dog 
and say “this cat”, the indexical fails to refer. It keeps the function to refer to cats although 
fails to do so in the actual context. That indexical misrepresents a dog as a cat and fails to 
refer to what it is supposed to refer. We can have similar indexicals for properties, for 
example “this red”. Such an indexical uttered in a context where there are only green things 
would fail to refer to red things and would misrepresent something green as red.  
 In such cases of failed reference, we do not have to suppose that there is some 
intentional object which instantiates the property which is absent in the given context of 
utterance. We can give a similar explanation in the case of perception. A perceptual state has 
the function to indicate or refer to certain properties or objects in the context of the perceiver. 
Perceptual states have the function to refer to specific properties. A perceptual state typically 
caused by red objects cannot refer to green ones. It has the function to indicate redness. If 
such a perceptual state is tokened in a context which does not instantiate redness, the state 
fails to refer to redness while keeping the function to do so. It is a representation of redness 
which fails to refer to a red object. The fact that it is a representation derives from the function 
of the state, from what such types of states did in the past (refer to red things), it does not 
derive from an actual relation to something, an abstract intentional object, which instantiates 
redness. A heart has the function to pump blood and it usually does so. When it fails to fulfill 
its function and does not pump blood, the heart still keeps its function to pump. For that 
reason we say that the heart fails to do what it is supposed to do. But it would be absurd to say 
that the heart keeps that function because it is related to some abstract entity which 
instantiates the properties of the substance it is normally related to, some abstract entity which 
instantiates the properties of blood. Similarly, a perceptual state which fails to refer can still 
have a representational function without the need to postulate some abstract intentional object 
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which instantiates the property the perceptual state (type) is normally related to, or without the 
need to postulate some uninstantiated properties. 
 In order to explain the intentionality in perceptual misrepresentation, there is no need 
to postulate abstract intentional objects or uninstantiated properties. But the previous 
explanation just gives an account of the intentionality of perceptual states. It does not address 
the problem of an explanation of phenomenal consciousness of perception: How can we have 
the phenomenal experience of something red, if there is nothing which instantiates redness in 
our environment? Is it necessary to reintroduce uninstantiated properties or abstract objects 
which instantiate properties to explain our phenomenal consciousness in the case of 
perceptual misrepresentation? I cannot address that question here. The aim of the previous 
argument was just to show that for an explanation of intentionality of perception, it is not 
necessary to introduce such abstract entities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I tried to defend in the present chapter a version of a naturalistic semantics in order to explain 
the intentionality of perception. Such a theory gives us some criteria to attribute content to 
perceptual states. I followed Dretske and Neander in the view that the content of a perceptual 
state is given by the indicator function a perceptual state acquired. But I gave a different 
explanation of the way such indicator functions are acquired. The indicator semantics needs to 
be supplemented by a consumer-based teleosemantics to explain how perceptual states get 
indicator functions. The present combination of an indicator semantics and a consumer-based 
semantics gives two criteria for the attribution of content. First, the content depends on the 
cause of a perceptual state. Secondly the content depends on that cause of a perceptual state 
which is closely related to the success conditions of the activity upon which the perceptual 
state exercises a control. Because the perceptual state has this cause, it gets its function to 
indicate that cause and to represent it. This view of content as indicator functions can be 
applied to a satisfactory theory of the intentional object of perception which avoids to 
postulate abstract intentional objects and uninstantiated properties.     
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Chapter 5 
 
The Representational Content of Perception and Illusion 
 
Introduction 
 
We have the intuitive feeling that our perceptual experience can deceive us. It can 
perceptually seem to us that there is an object with some property in front of us when there 
isn’t. The intentionalist view of perception explains this impression by the attribution of 
content to our perceptual experience. Perception presents the world in a certain way and the 
world may be different from the way it is presented in perception. Perception can 
misrepresent. The way the world is presented is determined by the content of perception and 
that content can differ from the actual states of affairs in our environment. On that view, 
perceptual experience has the capacity to be erroneous. Strongest support for this 
intentionalist view comes from the phenomena of illusion and hallucination, where we seem 
to see objects or properties that are not there. In chapter three, I examined and criticized the 
relationalism about perceptual experience, because it rejects the attribution of semantic 
content to that experience. It rejects the content view. If such a content is rejected for 
perception, it becomes difficult to give a satisfactory account of illusions. On the other hand, 
intentionalism and the content view can only give a better account of illusions, if it has a 
coherent account of content. It has to be shown that a theory of intentional content offers a 
better account of illusions and perception more generally than relationalism. With this 
purpose, I will discuss the theories of perceptual content and propose a version of Russellian 
propositional content which is best fit to explain veridical and illusory perception. I will 
discuss the advantages of that theory and apply it to an explanation of common perceptual 
illusions. Finally I will show that the advantages of relationalism can also be captured by such 
a theory of perceptual content. Given that such a theory of perceptual content can better 
explain illusions than relationalism and given that it avoids the inconveniences relationalists 
attribute to the content view, it is preferable to opt for such a content view against a 
relationalist view. 
In a first part of this chapter, I will expose the intentionalist explanation of perceptual 
content and especially of the content of perceptual illusions and I will address some problems 
in that explanation of illusions. In a second part, I will discuss different theories of 
propositional content for perceptual representation. There, I will defend a Russellian view of 
propositional content. In a third section, that theory of propositional content will be applied to 
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the explanation of illusions. I will show how the shortcomings of some intentionalist views of 
illusions can be avoided. In a final section, I will discuss if the relationalist arguments against 
the content view apply to the specific view of Russellian content developed in this chapter. 
 
1. Intentionalism, Content and Illusions 
 
The content view about perception defends the position that perceptual experience or 
perceptual states have intentional content. Intentional content has to be distinguished from 
other forms of content. First, from what is sometimes called sensational content (Peacocke 
1983). Sensational content just designates the quality I experience when I have a conscious 
perceptual state. When I have an experience of red, then this chromatic quality is part of the 
sensational content of the experience. Sensational content differs from intentional content 
because it needs not to be about something. Sensational content just says that I have a red-
experience, but does not say if that experience is about any property in the world. It is 
equivalent to what is also called the phenomenal character of experience. The intentional 
content of experience to the contrary says what the experience is about, which property, 
object, relation or situation in the world it represents and it is about.  
Intentional content differs also from informational content (Peacocke 1983, Dretske 
1981). Informational content is a property of natural signs which vary causally with certain 
properties. Smoke is for example a natural sign of fire and varies causally with the presence of 
fire. In that sense, smoke carries information about fire. It has the informational content that 
there is fire. Intentional content differs from informational content because it can misrepresent 
objects or properties. It is a higher form of aboutness than information, because it can wrongly 
indicate something. It can represent a property which actually does not obtain.  We can define 
a mental representation as any mental state which has intentional content. Those who defend 
the content view take perceptual experience to be a mental representation (Siegel 2010). But 
perceptual experiences are limited to conscious perceptual states which have a phenomenal 
character. Given the possibility of unconscious perceptual states, the content thesis can be 
extended more generally to perceptual states, whether they are conscious or not. I will speak 
here about perceptual states in that general sense as a conscious or unconscious state of 
perceptual systems which has intentional content. 
Intentional content specifies accuracy conditions. And the content view can be equated 
with the view that perceptual states have such accuracy conditions.  These conditions must be 
satisfied in the world in order for the perceptual experience to be accurate. But contrary to 
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informational content, intentional content may specify conditions which do not actually 
obtain. The perceptual state may be inaccurate. It may occur in situations, where its accuracy 
conditions are not satisfied. So, perceptual states having accuracy conditions can be evaluated 
relative to situations or worlds.  If the content of my visual state is a red square, then that state 
is accurate only if there is a red square in the specific situation where I find myself.  
On this representational view of perception, perceptual states are seen in a way similar 
to propositional attitudes. Beliefs can be semantically evaluated as true or false and 
perceptual states can be semantically evaluated as accurate or inaccurate. Like beliefs, 
perceptual states are about something and can falsely represent something. We can attribute 
error to beliefs and to perceptual states. Despite these similarities, there are also differences 
between perceptual states and propositional attitudes.  
First, attitudes can be evaluated independently of the content of the attitude. We can 
evaluate the belief state and the content of the belief. If I believe that Barcelona is Europe´s 
biggest city, the content of my belief is false and my attitude is inappropriate. But if I doubt or 
desire that content, the attitude can be appropriate. But is there also such a difference between 
an attitude and a content in perception? Perception seems to be like the belief attitude. If the 
content is inaccurate, the “perceptual attitude” is automatically evaluated as inappropriate.  
Secondly, contrary to belief, where we can change the attitude towards the same 
content, it is impossible to change that specific “perceptual attitude”. If I have a perceptual 
state with a certain content, it is difficult to imagine that I can have a perceptual state of a 
different type towards exactly the same content. If I hear a sound in the street, could I have 
another attitude which has exactly the same content, that sound at that distance with these and 
these qualities? We can see a triangular shape and we can also get the same information about 
its shape by touch. But the touch experience would have some additional content about 
temperature, resistance and texture of the triangular shape, a content which is not present in 
the visual experience. Chalmers (2006) defends the position that we can apply the distinction 
between attitude and content to perceptual representations. Such a distinction may only be 
defended in some limited cases, but in most cases of perceptual experience, it is impossible to 
draw that distinction.  
A third, often emphasized difference between perceptual states and propositional 
attitudes concerns the difference in the content of states involving concepts and other mental 
states which do not. A belief is constituted by concepts. Most intentionalists claim that, 
contrary to beliefs which have conceptual content, perceptual states have non-conceptual 
content (Tye 1995 and 2006, Dretske 1995), while some defend that perception has also 
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conceptual content (McDowell 1996, Brewer 1999).  
Despite these differences between propositional attitudes and perceptual states, 
intentionalism stresses the similarities. Both mental states have intentional content and the 
capacity to misrepresent. Those who reject the content view emphasize the fundamental 
differences between propositional attitudes and perception. They attribute content only to the 
former. But the obvious advantage of the intentionalist position is its capacity to explain 
perceptual error in illusions and hallucinations. In illusions, our perceptual states represent 
certain properties of perceived objects, although the objects we see do not instantiate these 
properties. The properties we experience are just properties represented by that experiences. 
As in the case of beliefs, what is represented by mental states needs not actually to be the 
case. As with false beliefs, we can have non-veridical perceptual states or experiences, states 
which represent properties although no object in our environment instantiates these properties. 
When I see the Müller-Lyer illusion, my perceptual experience represents one line as longer 
and one as shorter. The different sizes of the lines are just represented properties although the 
drawing does not instantiate these properties. When I see a grey square as white, the property 
of being white is just a property represented by the experience. If perceptual states are mental 
representations and have intentional content, there is a straightforward explanation of illusions 
(and hallucinations).  
But the intentionalist position depends on a theory of intentional content for perceptual 
states. Several options to explain the content of illusory experience have been offered. We can 
group them into three options for an intentionalist explanation of the content of illusory 
perceptual states: the content can be (1) a conceptual content, (2) a Russellian content 
constituted by objects or properties, (3) a content conceived as a set of possible worlds. Let us 
expose briefly these options, before passing to a more extensive discussion of perceptual 
content in the next section.  
(1) Either the content is conceived as a conceptual content (Schellenberg 2011a). In 
that case, the content of the perceptual experience is constituted by concepts defined as 
abstract entities, either Fregean senses or intensions. A concept can fail to refer to an object or 
an instantiated property. We can have a perceptual state with a certain conceptual content, for 
example a content which contains the concept “redness”, although nothing in our environment 
instantiated that property, nothing is actually red. We have concepts which fail to refer. On 
this account we can therefore have perceptual states or experiences which have a certain 
conceptual content, but fail to actually refer. But such an explanation of perceptual content 
has the disadvantage that we perceptually represent objects and properties of the environment 
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only via some conceptual intermediaries, e.g. Fregean senses. Such an explanation is 
vulnerable to the objections from direct realism, that we have the impression to directly see 
objects and their properties and do not have the impression to represent them via some 
intermediary conceptual content. If Fregean senses are abstract entities, that view has 
furthermore the disadvantage to introduce abstract entities with a dubious ontological status as 
the intermediaries in the process of perception. 
(2) Another intentionalist option is to avoid conceptual content and to treat the content 
as something which is directly constituted by the objects we see and by their properties. On 
that option, the content of veridical perception is directly constituted by the objects we see 
and the properties they instantiate. This view preserves the direct realist intuition that we 
represent directly the objects of the external world without the intermediary of some other 
content. But on that option, it has to be explained which objects and properties enter into the 
content in the case of illusion. In illusory experience, we represent a property which the seen 
object does not instantiate. We see a red object as green, a long line as short, or a straight line 
as bent. If the property which enters the content is not instantiated by the object, it is either an 
uninstantiated property or the apparent property is instantiated by an intentional, but non-
actual object.  
Dretske (1995) defends the view that we just represent properties which may be 
instantiated or not, while the object itself does not enter into the perceptual content. Lycan 
(1987 and 1996) defends the view that the apparent properties we see in illusions are 
instantiated by intentional objects treated as possibilia. When I see wrongly a red object as 
green, then I represent a possible object instantiating the property green. And that possible 
object is an object in an alternative possible world. For Tye (2009), we represent a “content 
schema” constituted by an empty slot into which different objects may enter and properties 
attributed to the value entering the empty slot. Such a content with an empty slot is generally 
called a gappy content. In illusions, the object which enters the empty slot does not instantiate 
the properties which the content schema attributes to it. This second, Russellian option for 
intentional content preserves our direct realist intuitions, but has the disadvantage that we 
need either a richer ontology of possible objects and uninstantiated properties to explain the 
content of illusions; or we find a way to explain intentional objects which avoids these 
abstract entities. 
(3) The third option avoids these problems by identifying the content of perception 
with sets of possible worlds. Perceptual experiences represent sets of possible worlds. In the 
case of veridical perception, the actual world is part of that set, in the case of illusion it is not. 
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Recently, Tye (2011) opted for such a view. A combination of these three options is also 
possible, for example a two-dimensional view of content (Chalmers 2004) accepts a 
conceptual, Fregean content as one dimension of content and objects and properties as another 
dimension. 
I will defend a version of option two which avoids ontological objects like possible or 
uninstantiated properties. 
 
2. Propositional Content 
 
2.1. Is Perceptual Content Propositional ? 
 
I will first examine the question whether perceptual states have a propositional content or 
whether they have some type of non-propositional content. I will claim that there is no 
obstacle to describe perceptual content as a form of propositional content.  
Most intentionalists defend the position that the content of perceptual states (or 
experiences) is propositional content. As we saw in chapter three, Siegel (2010: 28-29) 
distinguishes the Content View which says that perceptual experience has content and the 
Strong Content View which says that visual experience is a propositional attitude. The strong 
content view may be contested because of the already mentioned problem to distinguish 
between the propositional content and the attitude in perceptual experience. If we cannot have 
different attitudes towards the same content in perceptual experience, then it is inaccurate to 
treat perceptual experience as an attitude.  
One can still argue that in perception we have always an attitude similar to the belief 
attitude. But even that is not obvious. When we know how we are tricked in perceptual 
illusions we withdraw our beliefs from the perceptual content we experience. One could still 
say in that case that our perceptual experience is an attitude similar to belief, but that this 
attitude is contradicted by our epistemic beliefs about the presented perceptual content. Our 
perceptual experience presents the world as being so and so, but we do not belief it. 
Perceptual experience would be an attitude similar to belief but different from our epistemic 
beliefs. But even that can be contested. There are perceptual experiences which are 
completely ignored by us or which are just treated as noise. The visual experience we have 
during the saccadic eye movements are usually completely ignored by us and treated as noise. 
The same is the case for perceptual experiences we have when our eyes are closed, i.e. some 
vague experience of color and sometimes rudimentary shapes. Usually these experiences stay 
completely unattended and are not taken to present us anything (on closed eye visual 
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experiences, see Schwitzgebel 2011: 139-159). They are neither used by our cognitive system 
to construct beliefs nor are they used in action, that is, we do not act on them. Which attitude 
would we have towards the contents presented in these experiences? Given that we cannot 
change our “perceptual attitude” toward the same content and given that it is hard to say what 
such an attitude would be, it is contestable that perceptual experiences are comparable to 
beliefs in the sense that they have an attitude part and a content part. But given that we cannot 
clearly specify “perceptual attitudes”, this does not affect the thesis that experiences may have 
propositional contents.  
This analysis does neither contest that perceptual experiences can occur in different 
factive states (the state of seeing) or non-factive states (the state of hallucinating and 
dreaming), nor does it contest that we can have different attitudes towards our perceptual 
experiences (believing, doubting fearing what one sees). It just contests that perceptual 
experiences or states are themselves composed of a content and an attitudes. It contests that 
there are some specific “perceptual attitudes” to be added to the usually mentioned 
propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires etc.). 
We may therefore distinguish an intermediary view between the content view and the 
strong content view, an intermediary view which just says that perceptual experience has 
propositional content. That intermediary view avoids the question whether perceptual 
contents can be shared by different attitudes. We have then a difference between the content 
view which just claims that perceptual states have content and the view which says that this 
content is more specifically a propositional content.  
Some philosophers have contested that the content of perceptual states is 
propositional, so Peacocke who describes perceptual content as either a scenario content or a 
proto-propositional content (Peacocke 1992). Crane (2009a) defends also the position that 
perceptual experience has pictorial content and not a propositional content.71 One should not 
confuse here non-propositional content with non-conceptual content, because there can be a 
non-conceptual content which is propositional, for example Russellian content.  
What distinguishes the content of pictures from propositional content and why should 
the perceptual content be like that of pictures? Crane presents three arguments against the 
thesis of propositional content of perception.  
First, propositions are bearers of truth-values, they are either true or false, while 
                                                 
71 There is also a general skepticism about the existence of such entities as propositions, see for example Iacona 
(2003). I let this general skepticism aside because the philosophers I treat here and who contest that perception 
has propositional content do not contest that other mental states (the propositional attitudes) have propositions as 
their content.   
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perceptual experience, like pictures, are only accurate or inaccurate. Accuracy is a gradual 
notion, while truth is not. For Crane, we cannot infer from the fact that perceptual experience 
has accuracy conditions that their content is propositional. We could only infer that if they 
had truth-values. I do not find this argument convincing. Crane does not say what it means 
exactly to say that accuracy is gradual. Either it means that only some aspects of an object are 
represented and other aspects not. On that view, a complete representation is more accurate, 
than a partial (or incomplete) representation. But this property is shared by any representation, 
be that a picture or a description by propositions.  
Or, as second possibility, accuracy is gradual, because the represented properties are 
not represented in an absolutely determinate way. On this view, a representation of 
determinate properties is more accurate that a representation of determinable. A picture 
represents the size of an object only relatively to its surroundings, but does not represent an 
object as being, say, 1 meter rather than 1 meter 10. In that sense, a picture only represents 
determinable properties and not absolutely determinate properties. But here again this is not a 
property specific to pictures or perceptual experience. Most sentences expressing propositions 
contain predicates of only determinable properties. Sentences like “this tree is big” or “green” 
do not say in a determinate way how big this specific tree is or which shade of green it exactly 
has. If perceptual representations were accurate only to a certain degree because they 
represent only determinable properties, then most propositions would share that type of 
gradual accuracy.  
A third possibility is that accuracy is gradual because sometimes only some parts of 
pictures or of  perceptual representations are true while other represented aspects are false. On 
that view a representation in which all represented aspects are true, is more accurate than a 
representation which misrepresents some aspects. If a picture or a visual experience represents 
a cherry as red and flat, it represents truly its color, but not its shape. The representation is 
accurate only to a certain degree. On this view, perceptual states represent truly some parts.  
The representation is only accurate to a certain degree, because not all its parts are true 
representations. It is partly true, partly false. This view is the most plausible explanation of 
accuracy (see also Siegel 2010: 32).72 But on this view, pictures and perceptual experiences 
can be true, like propositions. Only perceptual experiences (and pictures) can also be only 
partly true and therefore accurate to a certain degree. What perceptual experiences and 
pictures lack, is a truth function ascribing either truth or falsehood to the complex proposition, 
given the truth-value of their constituent propositions. So, the gradual character of accuracy is 
                                                 
72 See the discussion on accuracy on p. 83-4. 
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not an argument for the thesis that perceptual experience is no possible bearer of truth-values 
and therefore not propositional. 
Crane’s second argument against the propositional content of perceptual experiences 
depends on the difference that truth-functions can be applied to propositions and not to the 
content of pictures or perceptual experience. The truth function of negation, conjunction, 
disjunction can be applied to propositions, but not to the content of pictures or experiences. 
The components of the content of pictures and perceptual experiences do not stand in logical 
relations, and pictures or perceptual experiences do not stand in logical relations to other 
pictures or experiences. It is questionable that there is such an absolute difference between 
propositions and the content of perceptual experience. Certainly, there is no clear truth-
function giving a truth-value to the content of a complex perceptual experience. And certainly 
there are logical relation the content of perceptual experience cannot express, for example a 
disjunctive proposition. But there are other rudimentary forms of logical relations between the 
components of the content of perceptual experience. In impossible pictures (of the sort drawn 
for example by Escher), one part of the picture contradicts another part. And pictures express 
a form of conjunction. So, that difference between propositions and the content of pictures or 
perceptual experience is only a gradual one and not an absolute one. All representations need 
not be able to express all the logical relations a sentence can express in order to have 
propositional content. And we can certainly agree with the fact that the content of pictures or 
experiences is logically a simpler form of proposition than the propositions expressed by 
sentences. 
Crane gives a third argument against the propositional content of perceptual 
experience and  pictures, when he claims that propositions can be asserted while we cannot 
assert the content of pictures (or experiences) without adding some other propositional 
content, expressed for example by a sentence (e.g. “I believe this picture to be accurate“).  But 
it is not clear why the force, in Frege´s sense, associated with a proposition should be 
essential to the attribution of propositional content to a representation.  
Further arguments sometimes mentioned against propositional content are the richness 
and fine-grainedness of the content of perceptual experience. Richness means that a 
perceptual experience can represent a great amount of details and a very complex layout. 
Fine-grainedness means that fine differences of perceivable qualities (shades, pitches, tastes) 
can be represented in perception. Certainly the content of a visual experience is usually richer 
than the content expressed by a sentence, but there is in principle no limit in the complexity of 
a proposition. So, the richness of perceptual content is no argument against the attribution of 
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propositional content to perceptual experience. Concerning the fine-grainedness, propositions 
expressed by sentences can even represent more fine-grained differences than perceptual 
experiences. Concepts can express differences which are more fine-grained than differences 
in the object or property referred to, as shown in the difference in content between the 
concepts of “morning star“ and “evening star“ (Tye 2006). These concepts express a 
difference in content, although they do not refer to different objects or intrinsic properties of 
these objects. Color concepts can for example express a difference between “turquoise” and 
“cyan” although these concepts refer to the same shade of greenish blue. So, conceptual 
content can be more fine-grained than perceptual content. The fine-grainedness of perceptual 
content is therefore neither a reason to deny propositional status to that content. 
Eventually the question whether perceptual content is propositional or not will depend 
on the theory of propositions one adopts. If propositions are defined as a set of possible 
worlds (Stalnaker 1976), namely all those worlds in which the accuracy conditions of the 
perceptual content are satisfied, then there is no strong reason to make a sharp difference 
between the content of propositions and the content of pictures. On that view, the content of 
pictures can also be given by a proposition, defined as a set of possible worlds. The same can 
be said for Peacocke´s scenario content, which fills out in a certain way the three-dimensional 
space around a center. Such a scenario content can equally be defined as a set of centered 
possible worlds and can therefore be treated as a propositional content. There is therefore no 
strong reason to reject the thesis that perceptual content is a form of propositional content.  
 
2.2. Types of Propositional Content 
 
2.2.1. How are perceptual state related to proposition?  
 If the content of a perceptual state is a proposition, as I defended in the previous section, then 
two questions have to be answered. First, what is the relation between the perceptual state and 
that proposition? Secondly, which theory of propositions captures best the content of 
veridical, but also illusory perception? I will briefly address the first question before I answer 
more extensively the essential second question. 
Propositions give the accuracy conditions of a perceptual state. They say what must be 
the case in order for the state to be accurate or veridical. The perceptual states themselves are 
the vehicles of representation. They are the equivalents of the letters and sentences in 
linguistic representation. These vehicles have a propositional content. They are associated 
with a proposition. There are different ways to conceive that relation of the vehicle to the 
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proposition (see also Schellenberg 2011a: 3 and Logue 2009). I will mention four different 
possibilities: (1) either the content of the perceptual state can be expressed or described by a 
proposition. But such a relation is too weak because even someone rejecting that perceptual 
states have propositional content can agree that its content can be described by propositions. 
That weak relation to a proposition can be rejected, because it falls back on the position 
criticized in the previous section. (2) Another possibility is that the perceptual state represents 
external objects and properties by being associated with a proposition. In that case, the 
proposition is neither represented, nor do we need to be aware of the proposition. What is 
represented and what we are aware of are the external objects. (3) A third possibility is that 
we represent the external world, its objects and properties, by representing a proposition. This 
relation to the proposition can also be conceived as a relation of awareness: we represent 
external objects by being aware of a proposition. This third possibility has the disadvantage 
that the representation of the external world becomes indirect. Such an indirect realism, where 
external objects are represented through the awareness or representation of other mental 
entities has become strongly contested since the rejection of sense-data theories of perception, 
which conceived perception as such an indirect relation to external objects.  (4) A fourth 
option is that the represented objects (and properties) and the proposition overlap. This is the 
case in Russellian propositions, where objects and properties are components of the 
proposition. In that case the perceptual experience represents components of the proposition 
(objects and properties) and perceptual experience consists in an awareness of these 
components.   
Those who think that propositional attitudes are relations to a conceptual content 
expressed by a that-clause, opt generally for a model similar to (2) or (3). A Fregean view of 
propositions considers them to be constituted by concepts. And these concepts have a 
reference; they refer to objects and properties of the world. If propositional attitudes are 
relations to Fregean propositions, then they are relations to concepts and to the objects refered 
to by these concepts. Either we represent objects and properties by having representational 
vehicles associated with a Fregean proposition (option 2), or we represent objects and 
properties by representing a Fregean proposition (option 3). On these two options, we have 
two levels of content, the propositional content and the content which consists of the entities 
of the external world, i.e. objects and properties (for an explicit defense of such a two level 
view of content, see Chalmers 2004 and 2006). If perceptual states, or more generally 
representational vehicles, are associated with Fregean propositions constituted by concepts, 
then option 2 or 3 is the most probable relation between perceptual states and propositions. 
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Russellian propositions permit a relation of the type described in the last option (4).73 That 
fourth option captures best the direct realist intuition that we directly represent external 
objects without representing some intermediary mental entities.  
Before answering the question about the relation of perceptual experience to 
propositions, we have to look closer at the different constituent of propositions. And we have 
to address the question which theory of propositions is the most adequate for an account of 
perceptual content. It is not necessary here to defend a theory of propositional content which 
could apply to all types of mental representation (propositional attitudes, emotions, mental 
imagery, perceptual states etc.) and therefore to all types of mental content. It is possible and 
even probable that the content of perception is a different propositional content than for 
example the content of the usual propositional attitudes.  
So, which theory of propositions is the most adequate for perceptual content and 
which components does the propositional content of perception have? Accounts of 
propositions are generally divided in those which suppose that propositions are unstructured 
and those which suppose that propositions are structured. Structured propositions are further 
subdivided into Russellian propositions and Fregean propositions. There is a further 
distinction between singular propositions and propositions with existential content i.e. 
propositions involving only existentially quantified variables, properties or concepts, but no 
singular entities. 
 
2.2.2. Structured or unstructured propositions 
Let us first address the question whether perceptual content is structured or unstructured 
propositional content. On the unstructured account, propositions are not defined by any 
constituents and relations between them, but they are defined by a set of possible worlds 
(Stalnaker 1976). A perceptual state is veridical only if the actual world is member of the 
specified set. But the perception of a red apple is not simply accurate, if there is a red apple in 
the actual world. It is only accurate if there is such an apple in the close environment of the 
perceiver at a specified spatial location. This feature of perceptual content can be captured by 
introducing centered worlds (Quine 1969). Centered worlds are possible worlds which have as 
center a moment in time and an individual or location in that world. The content of my 
perceptual state, when I see a red apple, can therefore be given by the set of centered possible 
                                                 
73 If the entities of the external world are thought to be somehow conceptual, than Fregean propositions could 
also permit this fourth option. McDowell seems to defend such a view (1996). But it seems to me that such an 
extreme ontological position, namely an idealism where the common objects of the external world are identified 
with concepts is quite hard to swallow. 
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worlds where the apple stands in such and such a relation to the defined center, for example a 
perceiving individual. 
Are unstructured propositions sufficient to capture perceptual content? Unstructured 
propositions have the disadvantage that they cannot define content in a way which is fine-
grained enough for the content of some mental states or linguistic expressions. For example, 
necessary propositions are true in all possible worlds and are therefore defined by the set of 
all possible worlds. Analytic sentences such as “Bachelors are unmarried men” and “Brothers 
are male siblings” express therefore the same proposition on the unstructured account (King 
2011).74 But we would certainly want a theory of propositional content which makes a 
difference between these two expressions. The same problem arises for contradictory 
sentences. They all express the empty set. Is that a problem for perceptual content?  
There are many perceptual contents which are contradictory. When we see Escher´s 
drawing of impossible objects, we represent for example contradictory spatial properties. The 
men on the endless staircase are endlessly ascending but at the same time they stay in the 
same spatial region; the staircase is increasing and not increasing in height (see Escher´s 
drawing “Ascending and Descending“, 1960).75 Similarly with auditory perception, in the 
Shepard tone we perceive an infinitely ascending sound which at the same time stays in the 
same limited interval (Shepard 1964). Obviously, neither the drawings nor the sound (the 
physical objects) are impossible and their features could be modeled by a set of possible 
worlds, but the content represented by the experiences caused by these drawings and this tone 
is. An unstructured account of propositions would ascribe the same content, namely the empty 
set, to all these different perceptual experiences which represent contradictory contents. That 
is quite unsatisfactory. 
The unstructured account of propositions is not fine-grained enough to capture some 
aspects of perceptual content. Unstructured propositions are insufficient for an account of 
perceptual content. But we need not reject the unstructured account as long as we complement 
it with a structured account of propositions. On the structured account, the components of the 
representational vehicle (of a sentence or of perceptual state conceived as a complex neural 
state) play a role in determining different components of the proposition. The unstructured 
account can be combined with the structured one, if, beyond the sets of possible worlds, the 
                                                 
74 I do not want to defend here my specific examples for analytic sentences, but I just want to say that sentences 
which are true in all possible worlds have the same meaning or content on the given reading of propositions. I 
am fine with Quines objections to the given examples of analytic sentences. 
75 Escher´s drawing “Belvedere“ (1958) shows another good example of a spatially impossible object, a long 
rectangular pavilion oriented in one direction and at the same time in another direction perpendicular to the first 
one. 
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vehicles and their structure play a certain role in determining the components and the 
structure between these components. If the components are for example defined as objects 
and properties, we can define the content as the set of possible worlds where these objects 
instantiate these properties. 
 
2.2.3. Fregean propositions 
But which structured proposition can capture perceptual content in the best way. Both 
Fregean and Russellian propositions involve components and a structure between them. But 
these two types of proposition have components of a very different nature. Let us look first at 
Fregean propositions. The components of a Fregean proposition are concepts. On the Fregean 
view, concepts are abstract entities and not psychological entities like mental representations 
(or Frege´s “Vorstellungen“). The components of Fregean propositions are intensions or 
Fregean senses (“Sinn“) (Frege 1892). These concepts determine their reference and they 
explain also the cognitive role they play in one´s mind. Concepts which refer to the same 
object or property, but which play a different cognitive role are to be distinguished as two 
different concepts. Fregean propositions have a major advantage over other views in the 
explanation of perceptual content. They can easily explain non-veridical perception (illusion 
and hallucination). In illusory cases, the content is a proposition into which a concept enters 
which does not refer. When we falsely see a grey square as white (as in Adelson´s 
checkerboard illusion), the concept of “whiteness” enters the content, but fails to refer to that 
property. The concept is empty because it has no referent. Still the intension or Fregean sense 
can explain the appearance of something white, the phenomenal character of our experience, 
although nothing white is before us (see Chalmers 2004 for such an explanation of illusions 
based on Fregean content). If concepts are conceived as representational vehicles (terms or 
mental states) which directly refer to objects and properties, it is less evident to explain what 
they contribute to the content of the representation in the case they are empty and fail to refer 
(Everett 2003). 
But this advantage of a straightforward explanation of illusions by empty concepts is 
counter-balanced by two major disadvantages for an account of perceptual content by  
Fregean propositions. The first problem is a growing skepticism about the abstract entities 
which are supposed to form the components of Fregean propositions. The Fregean view of 
concepts still relies on the classical view of concepts i.e. concepts as definitions or feature 
lists which determine reference. Such a classical view fits less and less well with the growing 
literature on concepts from the cognitive sciences (see Laurence and Margolis 1999). 
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Schellenberg (2011a), who defends a view of perceptual content as Fregean propositions, 
emphasizes that the components of Fregean propositions are not the mental states or 
representations postulated by the cognitive sciences. But it is certainly more in harmony with 
empirical research to identify concepts with psychological entities, namely mental 
representations (a view adopted by Laurence and Margolis 1999 and Prinz 2002). 
Furthermore it is unclear how the representational vehicles, the mental and perceptual states, 
are related to such abstract entities. Are they “associated” with the mental states? Are these 
concepts “grasped” by us? Do we represent the world “through” them? 
A second problem with Fregean propositions is that they constrain to postulate two 
levels of content, the conceptual content given by the intensions or senses in the Fregean 
proposition and the content given by those entities which the concepts refer to, the objects and 
properties of our physical environment. Fregean propositions introduce an intermediary 
between perceptual states and the properties and objects they represent. The 
phenomenological argument of the relationalists76 stressed that perceptual experience does 
not seem to present such an intermediary step. We seem to be directly acquainted with 
external objects and their properties. Even if one rejects the relational conclusions drawn from 
this argument, such an intermediary is still an unnecessary postulation which is neither 
supported by our phenomenal experience nor by the research in the cognitive sciences. 
 
2.2.4. Russellian propositions 
A Russellian account of propositions avoids these two problems. So, let us look more closely 
at this view of propositional content. Russellian propositions have objects, properties or 
relations as their constituents. On this view, the common external objects and their properties 
that we experience in perception enter into the proposition. They are components of the 
proposition. But such a proposition is not simply a list of such objects and properties. It has a 
structure relating these components in a certain way.  What are these components and the way 
they are related? And what are the advantages of such a view of content? I will answer these 
questions in three steps: (1) I will specify what the components (objects and properties) of 
such a propositional content are in the case of perceptual representations. (2) Then, I will 
explain the structure of a Russellian proposition. (3) Finally, I will emphasize the advantages 
of such a view of propositions for an analysis of perceptual content. 
(1) Which objects and properties are the components of a Russellian proposition? Let 
us look first at properties: The Russellian view does not impose any limits on the properties 
                                                 
76 See chapter 3, p. 73-4. 
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which can be components of a proposition. Any property designated by a predicate can be 
part of a Russellian proposition. But in the case of perceptual representation, there certainly 
are limitations. Not any property which can be represented by some mental state can also be 
represented by perceptual states. In the case of perception, the question which properties are 
part of the content can ultimately only be answered by an empirical analysis of perceptual 
processing. It depends on the empirical question whether a specific mental state representing 
property X is also a perceptual state.  
We can generally distinguish between basic properties and higher order properties. In 
the case of visual perception, color, shape, texture, size, illumination and motion are generally 
mentioned as basic properties represented by perceptual states (Siegel 2010: 99, Brogaard 
2012). Higher order properties are for example causality (seeing that one object causes 
another to move), kind properties (seeing that this is an oak), dispositional properties (seeing 
that object as being climbable). While the intentionalists agree that basic properties are 
represented by perceptual states, it is a matter of controversy if and which higher order 
properties enter into perceptual content. Siegel (2010) defends what she calls a “rich” content 
view which accepts higher order properties such as kind properties and causality as perceptual 
content, while Prinz rejects them (Prinz 2012). Nanay (2012) defends for example 
dispositional properties as part of perceptual content. The distinction between basic and 
higher-order properties is only vague and separates those properties which are incontestably 
represented by perceptual states from other properties which can be represented by mental 
states of a higher order, but perhaps not by perceptual states. 
A further distinction has to be made between intrinsic and relational properties. One 
can call a property intrinsic, if an object can have it independently of its relations to other 
objects. A “relational” property depends on the relation the object has to other objects. This 
definition can be misleading, because it does not exclude that intrinsic properties are 
relational: the property that I have a heart is a relation of me to my heart, but it is not a 
relation to another object, because the heart is considered as part of me; so, it is also an 
intrinsic property of me. But this property is not relational in the sense defined here, because 
it does not depend on my relation to some other objects (see for a discussion of the criteria of 
intrinsicness, Weatherson 2006). If we follow that distinction, then some properties 
represented by perceptual states are intrinsic (form, texture, reflectance properties), while 
other properties are relational. For example, distance depends on the relation to an observer; 
movement depends on the inertial systems of the object and of the observer.  
It is important to note that the distinction between basic vs. higher-order properties 
 156
does not overlap with the distinction of intrinsic v. relational properties. Some higher-order 
properties can be intrinsic properties of an object (being H2O, being an oak), others relational, 
for example causality and dispositional properties. Something is climbable only relative to the 
organism which tries to climb it. Some basic properties can be relational (movement, distance, 
color), while others are intrinsic (shape). I will stay neutral here on the matter whether 
perceptual states represent higher-order properties. It is a matter which has ultimately to be 
decided by neurophysiological investigations. I address in this chapter only the question under 
which conditions a perceptual state represents accurately or misrepresents basic properties, be 
they intrinsic or relational. Therefore higher-order properties are not central here.  
I have only to add some remarks concerning kind properties. I said in the last chapter 
that only surface properties of things and a configuration of such properties are represented.77 
This implies that perception does not represent such properties as “being a tree” or “being a 
fly”, that is, kind properties. Siegel (2010: chap. 4) argues that visual experience can 
represents kind properties. She claims furthermore that the fact that a visual experience 
represents a kind makes a difference to the phenomenal character of that visual experience. A 
visual experience can represent the basic properties of a pine tree. When I learn to recognize 
pine trees, the visual experience represents not only these basic properties, but also the kind 
property that this is a pine tree and this difference in representational content makes a 
difference in the phenomenology of the experience, so Siegel’s rich content thesis. Prinz 
(2012) emphasized that we have to distinguish between a modest version and Siegel’s 
stronger version of the rich content thesis. The modest version accepts that kind properties can 
be represented by perceptual experience, but rejects that a representation of a kind property 
makes a phenomenal difference to the perceptual experience. It may be that a certain 
configuration of features represented by the perceptual experience is used to detect a certain 
kind of things. In this way the experience represents, besides the basic properties of an object, 
also a kind property of that object. In Prinz’s version of rich content, it is only through the 
basic properties represented in perception that kind properties can be represented. But in 
Siegel’s version, the representation of kind properties changes also the phenomenology of the 
experience. There are several reasons to prefer the modest version to Siegel’s stronger one, as 
Prinz argues.  
 First, Siegel thinks that the acquisition of recognitional capacities (e.g. recognizing 
pine trees) changes the output of the perceptual process (of seeing a pine tree). But it is 
contested and even implausible in the neurosciences that such recognitional processes are 
                                                 
77 See p. 137. 
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involved in the brain areas responsible for perceptual processing (Prinz 2012).  
 Secondly, Siegel’s version of the rich content thesis conflicts with content externalism. 
For externalism, content depends on the relation to the environment. A duplicate of me on 
twin-earth has a different content if he stands in relation to different entities than me (for ex. 
to twin-water). But this difference in the kind-property represented does make no difference 
in the phenomenal character of the states of the duplicate. Given externalism, the kinds 
represented by mental states can change without a change in the internal states or the 
experienced phenomenology of the duplicates. This seems to contradict Siegel´s strong 
position that the represented kinds affect the phenomenology of experience.78 But Siegel 
affirms that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is not identified with content, 
but supervenes only on content (Siegel 2010: 114). So, there can be a change in content, for 
example from water to twin-water, without a change in phenomenal character. But Siegel 
thinks also that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience changes with the 
recognitional capacities one acquires: one gets to recognize pine trees and this changes the 
perceptual phenomenology of seeingpine trees. But these recognitional capacities depend on 
the internal constitution of an individual. So, changes in recognition capacities affect the 
phenomenal character of experience, but given externalism, change in content does not. So, 
content as conceived by externalists seems to be independent of the phenomenology of 
experience and phenomenology seems to depend on internal capacities. Or otherwise, Siegel 
would need to reject externalism and claim that content depends on internal factors like 
recognitional capacities. Both options, either admitting the independence of phenomenal 
character from the represented kind properties (wide content) or the rejection of externalism, 
speak strongly against Siegel’s strong version of rich content. 
Let us come back to relational properties. It is essential to accept relational properties 
as part of the propositional content in order to explain the role of perspectival properties, the 
fact that perception presents objects from a certain point of view and the fact that perceptual 
content changes with such points of view (Noë 2004). Besides perspectival properties, other 
relational properties are important, namely those which depend conjointly on the object and 
the situation in which they appear. Schellenberg calls these relational properties situation-
dependent properties (Schellenberg 2008). Situation-dependent properties of objects explain 
for example the changing appearance of color under different conditions of illumination. This 
situation-dependent color property depends on the reflectance properties of the object and on 
the conditions of illumination in a given situation.   
                                                 
78 With phenomenal externalism (Dretske 1996), the phenomenal character of the experience could change with 
a change of wide content. But Siegel does not explicitly adopt phenomenal externalism. 
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In principle, a Russellian view of propositions is liberal enough to accept all these 
properties as components, basic or higher-level properties, intrinsic or relational properties. 
Which properties actually enter into a Russellian content of perception depends on the 
capacities of perceptual states to represent such properties. And as I stressed, there are 
certainly limits for perceptual states here. There are properties which cannot be represented by 
these states, but only by certain concepts. A perceptual state can represent the property 
“redness“, but not the property “being an uncle“. Such a property has to be represented by 
concepts. Concerning the properties represented in perception, the main difference between 
Fregean and Russellian propositions is the fact that the properties enter directly as 
components into the Russellian propositional content, while on the Fregean view, the content 
of propositions is a conceptual content which refers to these properties.   
What about the objects of perception? Some views of Russellian content suppose that 
only properties and variables are components of these propositions. In that case, the content 
just says that there is some object which has the properties specified by the proposition and 
which stands in the appropriate relation to these properties, for example the relation of 
instantiation. If the proposition predicates properties of an object, then the proposition just 
says that some object instantiated these properties. On that view, the object itself is not part of 
the content. Tye (2009) calls such a view of content the existential thesis. Such content 
contains, besides properties, just an existentially quantified variable which stands for some 
object. The content does not specify which particular object that is. Dretske seems to have 
such a view of perceptual content (Dretske 1995: 24-25), when he writes about perceptual 
representation that “there is nothing in the content of the representation, nothing the 
representation says, which makes it about this object rather than that object”. On that view the 
object of a perceptual state is given by the context. Whatever object stays in a specific relation 
to the perceptual state and satisfies the conditions specified by the perceptual content is the 
object of the perceptual representation.  
There are several disadvantages of the existential thesis about content. First, some 
examples of perceptual experiences which seem intuitively to be illusory are not inaccurate on 
the existential account. Let us suppose that I see a white cube in a yellow illumination placed 
next to a mirror. That cube reflects in the mirror and I have therefore the experience as of a 
yellow cube at some distance behind the location of the mirror.79 That perceptual experience 
is inaccurate: there is no yellow cube and the cube we see is not located at some distance 
behind the mirror, but next to it and in front of it. But suppose we actually place a yellow cube 
                                                 
79 See Grice (1961: 238) for a similar example. 
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behind the mirror. On the existential view of content, my experience would be accurate under 
that condition. There is some object which satisfies the accuracy conditions of that 
experience. But intuitively, we would still say that our experience represents inaccurately the 
white cube next to the mirror and does not represent at all that particular yellow cube behind 
the mirror. A view which states that the particular object we see does enter into the content 
can give a much better explanation of these intuitions about the accuracy conditions of the 
experience. The experience would be accurate, if the yellow cube behind the mirror were part 
of the content. But the object which actually is part of the content is the white cube next to the 
mirror, and it is falsely represented as yellow and as located behind the mirror.  
Another problem for the existential thesis is veridical hallucination (Lewis 1980). In 
veridical hallucinations, we have by some strange coincidence a hallucination of the scene 
which is actually in front of us. We hallucinate for example the room we are actually in. 
Usually some evil demon or some scientist is invoked who is supposed to create in us such a 
hallucinatory state. But there is also a more realist but comparable scenario: Some dreams 
include so-called false awakenings (Green 1968). We dream that we wake up and find 
ourselves in our bedroom. In such dreams, we hallucinate that we are in the environment we 
are actually in, our bed and its surroundings. We have a veridical hallucination although we 
do not literally see our environment. If we follow the existential thesis, then we have in this 
case an accurate visual experience. At the same time, we have the feeling that something goes 
wrong in such visual experiences. If we suppose that the object of perception can be part of 
the content or fail to be part of it, then the difference of normal veridical perception and this 
hallucinatory case can be explained. So, the rejection of the existential thesis and an 
acceptance of singular objects as parts of perceptual content permits a better account of our 
intuitions about the veridicality of perception.  
If the existential thesis is rejected, the perceptual experience can have gappy 
propositions as content, where the gap can be filled by a singular object. Once the gap is 
filled, the propositional content has a singular object as component (Tye 2009, Schellenberg 
2011a). A major problem for gappy contents is the case of hallucination, because no object 
enters into the content when we hallucinate. In such case, either the gap stays empty, or some 
abstract object enters the gappy proposition (Tye 2013).  
(2) A proposition is not only a series of components (objects and properties), but these 
components must be related in a certain way. A list of objects and properties does not per se 
form a proposition. A certain propositional relation needs to give the proposition a unity 
(King 2009, Soames 2010). If the constituents of a proposition are an object and a property, 
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then it has to be cleared what actually holds this object and property together in order to form 
a proposition. This question is different from the question what explains that an object 
instantiates or has a property. The later question is about the relation of a property to an object 
in a state of affairs. The question about the unity of the proposition is about the way the object 
and property are joined to form a proposition and not about the way they are related in the 
world to form a state of affairs. We have to hold propositions and states of affair separate, 
because states of affairs are generally considered as the entities which make propositions true. 
They are truth-makers for propositions, while propositions are truth-bearers. And obviously 
the truth-bearers cannot be identical with the truth-makers.80  
King (2009) and Soames (2010) reject the thesis that propositions are entities which 
are independent of language and of intentional mental states. If we follow their analysis, the 
existence of a proposition depends on certain linguistic and mental facts. Independently of 
these features of language and the mind, there are no propositions. This view abandons the 
position that propositions are some eternal representations existing in some Fregean “third 
realm”, independently of the psychological states of persons or the social facts about 
language.  
Now, what are these facts which explain how objects and properties are related into a 
proposition? King (2007 and 2009) explains the structure of the proposition by the syntactical 
structure of the sentence expressing the proposition. A sentence is composed of terms and 
predicates which have a certain semantic value; they refer for example to objects and 
properties. These linguistic components are related by a sentential relation. This relation 
expresses for example the relation of ascription between the object and the property in the 
proposition. The sentence “the wall is white” has a term which has as semantic value the 
object wall and a predicate which refers to the property whiteness. These two linguistic 
elements stand also in a sentential relation which encodes ascription. The object designated by 
the term “wall” and the property designated by the predicate “white” are related by the 
relation of ascription: whiteness is ascribed to the wall. The structure of the proposition 
reflects the structure of the sentence and the sentential relation between the terms.  
This view can be extended to propositions which are not expressed by sentences, but 
by other representations, for example mental or perceptual representations. Soames (2010) 
extends King´s analysis of propositional structure from language to other mental 
representations. Entertaining a proposition is identified by Soames with “specific acts of 
predication that occur in perception and both linguistic and non-linguistic thought” (Soames 
                                                 
80 Exceptions are self-referential expressions. 
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2010). On such an extension of the view of King and Soames, the structure of a proposition 
depends on the structure of the vehicles of representation (sentences, mental states). The 
elements in a vehicle of representation, the equivalent of the linguistic terms in a sentence, 
stand in a certain relation and the components of the proposition reflect this relation within the 
vehicle. The different elements of a perceptual representation, conceived as a vehicle, a brain 
state in the perceptual system, are connected by certain relations. Given these relations, the 
objects and properties in the perceptual content are related in a certain way, a property is 
bound, for example, to a specific object. Unfortunately, although we can analyze sentential 
relations, it is still unclear what the relations in a perceptual vehicle of representation are. The 
neurosciences investigate this question with the so-called binding problem. Properties 
detected by the perceptual systems (e. g. color, shape, movement) are bound together to form 
for example the representation of an object (e.g. a colored moving shape). But how the 
different perceptual states which detect specific properties are held together is still an open 
question. But still, it can be supposed that in perception there is some equivalent for the 
predicative relation which holds together the components of the content of propositional 
attitudes.  
We have now analyzed the different aspects of a Russellian view of perceptual 
content. We saw that a Russellian proposition has objects and properties as constituents and 
has a structure relating them. Based on this analysis, there are two ways a Russellian 
proposition determines accuracy conditions of a perceptual state. If a perceptual state has a 
Russellian proposition as content, then it is accurate if it actually refers to the components of 
the proposition (objects and properties). And the perceptual state is accurate if these objects 
actually instantiate the properties ascribed to them by the proposition, given the propositional 
structure. We have now to ask, if Russellian propositions are the best explanation of 
perceptual content. Can they explain the content of the different types of veridical and non-
veridical perception? And especially, can they give a better explanation of perceptual illusions 
than the relationalist view of illusions we discussed in chapter three? And can they give a 
better explanation of perceptual content than the Fregean propositions we discussed above? 
(3) Let us look first at the advantage of Russellian propositions over the Fregean view 
of content. How do Russellian propositions avoid the two problems mentioned in the 
discussion of Fregean proposition, i. e. the problem with abstract entities and the problem 
with intermediary levels of content? In a Fregean view of content, the intermediary level of 
content is conceived as an intermediary of abstract entities. So on that view the two problems 
mostly fall into the one problem about abstract entities. But for the moment, let us keep the 
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difference of two problems as it is possible to conceive these intermediaries as something else 
than abstract entities. So, how do Russellian propositions avoid these problems? 
 First, contrary to Fregean propositions, it does not involve any abstract entities the 
postulation of which may be in conflict with the entities accepted by the cognitive sciences. A 
Russellian proposition indeed only involves as components ordinary objects and their 
properties.  
Secondly, on a Russellian view of propositional content, objects and properties are 
directly represented by our perceptual states without the intermediary of a content separate of 
these objects and properties. The Fregean distinction between senses and their reference is 
abandoned and the mental states are thought to refer directly to objects and properties. 
A third advantage of the Russellian view is that it is easily combined with a causal 
theory of reference. The Fregean view on the contrary is usually seen as a descriptivist theory 
of reference, where the extension of a term is given by some description or feature list 
attached to that term. Or since Kripke (1980), the descriptivist view of reference has been 
submitted to an extensive criticism. In the causal theory of reference, there is no need for 
intermediary abstract entities which fix the reference of terms or mental states. On the 
Fregean view, concepts have the property to determine reference. They are abstract entities 
associated with mental states or linguistic terms. And these abstract entities determine the 
extension of the mental state or term. These abstract entities or concepts give either a 
description or a certain number of features. All entities which satisfy this features or this 
description fall under the extension of the concept. The term “Hesperus” has for example the 
sense “the star which appears the first in the evening sky” and it has as reference the entity 
which satisfies that description. The reference of terms or mental states is given by such 
Fregean senses or descriptions. On the contrary, the Russellian view does not presuppose such 
reference-fixing descriptions and reference-fixing abstract concepts. The Russellian view is 
therefore easily combined with a view where the reference is determined by the relation of a 
term or mental state to external circumstances, for example its causal relations to the 
environment.  
But, as previously indicated, there is an advantage of the Fregean view of content in 
the explanation of the perceptual content of illusions. The Fregean view has a straightforward 
explanation of the case where we perceive some property which is not instantiated in the 
scene before us. In that case, the concept of that property enters into the content, but that 
concept has no reference. An explanation of illusion is essential for a viable theory of 
perceptual content. The Russellian view of perceptual content needs therefore to present an 
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equivalent explanation of failed reference. But it only keeps the previously mentioned 
advantages over the Fregean view, if it explains failed reference without reintroducing some 
abstract entities (abstract objects or senses). In the previous chapter I defended a version of 
the causal theory of reference which is an adequate explanation of perceptual content. This 
theory is able to explain how a perceptual state refers to objects and properties and it is able to 
explain how perceptual states can fail to refer to these entities. It can explain veridical and 
illusory perception. In the case of illusion, a perceptual state which has the function to refer to 
a certain property of an object may actually fail to do so. The property is part the content of 
perception and that content is false because the seen object does not instantiate that property 
(see my explanation in chapter 4, section 5). 
 
3. The Content of Illusions 
 
3.1. Two explanations of misrepresentation 
 
I want now to explain the content of perceptual illusions by applying to them the previously 
developed view of perceptual content as a Russellian propositional content. That view of 
propositional content permits two different types of misrepresentation: first, a 
misrepresentation due to the falsity of the propositional relation between the components of 
the content and secondly a misrepresentation due to a failure to refer to one (or several) of the 
components of the propositional content. Let us examine these two types of perceptual 
misrepresentations separately. 
 In the first type of misrepresentation, it is the structure of the proposition which is 
false although all the components which enter into the proposition may be represented 
accurately by our perceptual state. The proposition is false, because the structure of the 
proposition relates the components in a certain way, but the components are actually not 
related in that way in the external state of affairs. Their relation is misrepresented. If my 
perceptual experience represents for example a white wall in a yellow light as a yellow wall, 
then we have a propositional content which has as constituents an object, a wall, and a 
property, yellowness. It is true that we see a wall and it is also true that we see something 
yellow, a yellow light. So it is not the components which are misrepresented but only their 
relation. A proposition has a propositional relation which indicates the structure between its 
components. As the wall seems to us to be yellow, the propositional content of the perceptual 
experience ascribes the property yellowness to the wall. And that ascription is false. The 
proposition ascribes a property to the object, although the object does not instantiate that 
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property. The wall is not yellow. The proposition represents falsely the states of affairs in 
front of us. But here, no component of the perceptual vehicle, no component of the perceptual 
state misrepresents any component which enters into the content. This is often the case in 
illusions where we see accurately an object and see accurately a certain property, but 
misattribute the property to the object we see. 
 Misrepresentation can also be due to failed reference, to the fact that we misrepresent 
a component of the propositional content. Here, the perceptual state fails to refer to a certain 
object or property. For example, something seems to be yellow, but there is nothing yellow in 
our environment. We can have a yellow after-image, a yellow patch of color instantiated by 
nothing, or we can see an actual object which falsely seems to be yellow. The property 
“yellowness” is not instantiated. In this case the perceptual state falsely represents something 
to be yellow, because it fails to refer to the property yellowness. This case of illusion is 
different from the first case and it is more difficult to explain, because it generates the 
problems mentioned above about the nature of the represented component, the nature of the 
intentional object. Is the property instantiated by an abstract object? Do we represent an 
uninstantiated property? Or do we have a concept of yellowness which fails to refer to an 
instance of yellowness? Do therefore these abstract objects, these uninstantiated properties or 
these concepts enter the content? It is important to distinguish this types of illusion from the 
previous one, because only here this problem of represented but not instantiated properties 
appears, while in the first type of illusion the propositional structure is sufficient to explain 
misrepresentation. As I argued in the previous chapter, the best explanation is that the 
vehicles of perceptual representation have content due to a function they acquire. But 
although they have that function, they may fail to fulfill that function. In illusions, failed 
reference to a property can be explained by such failure of a representational vehicle to fulfill 
its function. 
 Naturally, the two types of misrepresentation can be combined. I can see a property 
which is not instantiated by any actual object and I can ascribe that property to the object I am 
actually seeing. If nothing is yellow, but I see a white wall as yellow, than my perceptual 
experience represents falsely yellowness and falsely ascribes that property to the wall, which 
does not instantiate it. 
 What about cases where we see a round glass as oval from a particular perspective? 
The glass is round although we see it oval. Is that a case where we misrepresent a property 
(“ovalness“) and falsely ascribe it to an object which does not instantiate it? That would be 
the conclusion, if we only accept the intrinsic properties of an object i.e. those properties an 
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object has independently of its relation to other objects. In that case, seeing something round 
as oval would be a misrepresentation of the second type because the round object does not 
have “ovalness” as its intrinsic property. But such a view which restricts perceptual content to 
the intrinsic properties of the objects would have radical consequences. We see for example 
that the form of objects changes when we walk around them although the object is not 
submitted to any change. The object itself does not transform. The change in form in our 
experience would be a perceptual illusion, if only the intrinsic properties of an object are 
allowed to enter perceptual content. As we constantly see changing shapes and colors due to 
our changing relation to objects, such a view would make most of our perceptual experience 
an illusion.  
 Hume (1739/1969) defends such a highly skeptical view about perceptual 
experience.81 But such a view declares most perception as a form of illusion and would be 
quite an unsatisfactory position. It is therefore preferable to include, besides the intrinsic 
properties, the relational properties of objects as possible components of perceptual content. If 
relational properties are included into content, then the round object which looks oval has 
actually “ovalness” as its relational property. We represent accurately that property and 
correctly attribute it to the object which instantiates it. 
 Relational properties are essential to differentiate veridical perception from illusions 
i.e. cases where we represent some property the object does not instantiate. It is therefore 
important to be clear about the properties an object actually instantiates. I will show in the 
next section that there are two types of relational properties: Mind-independent relational 
properties which involve only relations of the object to features of the environment and mind-
dependent relational properties which depend on the relation of an object to a specific mind 
or mental process.82 A perceptual state is veridical, if it represents accurately the intrinsic 
properties or the mind-independent relational properties of that object. Mind-dependent 
relational properties depend on the specific and often idiosyncratic working of the mind and 
are not in that sense objective properties of our environment. They are properties objects 
instantiate given their relation to a specific type of mind. But they depend on the specific 
properties of the given mind and in that sense they are not objective properties of the entities 
we see. A special type of illusions is generated, if these mind-dependent properties are taken 
to be intrinsic properties of an object or mind-independent relational properties of that object. 
In this case of illusions, the intrinsic properties and the mind-independent properties are 
                                                 
81 See in Hume (1739/1969), especially the chapter „Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses“. 
82 Schellenberg (2008) uses a similar distinction between “mind-independent”, “situation-dependent” properties 
and “mind-dependent” properties. 
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misrepresented and we have misrepresentations of the second type defined above. To make 
this point more explicit, it is necessary to look closer at relational properties and especially at 
the distinction between mind-independent and mind-dependent relational properties.  
 
3.2. Relational properties 
 
Relational properties are ubiquitous and we are incapable to perceptually represent most of 
the relational properties an object has. In perception, only those relational properties play a 
role which influence the way objects appear. Different intrinsic properties (shape, texture, 
reflectance properties) affect the way an object appears to us. And so do certain relational 
properties, for example the distance, illumination or orientation of an object. The way in 
which distance, illumination or orientation changes, affects the way the object looks. In the 
case of relational properties, we have to distinguish two types: those relational properties 
which depend on the intrinsic properties of the object and specific features of the 
environment, and those properties which depend on the intrinsic properties of the object, 
environmental feature and specific properties of minds and mental processes. I call the first 
type mind-independent relational properties and the second type mind-dependent relational 
properties. Let us look first at the mind-independent relational properties. 
 Noë (2004) distinguished a certain type of properties presented in perception which he 
called perspectival properties (or P-properties). These are properties of an object which 
change with the distance of the object relative to a point of view, with the orientation of the 
object relative to a point of view or with the illumination of the object. When the object is 
farther away, it looks smaller (a sound appears fainter with a greater distance of its source). A 
plate looks once round in a certain orientation and once flat in another orientation. An object 
looks bright in a certain light and dark in another. The type of medium (air, water) into which 
an object is placed affects also the way that object looks. An object looks different in a foggy 
air than at a clear day. It looks different in water than in the air because light is reflected 
differently on the surface of the water. Neither the distance nor the orientation of an object, 
nor its relation to some source of light or to some other medium is an intrinsic property of that 
object.  
 I spoke about different “looks” and “appearances” of objects relative to points of view, 
illuminations or specific media. One may argue that looks and appearances are mind-
dependent aspects. But Noë argues that the mentioned relational properties are objective 
properties of external entities and situations and are independent of the mind. Schellenberg 
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(2008) defends a similar position concerning properties she calls situation-dependent 
properties. Perspectival properties and situation dependent properties depend only on the 
intrinsic properties of the object and on the properties of the situation they are placed in, 
independently of the fact whether a mind perceives them or which type of mind perceives 
them. This is easy to see in the case of illumination. An object has certain reflectance 
properties which do not change with the environment it is placed in. But through different 
illuminations different light waves are reflected from the object. The light which reaches our 
eyes is different from one illumination to another. This changing “objective appearance” can 
be explained exclusively by the reflectance properties of the object, an intrinsic property, and 
the type of light the object is placed in, a relational property of the object. It can be explained 
alone by the properties of the object and of the light in front of our eyes.  The change of 
appearance has nothing to do with any properties of the perceiving mind.  
 A similar explanation can be given for perspectives. With the changing distance of an 
object to a certain location, the size of the object projected by the light to that location also 
changes. This changing size can be explained by the laws of projection from the object to the 
defined location. Whether the projected size appears as shadow on a wall, on the lense of a 
camera or on our retina, the projected size is submitted to the same laws of projection. And 
these laws have nothing to do with the properties of our mind. The way projected size varies 
in different conditions has nothing to do with specific properties of our mind. 
 Distortions in some media, as for example the fact that a stick looks bent in water, can 
also be explained by the properties of the stick and the properties of the medium alone. The 
stick looks bent to us, but it is also represented as bent on photo made by cameras. The fact 
that it looks bent depends on the projected shape in front of us, a property which can be 
detected by minds or cameras. 
 Perspectival properties and situation-dependent properties are relational properties 
which depend only on the intrinsic properties of the object and certain features of the 
situation. Usually, properties are defined in possible world semantics by a function from 
possible worlds to extension. The function gives for any possible world a specific extension, 
where all objects which instantiate the property are part of the extension. To define relational 
properties, one can say that the object instantiates the property having-the-projected-size-S-
relative-to-location-X. In all possible worlds the objects which instantiate that property are 
picked out. Such a definition of relational properties can also be translated into a semantics of 
centered worlds (Brogaard 2011b). Here an object has the relational size property (having-the- 
projected-size-S) relative to a possible world with a time and a location marked as centers. 
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The important point for mind-independent relational properties is the fact that they can be 
defined without mentioning any properties of individuals having a mind. It is enough to just 
mention a location in order to attribute the relational property to the object. Whether that 
location is occupied by a mind, a camera or something else does not play a role in the 
attribution of the relational property.  
 That is different for mind-dependent relational properties. These properties depend 
not only on the intrinsic properties of the object and features of the situation, but also on 
specific properties of the mind. They can only be defined by a relation to the mind in general 
or a specific individual having certain psychological capacities. The attributed property must 
mention a mind instead of mentioning only a situational feature like a location, for example 
the property of causing-the-size-appearance-S-relative-to-mind-X.  
 If I look at a perfectly round plate from above and it looks oval or blurry to me, that is 
not explained by the perspectival property of the object. If I look at the plate from above, the 
light projects the round shape of the object in front of me as round, not as oval; and if there is 
no foggy air in front of me, the blurriness cannot be explained by situational features. If I see 
it oval or blurry, that must be explained by some distortions in my visual apparatus or some 
specific (malfunctioning) neural mechanisms. Now, we can say that the plate has the 
relational property to look oval and blurry to me, but it has that property only in relation to my 
specific (malfunctioning) perceptual system. The relational property depends on my mind. 
Contrary to perspectival properties, it is mind-dependent.  These mind-dependent properties 
are subjective in the sense that they involve the specificities of a perceiving subject and 
cannot be defined by the objective features of situations.  
 How is the distinction between mind-dependent and mind-independent properties 
related to the traditional Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities? For 
Locke, qualities in general are powers of objects to cause certain ideas in our mind. Locke 
distinguishes between two types of ideas (Locke 1700/1975: Book II, chap. 8, § 8-16. For an 
interpretation of Locke´s distinction, see Eagle 2010). First, some ideas resemble some 
properties the object actually has. These properties are primary qualities (for example shape 
or “figure“, solidity, number, extension) and they are intrinsic properties of objects. So, 
primary qualities can be identified with some of the intrinsic properties of objects as we 
discussed them in this chapter. Secondly, there are ideas which are caused by the objects but 
which do not resemble anything in the object. They do not represent anything of the object 
(given that representation is conceived by Locke as a relation of resemblance). The powers 
objects have to cause such ideas are their secondary qualities. The attribution of these 
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qualities depends alone on their effect in our mind, they depend on the experience we have. 
So, secondary qualities can be classified as mind-dependent relational properties in our sense. 
But how does the distinction between intrinsic, mind-independent and mind-dependent 
properties differ from Locke´s distinction between primary and secondary qualities? 
 Perspectival properties, situation-dependent properties and mind-independent 
relational properties introduce a category of properties which does not appear in Locke´s 
famous distinction. Locke thought that all ideas which vary with our relation to the object do 
not resemble anything in the object. They do not represent. Warmth increases and decreases 
with the relation to the object, therefore warmth cannot be a quality of the object. If warmth 
cannot be an intrinsic property (a primary quality), it must be a secondary quality. But the 
introduction of mind-independent relational properties opens other possibilities. Properties 
can be relational without being mind-dependent. 
 Secondary qualities are only one type of mind-dependent relational properties. For 
Locke, colors, sounds, tastes, coldness and warmth are examples of secondary qualities. But 
in our conception, also shapes can be mind-dependent relational properties. Shape can be an 
intrinsic property, as Locke conceives it, but also a mind-independent or mind-dependent 
relational property. The same shape (a bowed line) can be an intrinsic property of an object (a 
bowed stick), a mind-independent relational property (a stick deformed in a medium) or a 
mind-dependent relational property (the line in the Hering illusion). Contrary to Locke´s 
qualities, basic properties (like shape, size, color) represented by experience cannot be 
univocally classified into one of the Lockean property types. 
 A certain number of perceptual illusions can only be explained by mind-dependent 
relational properties. Let us take the Müller-Lyer illusion again. There are two lines of equal 
length in the Müller-Lyer figure. The projected length of the two lines on a plane in front of 
our eyes is the same length in both cases. The fact that one line has arrows at its ends, while 
the other line has inverted arrows at its end, does not influence the laws of projection of the 
line and therefore does not influence the projected size on a plane in front of us. The two lines 
are at the same distance from us and they have the same projection properties. Both lines have 
the same perspectival properties, the same mind-independent relational property concerning 
their size. Still, we see them as having different lengths. This difference can neither be 
explained by the length of the lines on the paper, nor by their perspectival properties. The 
difference must be explained by a mind-dependent relational property of the figure, a property 
which mentions the specific working of our mind or perceptual apparatus. The lines have the 
property to look different to us. Our mind happens to process equal lines differently, 
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depending on the configuration of the attached arrows. To attribute that mind-dependent 
property to the lines, we must mention, besides the intrinsic and situational features, our mind.  
 The most plausible explanation of the Müller-Lyer figure is that the length of the line 
and the different properties of the context (arrows versus inverted arrows) interact in our mind 
in such a way that the lines are seen as different. But the context (the arrows) do not cause any 
difference in the objective perspectival properties of the lines, they only cause such a 
difference in our mind. The different length of the lines is therefore a mind-dependent 
relational property. The Müller-Lyer figure differs from two equal lines at different distances. 
In such a figure the distance would explain a perspectival difference of the lines relative to 
location X; the perception of different length would be explained by mind-independent 
relational properties of the objects. In the Müller-Lyer figure the context only explains mind-
dependent differences in the appearance of length.  
 An important difference between mind-independent relational properties and mind-
dependent ones is that a perceptual experience of the Müller-Lyer figure cannot be explained 
by objective properties of the situation (object or situational features of the context). Because 
the second type of relational properties involves the reference to some mind, such properties 
cannot be considered as objective features of the situation alone. Given that relationalists want 
to explain all perceptual experience by some objective features of the perceived situation, 
such mind-dependent properties pose a serious problem for relationalism. If the phenomenal 
difference in perceptual illusions like the Müller-Lyer illusion involves such mind-dependent 
properties, as we claim, these illusions pose a serious problem to the relationalist program of 
an explanation of all phenomenal differences by objective differences of the perceived 
situation.  
   
3.3. Types of illusions 
 
With the distinction between intrinsic properties, mind-dependent and mind-independent 
relational properties we get a more detailed analysis of the two types of misrepresentation we 
defined at the beginning of this section (in 3.1). I distinguished above two forms of 
misrepresentation, misrepresentation by erroneous ascription of accurately perceived 
properties and misrepresentation of the components of content. The first form is a 
misrepresentation due to an erroneous ascription of a property to an object which does not 
instantiate that property. In this case, it was not necessary to suppose that the perceived 
property was a case of illusion. We can accurately see such a property but just ascribe it to an 
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object which actually does not have that property. This picture is now complicated by the fact 
that an object can instantiate a relational property, but we can erroneously ascribe that 
property to the object as an intrinsic property. We see for example a round object from a 
certain perspective where it looks oval and take it to be an oval object. We see an object in 
certain lightening conditions and attribute the properties the object has under these specific 
conditions as an intrinsic property to the object. We see a green car in a shadow and see it 
erroneously as a grey car. In these cases, we ascribe an intrinsic property to the perceived 
object which that object has only as a relational property. We take a shape under one 
perspective to be the object´s intrinsic shape. Or we take for example an illumination which 
gradually changes over the surface of an object to be a change in the intrinsic reflectance 
properties of the object. Changing situational features of the object are seen erroneously as 
constant properties of that object 
 The second form of misrepresentation distinguished above was the failure to refer to 
specific properties of the object. The object has a property X and we misrepresent that 
property. Given the distinction between intrinsic and relational properties, it can be the case 
that only the intrinsic property of the perceived object is misrepresented, while we see 
correctly the mind-independent relational properties. Or both properties, intrinsic and 
relational, can be misrepresented.    
 Two fundamental types of illusions follow from this distinction. On the one hand a 
type of illusions where I see correctly the relational properties of the object, but where these 
relational properties are taken to be intrinsic properties of the object; on the other hand, 
illusions where the mind-independent relational properties themselves are misrepresented. 
And a misrepresentation of these relational properties leads to a misrepresentation of the 
intrinsic properties Both types are illusions, because the intrinsic properties of the object are 
not represented veridically. 
 In the first kind of illusions, we see the mind-independent relational properties of the 
object correctly. We see how the object appears under a specific perspective, under a specific 
illumination or under the specific conditions of a specific medium, for example in water or in 
a mirror. If we see for example a straight stick in the water as a bent stick, we see correctly 
how the shape of the stick is changed given the laws of refraction of light in that specific 
medium. Our perceptual experience would be wrong, if we did not see these specific 
refractions due to water. Other mechanical detectors of light equally register this specific 
distortion of the shape of the stick, as we can see in photographs of the stick in water. So, we 
do not misrepresent these relational properties of the stick given the specific medium it is 
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placed in. Austin (1962) argued for similar reasons that this often used example of a 
perceptual illusion actually is no illusion. It certainly is no illusion about the relational shape 
property of the stick. But the question whether we have here a case of illusion depends less on 
the way we see the refraction of the stick´s shape by light in water, but on the question how 
we see the intrinsic shape property of the stick. If the relational property of the stick is taken 
as its intrinsic shape, then we have a case of perceptual illusion, otherwise not. 
 A clearer case where the relational properties of an object are perceived as its intrinsic 
properties is the illusion of the Ames room. The psychologist Adalbert Ames constructed a 
strongly distorted room which looked from one point of view like a normal rectangular room 
(Ittelson 1952). Observers of the room could only look at it through a hole from one specific 
point of view. The room was distorted in such a way that the back wall was much closer to the 
observer on the right side than on the left side. But from the observation point it could not be 
seen that the back wall was receding away from the observer into the back. Two persons of 
approximately the same size were placed in the room, one on the farther left side of the back 
wall and one on the closer right side of that wall. The visual effect is that the person at the left 
looks much smaller than the person at the right. We perceive a small person and a much 
bigger person. Given that persons farther away look normally much smaller than persons 
which are nearer, we accurately see the perspectival size of the two persons, the size they look 
given the difference of distance. The relational size properties of the persons are perceived 
accurately. But because of the special construction of the Ames room, we do not see the 
difference of distance between the left side and the right side of the room. We therefore do not 
see the different distance of the two persons from us. The effect is that the perspectival, 
relational size is perceived as the actual, intrinsic size of the persons placed in the room.  
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Schematic representation of the           The Ames room illusion. 
Ames room. 
 
 The Ames room is a clear case where the relational properties of objects (or persons) 
are ascribed as intrinsic properties to these objects. We actually see some objective, situation-
dependent and mind-independent properties of the scene before us. We do not misrepresent 
the relational properties (the relational size of the two persons) we look at. But the illusion 
derives from the fact that we take a difference in the relational properties of the persons 
observed for a difference in their intrinsic size, a difference in the constant properties of the 
seen persons. What is the difference to the example of the stick in the water? In the case of the 
Ames room, we do not represent correctly the situational feature which explains the 
difference in size: we do not see the difference in distance which explains why one person 
looks bigger than the other. If we did not see the situational feature which explains the 
distortion of the straight stick, i.e. the water, we would automatically misperceive the straight 
stick as intrinsically bent. If we would not perceive the difference of illumination falling on 
the wall, but only see the difference of shading on the wall, we would not be able to see that 
the wall is uniformly painted in the same color. We could not differentiate perceptual 
constancies from variable properties due to the situation. So, in these illusions, what we see 
can be explained by the objective, relational, but mind-independent features of the object and 
the situation.  
 The second type of illusions is different. In the second type, the illusion is due to an 
unveridical representation of the intrinsic and of the mind-independent perspectival and 
situational features, the mind-independent relational properties. In cases like the Müller-Lyer 
illusion, the difference in the size of the line is neither a difference of the intrinsic size of the 
line, nor of the perspectival size, the size of the line as it is projected in front of us, given the 
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laws of projection. The lines have the same intrinsic and also the same perspectival size. Here 
the objective size properties of the objects are misrepresented.  
 Major perceptual illusions described in perceptual psychology follow the same 
scheme: Other size illusions like the Ebbinghaus illusion, the Ponzo illusion or the corridor 
illusion, shape illusions like the Hering illusion, the Wundt illusion or the Orbison illusion,83 
motion illusions like Kitaoka´s “rotating snakes”84 or color contrast illusions like the 
checkerboard illusion of Adelson all cannot be explained by the intrinsic or the mind-
independent relational properties alone. We must add a description of the special processing 
mechanisms of our perceptual system to explain why a line is once seen as long and once as 
short (Müller-Lyer illusion, Ponzo illusion), once as concave and once as convexe (Hering 
and Wundt illusion), and why a square of the same shade is once seen as dark grey and once 
as light grey. The size, shape or color cannot be represented accurately in both cases of these 
parallel perceptual experiences. Our perceptual experience misrepresents at least on of the 
perceived properties of the perceived objects (lines, shapes, color patches). In the case of the 
Ames room and the stick in the water, we have clear situational features which explain the 
difference. The different perspectival size of the persons in the Ames room is explained by the 
different distances from the observation point. The different perspectival shape of a straight 
stick in the air and the straight stick in the water is explained by the medium and the different 
laws of refraction of light in these media. In the mentioned illusions of the second type, there 
are also differences between the context of the lines, shapes or color patches. But these 
differences do not influence the mind-independent relational properties like the perspectival 
size or shape. They only influence the mind-dependent processing of the perceptual or 
cognitive system.  
 The second type of illusions can further be differentiated in those where the perceptual 
system misrepresents the intrinsic or relational properties by changing or distorting them and 
into those where features are added beyond the objective properties of the object. Lines have 
a specific size, but perceptual processing changes that size (in the Müller-Lyer case), changes 
the shape (in the Hering and Wundt illusion) or the shade of the color (in Adelson’s 
checkerboard illusion).  
 In other illusions, perceptual processing adds features to the intrinsic and mind-
independent relational properties. The Hermann grid is a white grid laid over black squares.85 
At the white intersections of the grid appear grey spots in our visual experience although the 
                                                 
83 See the illustrations on p. 193. 
84 See for that illusion http://www.psy.ritsumei.ac.jp/~akitaoka/rotsnakee.html 
85 For the Hermann grid, see illustration on p. 193. 
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intersections are of the same white than the rest of the grid. The grey spots are added by visual 
processing (actually by the inhibitory action of some retinal cells on other retinal cells. The 
inhibition makes the intersections look grey instead of white). In the Kanizsa triangle, we see 
three black circles.86 In each circle white angles are cut out. These three angles are completed 
by visual processing into a complete white triangle which appears in our perceptual 
experience to be on the white paper, although only angles are indicated. Modal completion is 
another phenomenon where features are added to the objective properties of the drawing. The 
addition of features to the properties of objects seems to differ only gradually from 
phenomena such as after images, phenomena philosophers usually classify as hallucinations.87 
Both the perception of grey spots in the Hermann grid and the perception of after-images are 
explained by quite similar physiological processes, i.e. by the reduced sensitivity of certain 
retinal cells (either because of lateral inhibition in the case of the grey spots, or by lowered 
sensitivity due to the exposure to intense light and complementary higher sensitivity to the 
complementary colors in the case of the after images).  
 Both the changes of the intrinsic and relational properties and the additions to these 
properties pose a problem for a relationalist explanation of perceptual illusions. Relationalism 
wants to explain all perceptual phenomenology by some objective features of the perceived 
entities or of the perceived situation. Such an explanation of perceptual experience needs to 
recur to the mind-independent properties of the objects and situation. But the second type of 
perceptual illusions involves beyond these objective properties also specific properties of the 
perceptual processing of a given mind, mind-dependent relational properties.  
 Finally it is important to distinguish perceptual illusions from other forms of illusions 
which are not due to perceptual misrepresentation. Austin (1962: 50) gave the example of a 
lemon-like object made of soap. Here the illusion is not perceptual. Our perceptual experience 
represents an object and its properties: yellow, a specific shape and texture. And the object 
before us actually has these properties; it has this color, shape and texture. If only these basic 
properties are represented by the perceptual experience, then that perceptual representation is 
accurate. If we say that the kind property that this is a lemon is not represented by the 
experience, then the experience does not represent something which is not the case. Still we 
are deluded about something. We believe that there is a lemon and there is none. In this case 
the illlusion is not perceptual, but cognitive. We get a false belief about the object due to its 
                                                 
86 For the Kanizsa triangle, see the illustration on p. 193. 
87 Philosophers usually call hallucination perceptual experiences where we perceive some properties although we 
do not see any corresponding objects. Psychologists call hallucinations pathological phenomena (hearing voices 
or seeing shapes or objects due to pathological psychological or neurophysiological conditions). After-images 
are clearly not pathological, but a common and unavoidable phenomenon of daily visual perception.  
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resemblance to a real lemon. The error lies in a false categorization, not in a false perceptual 
misrepresentation. Such cognitive illusions have to be distinguished from the perceptual 
illusions discussed above.  
 Similarly, we can have a perceptual illusion without a cognitive illusion. Knowing the 
effects of the Müller-Lyer, I stop to believe that the lines are unequally long. But the 
perceptual illusion persists. We perceptually represent the lines as unequal, but doxastically 
represent them as equal in length. We stop to be deceived by the illusion, at the level of our 
beliefs, although we continue to have a perceptual misrepresentation. Linear perspective in 
paintings since the Renaissance is a form of spatial illusion. Two-dimensional lines and 
surfaces appear to be three-dimensional. Although we persist to have the visual impression of 
three-dimensionality, nobody believes anymore that a space or room extends into the wall 
inside of the picture’s frame. We have a perceptual illusion without a cognitive illusion. Our 
personal experience of perceptual illusions and our knowledge about it has the effect that we 
stop to believe into the perceptual illusion we continue to have. 
 
4. Answering the Relationalist Challenge 
 
In chapter 3,88 I presented four arguments relationalists give for the rejection of a 
representational view of perceptual experience and the content view. I want to show in this 
final section how a representational view as developed above can counter these arguments.  
 (1) The argument from science uses the fact that the cognitive sciences increasingly 
question the explanation of perception by positing the construction of internal models and 
representations. And the cognitive sciences certainly use no philosophical theory of content 
similar to the theory of Russellian propositional content. But especially in the case of 
perceptual illusions, perceptual psychology postulates complex internal processing which can 
explain how often identical perceptual stimuli give rise to different perceptual experiences. 
The properties of the stimulus alone, be that the distal stimulus (the object) or the proximal 
stimulus in the retina cannot explain the way we experience our environment. Perceptual 
processing adds complex assumptions to the information received by external stimulation. On 
such a view of perception, as it is largely accepted by cognitive scientists, an explanation of 
perceptual experience by the objective features of the situation alone seems quite implausible. 
Especially for illusions, the “orthodox” representational view (Noë 2002) in the cognitive 
sciences is still the most probable. Psychologists like the Gibsonians, who contest that 
                                                 
88 See section 1.2. of that chapter, p. 74-79. 
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“orthodox” view, insist that in our daily perceptual experience, we do not encounter the 
perceptual illusions psychologists discovered in their labs in the last 150 years. But even if 
illusions like the Müller-Lyer figure are not widespread in daily experience, the sense that our 
perceptual experience can go wrong and can deceive us is quite widespread. When we accept 
that our senses can deceive us, that poses no particular problem for intentionalism. But 
relationalism has to find a way to explain away the apparent fallible character of the senses.  
 For the first type of illusions we distinguished above, a relationalist can still appeal to 
the fact that our experience presents objective relational properties. It can be contested that by 
presenting these properties we also misrepresent intrinsic properties. A relationalist can say 
that we just see these relational properties and nothing else and these properties do not involve 
any error. But in the illusions of the second type, this appeal to objective properties seems 
much more difficult to defend. And in the explanation of these illusions the cognitive sciences 
clearly postulate internal representations which do not match with the properties of the 
stimuli. 
(2) The argument from particularity claimed that only the acquaintance with singular 
objects can give meaning to our singular thoughts about particulars. But on the Russellian 
view of content, singular objects are represented in perception and enter into its content. Here 
again, this version of intentionalism has no disadvantage on this point when it is compared to 
relationalism. Our version of intentionalism has the advantage that it can accommodate 
particular content. But it has the further advantage that perceptual states can also be relations 
to general properties, an advantage relationalism does not have.  
 (3) The argument from indeterminacy is certainly the most challenging point against 
any theory of representational content. It says that we cannot determine in a precise way the 
content of perceptual experience. The perceptual experience can always be expressed by a 
multitude of propositions which attribute diverging contents to experience. Given that 
indeterminacy in the attribution of content, it is contestable that experience actually has 
content. Russellian propositions certainly attribute a precise content constituted by particular 
objects and properties. But the argument claims that there are no criteria to attribute one 
content rather than another to a given perceptual experience. Following the indeterminacy 
argument we could as well attribute some other Russellian propositional content to the same 
experience. To counter that argument, it is not sufficient to give a plausible theory of the 
structure and components of perceptual content, it is also necessary to give sufficient criteria  
which determine how this content and these components are attributed to a given perceptual 
experience. I proposed in the previous chapter a theory which gives sufficient criteria to 
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attribute Russellian content. 
 (4) Finally, the phenomenological argument for relationalism says that in our 
perceptual experience we are only aware of the external physical objects and their properties. 
It contests that we are aware of any representations or contents. But if the objects and their 
properties are components of the content as I defended in a Russellian view of perceptual 
content, then there is no phenomenal difference between the direct acquaintance with objects 
and properties as defended by relationalists and the relation to a content constituted by these 
same objects and properties. So, the phenomenological argument gives no advantage to 
relationalism compared to intentionalism when the perceptual content is defined as Russellian 
propositional content.  
 In the case of illusions which misrepresent the properties of the object by changing 
them or adding features to the actually instantiated properties (our illusions of the second 
type), the phenomenological argument gives an advantage to intentionalism. It can explain 
these changed and added features by represented properties which enter the content without 
being instantiated in the perceived situation. So, the Russellian version of intentionalism does 
not fare worse in explaining veridical perception, but has an advantage in the explanation of 
the phenomenology of illusion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In defense of an intentional view of perceptual experience it is particularly important to give a 
plausible explanation of perceptual misrepresentation. Especially when confronted with 
relationalism, intentionalism has a theoretical framework more adapted to explain the 
phenomenology of illusion. In order to argue for that point I developed a theory of perceptual 
content and identified that content with a Russellian propositonal content. I argued that this 
content can capture the different aspects of perception and that it has furthermore the 
advantage to avoid the inconveniences relationalists attributed to intentionalism: a content as 
an intermediary between mental states and the external objects and their properties, and a 
representational relation which involves abstract entities. Russellian content permits a direct 
realism where the objects and properties are directly represented. I claimed that on such a 
view of content relationalism looses its major theoretical advantages over the content view of 
intentionalism. The application of the previously developed Russellian view to illusions 
emphasized the advantages of the content view over relationalism. I claimed that there is a 
central type of perceptual illusions which cannot be explained by relationalism, but which is 
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explainable by the properties represented by perceptual states having Russellian content.    
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Abstract (English) 
 
 
The central problem of the dissertation is the question whether our perceptual states have 
content. While debates about the nature of perceptual content have been common in the 
philosophy of perception, a recent discussion questioned whether perception has intentional 
content at all. Relationalism defends the view that perception is not a form of representation, 
that it cannot be accurate or inaccurate, that it does not have a content which would give to 
perception the ability to represent or misrepresent the world. Relationalism is a serious 
challenge for intentionalism, the view that perceptual states have intentional content and can 
be accurate or inaccurate. The present dissertation analyses the different aspects of this 
conflict between relationalism and intentionalism.  
The central claim of the book is that the relationalist explanation of perception is 
insufficient and that a theory of intentional content for perception is needed in order to explain 
the different aspects of perceptual experience, especially perceptual illusions. Relationalism 
must reduce cases where we fail to see to cases of blindness, i.e. cases where we do not stand 
in an appropriate relation to a certain object or property, cases where we are blind to that 
object or property. It will be claimed that certain cases of illusions can be explained as such 
cases of a failure to see due to blindness. But other types of illusions cannot be treated in the 
same way. It will be claimed that we need the notion of inaccurate (or false) content to 
explain at least a certain type of common perceptual illusions. It will also be claimed that only 
intentionalism can give a coherent explanation of such illusions. 
The critical part of the book against relationalism will be complemented by a positive 
defense of intentionalism and perceptual content. This second part of the book offers first a 
teleo-semantic account of the intentional content of perception. The view is defended here 
that the content of perceptual states depends on their causal relations and on the functions 
these states have for systems which use them. Finally, the nature of perceptual content is 
specified as a Russellian propositional content. The dissertation finishes with the claim that 
such a view of content counters the relationalist objections against intentional content. 
Perceptions can have content and can involve a direct relation to external objects and their 
properties. 
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Abstract (German) 
 
 
Das zentrale Problem der Dissertation ist die Frage, ob Wahrnehmungszustände einen Inhalt 
besitzen. Diskussionen über die Natur des Inhalts von Wahrnehmungen sind seit langem 
allgegenwärtig in der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung, aber jüngst entstand eine Debatte 
darüber, ob Wahrnehmungen überhaupt einen intentionalen Inhalt haben. Der Relationalismus 
verteidigt die Sicht, dass Wahrnehmungen keine Repräsentationen sind. Sie können nicht 
zutreffend oder unzutreffend sein. Sie haben keinen Inhalt, einen Inhalt der ihnen die 
Eigenschaft verleihen würde, die Welt richtig oder falsch zu repräsentieren. Dieser 
Relationalismus stellt den Intentionalismus grundsätzlich in Frage, also die Ansicht dass 
Wahrnehmungszustände einen intentionalen Inhalt haben, dass sie zutreffend oder 
unzutreffend sein können. Die Dissertation analysiert die verschiedenen Aspekte dieses 
Konflikts zwischen Relationalismus und Intentionalismus.  
 Es ist die zentrale Behauptung der Dissertation, dass die relationalistische Erklärung 
der Wahrnehmung unzureichend ist. Eine Theorie des intentionalen Inhalts der Wahrnehmung 
ist notwendig, um die vielfältigen Aspekte der perzeptuellen Erfahrung erklären zu können, 
insbesondere Sinnestäuschungen. Der Relationalismus ist gezwungen, jene Fälle, in der die 
Wahrnehmung scheitert, auf Fälle von „Blindheit“ zurückzuführen, dass heißt auf Fälle in 
denen wir nicht in einer bestimmten Relation zu bestimmten Gegenständen und deren 
Eigenschaften stehen, auf Fälle also, wo wir gegenüber diesen Gegenständen und 
Eigenschaften blind sind. Einige Fälle von Wahrnehmungstäuschungen können tatsächlich 
auf diese Art des Scheiterns der Wahrnehmung reduziert werden, also auf Fälle wo wir 
gegenüber Gegenständen und deren Eigenschaften blind sind. Unser zentraler Kritikpunkt am 
Relationalismus ist, dass eine bestimmte Kategorie von Sinnestäuschungen so nicht erklärt 
werden kann. Zur Erklärung solcher geläufigen Sinnestäuschungen braucht man einen Begriff 
von unzutreffendem oder falschem Inhalt, einen Begriff von Fehlrepräsentation. Nur der 
Intentionalismus kann eine zufriedenstellende Erklärung solcher Sinnestäuschungen geben. 
 Dem ersten, kritischen und gegen den Relationalismus gerichteten Teil der 
Dissertation wird eine positive Verteidigung des Intentionalismus und des 
Wahrnehmungsinhalts gegenüber gestellt. Dieser zweite Teil des Buches entwickelt zuerst 
eine teleosemantische Theorie des intentionalen Inhalts der Wahrnehmung. Es wird darin die 
Sicht verteidigt, dass der Inhalt von Wahrnehmungszuständen von deren kausalen Relationen 
abhangt, aber auch von den Funktionen von Systemen, die diese Zustände verwenden. 
Abschließend wird der Inhalt der Wahrnehmung als ein Russell´scher propositionaler Inhalt 
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dargestellt. Die Dissertation argumentiert, dass so eine Auffassung von propositionalem Inhalt 
die relationalistischen Argumente gegen den intentionalen Inhalt der Wahrnehmung 
entkräftet. Wahrnehmung kann einen Inhalt haben und kann in einer direkten Relation zu 
externen Gegenständen und deren Eigenschaften stehen.  
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